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SUMMARY
This thesis uncovers the behavior of market participants in reponse to regula-
tory changes in the financial intermediation sector. The first essay, “Repo Regret?”,
I find that Independent Mortgage Companies (IMCs), which accounted for a third
of all mortgage originations in the U.S., experienced an exogenous increase in their
funding after the passage of the 2005 bankruptcy reform act. The act increased cred-
itor protection by including mortgage related collateral to bankruptcy safe harbored
repos, thereby expanding IMCs funding opportunities. Using multiple identification
strategies based on funding constraints, discontinuity in securitization propensity, and
geographic discontinuity in anti-predatory lending laws, I find that IMCs responded
to this funding shock by increasing the issuance of risky home loans which culminated
in higher ex-post defaults. Areas exposed to significant IMC lending also experienced
a greater house price growth. My results highlight the unintended role of regulation
in aiding the U.S. housing market boom and bust by safe harboring mortgage related
repo collateral.
In the second essay, “Are credit ratings still relevant?”, we show that firms’ stock
prices react significantly less to credit rating downgrade announcements when they
have Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts trading on their debts. We find that
CDS spreads predict firms’ future rating downgrades and defaults, and document a
significant information flow from the CDS to equity and bond markets before firms
are downgraded. Further, the CDS term structure can be used to construct a more
reliable measure of default risk premium for firms undergoing rating revisions. While
the CDS market is not a perfect substitute for credit ratings, our results suggest that
credit rating revisions have become less informative to equity investors in the presence
xii
of the CDS market.
In the third essay, “Credit Default Swaps and Moral Hazard in Bank Lending”,
we analyze whether introducing Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) on a borrower’s debt
leads to lender moral hazard around covenant violations, wherein lending banks can
terminate or accelerate the loan. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that
CDS firms, including those with agency problems, do not decrease their investment
after covenant violations, pay a higher loan spread, and perform poorly, but do not go
bankrupt at a higher rate when compared with non-CDS firms that violate covenants.
These results are magnified when lenders have weaker incentives to monitor and
suggest that introducing CDSs misaligns incentives between lenders and borrowers.
In the fourth essay, “Do Bond Investors Price Tail Risk Exposures of Financial
Institutions?”, we analyze whether bond investors price tail risk exposures of finan-
cial institutions using a comprehensive sample of bond issuances by U.S. financial
institutions. Although primary bond yield spreads increase with an institutions’
own tail risk (expected shortfall), systematic tail risk (marginal expected shortfall)
of the institution doesn’t affect its yields. The relationship between yield spreads
and tail risk is significantly weaker for depository institutions, large institutions,
government-sponsored entities, politically-connected institutions, and in periods fol-
lowing large-scale bailouts of financial institutions. Overall, our results suggest that
implicit bailout guarantees of financial institutions can exacerbate moral hazard in





The early 2000s saw an exponential growth in mortgage debt which rose to $14.6
trillion by 2008 before the collapse of the U.S. housing market.1 Since then, there has
been a concerted effort to understand the origins of the expansion in mortgage credit
and its consequences (see [105, 106, 107, 6, 7, 8, 45]). Central to our understanding of
the recent mortgage credit growth is the regulatory environment and incentives un-
der which the mortgage industry operated. This study contributes to the literature
focusing on the recent mortgage credit expansion by analyzing a class of mortgage
originators known as independent mortgage companies – which accounted for about
34% of all mortgage origination in the mid-2000s 2 – and the inadvertent role regu-
lation played in subsidizing their issuance of risky mortgage credit by safe harboring
derivative contracts.
An important regulatory change in the treatment of certain derivative contracts
in the event of bankruptcy occurred in April 2005 when Congress expanded the range
of safe harbored repos or repurchase agreements with the passage of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).3 The act ex-
panded the range of bankruptcy safe harbored repos by amending the definition of the
1Mortgage debt rose by 106% from $6.9 trillion in 2000 to $14.6 trillion in 2008. Sources: http://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/mortoutstand20090331.htm ;
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/supplement/2004/01/table1_54.htm
2Source: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data
3See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8;
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/STATUTE-119/STATUTE-119-Pg23/content-detail.html
1
“repurchase agreement” to include mortgage loans, mortgage related securities, inter-
ests in mortgage related securities or mortgage loans, and qualified foreign government
securities. The rationale behind this specific provision was to prevent systemic risk
by granting derivative counterparties an exemption to the bankruptcy automatic stay
rule, thereby allowing them to close out their positions (See [100], [111], and [134]).
Instead, I document that this change to the bankruptcy code expanded the fund-
ing opportunities of Independent Mortgage Companies (IMCs), which in turn led
to an expansion in the supply of risk mortgage credit. Specifically, IMCs increased
the issuance of risky home loans such as Subprime, Alt-A, Low-documentation and
Complex mortgages by about 10% per quarter due to the passage of BAPCPA. This
culminated in an increase in ex-post default rate by about 2.24% relative to a control
group.
IMCs operate using an originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of lending wherein
they originate mortgages and sell them off for securitization (see [55]). Unlike banks,
IMCs do not take deposits and thus fund their mortgage origination business by
relying on short-term revolving lines of credit called warehouse loans and repurchase
agreements (repos). After BAPCPA, repos with mortgage related collateral were
made exempt from the bankruptcy automatic stay rule. This exemption allows repo
lenders immediate rights to their collateral if a borrowing IMC defaults. However,
lenders extending warehouse loans to an IMC have to wait in line for an orderly
liquidation process and the bankruptcy court’s approval. By parsing 8-K filings and
collecting excerpts from 10-K filings of IMCs, I first document that the financing
documentation significantly shifts towards the use of repurchase agreements. This is
expected given that a secured loan and a repo are economically equivalent, but a repo
lender has greater protection in the event of a bankruptcy.
There are two potential reasons why BAPCPA affected IMCs’ funding. First, to
the extent that increased creditor protection lowers a lender’s loss given default and
2
reduces the risk-premium demanded, a competitive lending market will drive down
funding costs for repos. Second, by expanding the eligibility of the safe harbored repo
collateral to include mortgage related securities, IMCs could borrow greater amounts
via repos by using mortgages in their pipeline as repo collateral.4 Using a merged
database of BlackBox Logic (BBx Logic) data and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) data, I first show that the proposed funding shock due to BAPCPA in turn
translated to an increase in supply of mortgage credit by IMCs. Subsequently, I study
the consequences of this mortgage credit expansion on loan performance and house
prices.
The major impediments to identifying the effect of BAPCPA on IMCs are concerns
regarding the exogeneity of BAPCPA, choice of a good control group for the IMCs,
and the fact that BAPCPA was a singular as opposed to a staggered shock. The
exogeneity of BAPCPA with respect to IMC’s funding mechanisms derives from the
fact that the safe harbor rules were instituted to prevent systemic risk arising from
the inability to close out derivative positions due to the bankruptcy automatic stay
rule 5 (See [100], [111], and [134]). Moreover, the fact that a reduction in funding
costs and an increase in funding amount can only take place once the BAPCPA law
is in effect, gives rise to a causal interpretation of BAPCPA on IMC funding and the
growth in mortgage issuance. For the second and third concerns, I employ multiple
identification strategies based on funding constraints, discontinuity in securitization
propensity, and geographic discontinuity in anti-predatory lending laws. In each case
there is a different set of treated and control groups, and additionally I also include
County×Quarter fixed effects in the bulk of my analysis. The former allows the
results to be independent of the choice of control groups and alleviates the concern
4Before BAPCPA, safe harbored repo collateral included only U.S. Treasuries and Agency debt.
5This especially seemed to be a growing concern after the LTCM (Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment) crisis which allegedly provided an example of how derivatives and systemic risk might be
associated
3
that the results are being driven due to a particular control group. The later controls
for any time-varying common shocks influencing the treatment and control groups
that might affect the results.
My first identification strategy is based on exploiting the funding constraints of
IMCs compared to affiliated mortgage companies (AMCs) to test for the growth
in IMC mortgage credit due to BAPCPA. AMCs’ funding needs are mostly met
via their affiliated sister depository institutions or parent Bank Holding Company
(BHC).6 Thus arguably, AMCs are less financially constrained when compared with
IMCs. Therefore, the proposed BAPCPA-related funding shock should affect IMCs
more than AMCs. Furthermore, as Section 1.2 discusses in detail, IMCs and AMCs
were similar on other important dimensions such as their primary line of business
(OTD), and the lack of regulatory oversight ([44]). I also show that the difference in
quarterly growth rates of the volume of mortgage credit originated between IMCs and
AMCs did not significantly differ from each other in the pre-BAPCPA period (see
Figure 2). This establishes parallel trends between the treated (IMCs) and control
(AMCs) groups prior to the law change. However, in the post-BAPCPA period, the
growth rate of IMCs is significantly greater than that of AMCs and has an overall
increasing trend over time.
In a more formal regression setup, I confirm that IMCs have a higher growth
in mortgage origination in the post BAPCPA period – both in terms of the num-
ber and volume of loans. Consistent with the hypothesis of an increase in supply
of credit, controlling for the loan’s risk characteristics, there is a reduction in the
average mortgage interest rate, as well as an increase in the size of the mortgage loan
6For instance Citigroup in its 2006 10-K filing states that the primary source of funding for
Citigroup and its subsidiaries comes from diverse types such as deposits, collateralized financing
transactions, senior and subordinated debt, issuance of commercial paper, proceeds from issuance




for a given borrower income level. These results are robust to including both Firm
and County×Quarter fixed effects, which control for any time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity at the firm-level and any common time-varying factors at the county-
level. To the extent that a borrower’s access to credit is rationed in equilibrium, a
positive shock to the supply of credit translates into a higher growth in mortgage
originations, especially for the lower credit quality borrowers ([142]). Using subsam-
ples of low, medium and high FICO score samples, I find that the growth in mortgage
credit and reduction in interest rates monotonically decrease with FICO scores. In
other words, the low credit quality borrowers experience the highest growth rate in
mortgages and the highest reduction in interest rates when IMCs lend to them.
If IMCs and AMCs are inherently different kinds of firms, one concern with the
above tests is that they could differ on certain time-varying unobserved characteristics
(such as differences in regulatory treatment). To address this concern, I compare
mortgage credit growth among small and large IMC originators. In general, as firms
of the same kind are more similar on broader dimensions, a “within-IMC” comparison
potentially alleviates the aforementioned concern. I find that small IMC originators
have a larger growth in mortgage issuance compared with large IMC originators.
This is consistent with the relaxation of funding constraints due to a positive funding
supply shock as smaller firms in general tend to be more constrained than larger firms
([151]).
Although comparing small and large IMC originators relieves the concern of time-
varying heterogeneity among treated and controls to a certain extent, it does not
entirely eliminate it. To further address this concern, I test within IMCs by relying
on a discontinuity in mortgage origination documented by [94]. This discontinuity
exists due to the ease of securitization beyond certain FICO scores, particularly 620
for low-documentation loans, and 580 for full-documentation loans.7 As the number
7Consistent with [75], I find a discontinuity in loan originations at FICO scores of 620 and 580
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of potential borrowers at each FICO score is continuous, the demand for mortgages is
continuous. Thus, a discontinuity in mortgage origination at any FICO score implies
a discontinuity in the supply of credit at that FICO score. As mentioned previously,
IMCs rely on the OTD business model by securitizing their originated mortgages.
Therefore, as the propensity to securitize just above the FICO threshold is higher, a
positive shock to the supply of credit should result in a higher growth in loan origina-
tions for borrowers with FICO scores just above the threshold compared to borrowers
just below the threshold. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), I report a
discontinuity in the growth of the number and volume of low-documentation loans,
and find weak evidence for a discontinuity in the case of full-documentation loans.
Overall, this test also provides support for the BAPCPA-led mortgage credit growth.
Moreover, it suggests a robust mortgage credit growth for the low-documentation
loans which tend to be riskier than full-documentation loans.
Arguably the discontinuity in the propensity to securitize provides a cleaner setting
to test for a change in the supply of credit. However, a potential drawback is that
it can be applied only locally around the FICO thresholds to test for the BAPCPA-
related mortgage credit growth. To overcome this shortcoming, I exploit another
source of variation in state anti-predatory lending (APL) laws to capture the effect
of BAPCPA on mortgage credit growth. I specifically consider APL laws which
make the securitization trusts and the investors who acquire loans liable for statutory
violations committed by the original lender. Focusing on counties bordering states
with weak and strong APL laws, I find that counties with weaker APL laws indeed
experienced a higher growth in mortgage credit in the post-BAPCPA period. This
approach mitigates any potential unobserved differences across counties as economic
forces tend to be quite similar across neighboring geographic areas.
While the above results are suggestive of an increase in credit supply, there could
unlike [94] who find it at 620 and 600 for full-doc and low-doc loans respectively.
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be alternate explanations for the observed results such as a shock to the expected
income growth or the house price growth. The demand for housing may increase if
borrowers expect a future growth in income. On the other hand, lenders might be
more willing to lend more if they expect a growth in houses prices which in turn
would reduce their loss given default. I find an expansion in mortgage credit even in
counties with a negative real income growth which is evidence against the income-
growth hypothesis. Similarly, areas with a high housing supply elasticity should
experience only a minimal to moderate appreciation in house prices as any demand
for housing can be met with new construction of houses ([68]). I find that even in
such areas there is a substantial increase in mortgage credit, thus contradicting the
house price appreciation hypothesis.
Next, I document the consequences of the expansion of mortgage credit. Sec-
tion 1.2 details the life-cycle of a loan originated by mortgage companies and the
incentives of the various intermediaries involved to issue risky mortgages.8 As ware-
house lenders are unsure about the loan quality, they typically mitigate the origina-
tors’ risk-taking incentives by applying haircuts to the collateral, and by the spreads
charged on the warehouse loan. However, the exemption from the automatic stay
rule of bankruptcy increased the seniority of warehouse lenders’ as they could read-
ily liquidate the pledged mortgage collateral without requiring the bankruptcy court
approval. This seniority claim results in avoiding potential bankruptcy costs and
thereby increases the warehouse lender’s recovery rate.9 Further, theory suggests an
inverse relationship between seniority of debt claims and lender’s incentive to mon-
itor ([125]). Without adequate due diligence by the warehouse lender, originators
can have the incentive to significantly misrepresent loan applications ([89, 75, 121]).
8[105, 94, 124] show evidence for the deteriorating lending standards for mortgage loans sold for
securitization
9Estimated costs of financial distress in the existing literature vary from a 3% ([149]) to as high
as 20% ([10]).
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Therefore, I argue that BAPCPA lowered creditor monitoring10 which helped fund
riskier mortgage loans via repos as long as they could be readily securitized.11
Consistent with this notion, I find that the increase in credit supply by IMCs
mainly funded riskier types of loans in the post-BAPCPA period compared to the
pre-BAPCPA period. This result is corroborated by the evidence of higher default
rates of the loans originated in the post- versus pre-BAPCPA period. I also observe
that the default rates increase over time and peak between two and three after the
loan origination. This is consistent with the typical period after which the initial lower
fixed rates on complex adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) expire, following which there
is a substantial increase in the monthly repayments for the borrowers. Interestingly,
subsample analysis also conveys a higher default rate in the medium and high quality
borrowers, and counties with higher income growth and higher competition compared
to the AMC control group. This indicates risk-shifting within good quality borrowers
by the mortgage companies in addition to supplying credit to lower quality borrowers
due to lower credit rationing. Lastly, I examine the relationship between credit growth
and house prices and find that counties experiencing a higher growth in IMC lending
are also associated with a higher growth in house prices. Again, consistent with the
default results, I find the highest house price growth for the medium and high house
price indexes.
Overall, the results in this paper show the unanticipated adverse consequences of
BAPCPA which assisted the growth of risky mortgage credit via IMCs.12 My study
contributes to the literature focusing on explaining the expansion of risky credit in
10See the Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corporation (TBW) and Colonial Bank’s case of
fraud as a result of pending repurchase obligations. The case highlights the failure of counter-
party monitoring in the mortgage market. Sources: http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/
SIR_TBW_Colonial%20Investigation%20Lessons%20Learned%20August%202014.pdf; https://
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp-pr2011-68.pdf
11The growth in subprime mortgage credit from 12% in 2000 to 36% of all mortgages in 2006 in
part was due to the ease of subprime securitzation ([105]).
12The adverse consequences in the form of externalities on the economy due to higher house price
growth and higher default rates have been documented in the recent literature ([107, 108])
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the mortgage market specifically through mortgage companies which were largely
overlooked despite their significant share in the mortgage market. The results also
add to the literature exploring regulatory design by documenting the unintended
consequences of a regulatory change to the bankruptcy code in the mortgage market.
Specifically for BAPCPA, there still exists a debate on the costs and benefits of
privileged status of derivatives in bankruptcy (See [52], [99], [50], and [23]). The
results in this paper enrich that debate by furnishing new evidence on the real costs of
BAPCPA related to the safe harbor exemptions for repos which led to the expansions
of risky mortgage credit. This paper also contributes to the literature exploring the
role repo market played in the 2008 financial crisis ([71]).
The remaining paper is organized as the following: Section 1.2 elaborates on the
structure of U.S. mortgage market with information relevant to the study in this pa-
per. Section 1.3 gives details and provides evidence on effect of BAPCPA on IMC
funding. Section 1.4 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 1.5 de-
tails the empirical setup and presents results testing the positive “credit supply shock”
hypothesis due to BAPCPA. Section 1.6 studies the consequences of the BAPCPA-led
increase in mortgage credit and finally Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The mortgage market
In this section, I briefly describe the mortgage market in the context of this study.
There are different types of mortgage lenders in the U.S., and they can be broadly
divided into two main categories – depository institutions and mortgage companies.
Depository institutions take deposits and can be primarily categorized into banks,
thrifts and credit unions. Mortgage companies do not take deposits and can exist
either as independent mortgage companies (IMCs) or can be owned by or affiliated
with banks, thrifts and holding companies (AMCs). These different types of mort-
gage originating institutions differ in the extent to which they may participate in
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the mortgage market. In general, mortgages account for only a portion of a bank’s
overall business, which also includes other consumer loans, business loans and credit
extensions through other instruments; whereas mortgage companies typically focus on
originating mortgages. Based on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data
from the period of 2004 to 2006, mortgage companies companies together accounted
for about 54% all mortgage originations.
The various types of mortgage lenders in the U.S. also differed significantly in
regulation. Bank holding companies (BHCs) and state member banks are regulated
by the Federal Reserve System (FRS), national banks are regulated by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and thrifts are regulated by the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS). Mortgage companies that are subsidiaries are regulated
by their parent’s regulator, while independent mortgage companies are regulated by
the state and the federal trade commission to the extent that they engaged in any
unfair or deceptive practice in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act (see
[55]). [44] point out that the mortgage companies were relatively free of regulatory
oversight due to the fragmented U.S. regulatory system, despite having a market
share of about 50% in the mortgage origination market since the 1990s.13 They argue
that mortgage companies do not hold deposits and hence do not require a charter
from an institutional regulator such as the FRS, OCC, OTS or FDIC; and that their
activities did not fall under the purview of functional regulators such the SEC, CFTC
or state insurance regulators. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999 also stated
that the non-bank subsidiaries of BHCs could only be examined by the FRS if their
activities were deemed to have adverse material impact on the safety and soundness
of their sister affiliate banks. 14 This meant that regulating mortgage companies was
13For instance consider a BHC that has two subsidiaries - a mortgage company and a national
bank. If the national bank has another mortgage company as a subsidiary, then the national bank
and its mortgage company subsidiary would be regulated by OCC while the BHC and its mortgage
company subsidiary would be regulated by the FRS.
14See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102
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a matter of discretion rather than a decree of the law. In fact [44] show that mortgage
company subsidiaries of BHCs (AMCs) originated riskier mortgages and had higher
default rates when compared to the BHC bank subsidiaries.
Borrowers in the 2000s could get mortgage loans from three main channels, namely
the (i) retail channel, (ii) wholesale channel and (iii) correspondent channel. Retail
lenders work directly with the homeowner to originate the mortgage loan without any
middlemen or brokers. These loans are generally made in person, over the Internet
or via call centers and are processed by in-house loan officers as opposed to outside
brokers. Wholesale lenders work with independent mortgage brokers who generate
loan applications for them by working on the retail end with the borrowers. Once
the mortgage deal is secured, the brokers send it to the wholesale lenders who under-
write the loan and fund it. Correspondent lenders are institutions that make loans
through retail operations at their end, but according to underwriting standards set
by a wholesale lender who in turn commits in advance to buy the loans from the
correspondent lender at a set price. Although lenders might use multiple channels
to originate mortgages, mortgage companies typically originate through wholesale
and/or correspondent channels ([129]). 15. For instance an IMC usually originates a
mortgage loan to a borrower by drawing down on their lines of credit in order to fund
the mortgage.
Typically, these lines of credit are secured by the originated mortgages. However,
within a short period of time, which usually ranges from 30-45 days, the mortgage
is sold to a third-party, often for the purpose of securitization, and the warehouse
line of credit is then paid down. The bulk of IMCs’ income is usually earned through
originating fees and selling the originated loans for a higher value than when they
were made. Meanwhile, the warehouse lenders earn interest on their lines of credit
15The liabilities structure of American Home Mortgage Company, which is a large IMC, is shown
in Table A.1 Although they use multiple sources of financing, warehouse line of credit and repurchase
agreements remain their largest sources.
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when a draw-down occurs. In a typical case when the IMCs exhaust their credit lines,
they will need to securitize or sell the originated loans in their pipeline before they
can replenish their credit lines and further draw-down on them.
Mortgage brokers are generally independent agents who serve as a contact between
the borrowers and lenders. Brokers allow wholesale lenders to lend in markets where
they have no physical presence. Brokers earn commissions on every loan they arrange.
Each day the lenders provide brokers with “rate sheets” which have information on the
various types of mortgages the lender would underwrite along with the minimum price
they would accept for a loan for a given credit score. In the 2000s, the commissions
were higher if the brokers could get the borrower on a higher interest rate mortgage
with prepayment penalties ([55]). Brokers also earned higher commissions on low-
documentation (low-doc) and no-documentation (no-doc) loans.16. For instance [55]
note that the fees on a $300,000 low-doc was $15,000 whereas a comparable full-
doc loan would yielded less than $5,000 in fees Moreover, borrowers opted for the
low-doc loans as it entailed less paperwork and less processing time, or due to the
concern that the mortgages rates and house prices might rise. Borrowers who did not
qualify for conventional fixed-rate mortgages, were offered complex products such as
ARMs, option ARMs and hybrid ARMs which tended to have lower initial payments
compared to fixed-rate until the rates are reset to a higher number after a specified
term. In these cases, the borrowers were assured that they could refinance their
mortgages when the rates went up (see [55]).
1.3 Effect of BAPCPA on IMC Funding
This section describes the effect of BAPCPA on the funding opportunities of IMCs
in further detail. As discussed previously, unlike depositories, IMCs do not take
16The Wall Street journal article Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy, Dec 2007
by Brooks and Simon reports that 55% of all subprime loans in 2005 went to borrowers with credit
scores high enough to qualify for prime loans
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deposits and rely on funding their mortgage originations through external credit fa-
cilities such as lines of credit provided by warehouse lenders. Warehouse lenders are
typically banks which allow collateralized short-term borrowings that are secured by
the originated mortgages.17 A principal concern of the warehouse lender is the po-
tential default of the mortgage company to which it lends. As a result, bankruptcy
law has been a predominant factor in driving the type and cost of funding. Arguably,
IMCs’ cost of funding was significantly lower after the passage of the BAPCPA act
which subsidized the latter of the two major types of funding agreements used by
warehouse lenders and mortgage companies which are the “Master Loan and Secu-
rity Agreement” and the “Master Repurchase Agreement” (MRA). In the event of a
default or bankruptcy, under the loan and securities agreement, the warehouse lender
would not have the unfettered right to take over the ownership of the pledged mort-
gage loans. They would be halted by the “automatic stay” feature of the bankruptcy
code. On the other hand, under the repurchase agreement, the warehouse lender
would have the right to liquidate the pledged mortgage loans without having to ob-
tain the bankruptcy court approval and recover the related advances.18
After BAPCPA expanded the “safe harbored” securities to include mortgage loans,
the financing documentation for IMCs significantly shifted towards the use of repur-
chase agreements. Figure 1 shows the result of parsing 8-K filings for IMCs for the
number of occurrences of repurchase and loan agreements. The number of repurchase
agreements used have evidently increased after the BAPCPA took effect in 2005-Q4,
while the number of loan agreements have decreased over the same period.
To supplement this evidence, A.2 provides excerpts from the 10-K filings of IMCs
17A relatively large IMC – American Home Mortgage Company’s 2004 10-K filing states their
warehouse lenders were: UBS ($1.2 Bil), Bank of America ($600 Mil), CDC Mortgage Capital
($450 Mil), Morgan Stanley ($350), Lehman Brothers ($250 Mil), Bear Stearns ($500 Mil), and
Caylon Americas ($250 Mil). Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1256536/
000091412105000607/am031605-10k.txt
18Table A.1 reports that the cost of warehouse repos is indeed lower than warehouse lines of credit
based on the 10-K filings of a large IMC.
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and the industry responses to the U.S. Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD)
solicitation on the changes of funding mechanisms in the mortgage industry. These
excerpts clearly state a preference for repurchase agreements as a means for funding
IMC operations. Moreover they affirm an increase in the size of warehouse lines of
credit under these repurchase agreements as well as a change in the eligibility of the
collateral backing them.19
There are two potential reasons why BAPCPA reduced the funding costs and in-
creased the line of available credit to IMCs. First, the exemption from the bankruptcy
automatic stay allowed repurchase lenders immediate rights to their collateral if a bor-
rowing IMC defaulted. This results in increasing the warehouse lender’s recovery rate
by avoiding potential bankruptcy costs. [10] estimate that bankruptcy costs can be
as high as 20%. Second, as a repurchase agreement involved a “true sale” of the col-
lateral unlike a loan agreement, this allowed warehouse lenders to account for these
warehouse facilities as “loans held for sale” instead of a financing transaction.
There are benefits to accounting for repurchase agreements in this manner. The
risk-weights assigned to purchased qualifying mortgages is 50% (20% for FHA and VA
loans) whereas a traditional warehouse line of credit is recognized with a 100% risk-
weight ([141]).20 This also allows warehouse lenders (especially the smaller banks)
to extend bigger lines of credit without violating the “loans-to-one-borrower” restric-
tion.21 Together, these advantages of repurchase agreements can incentivize more
banks to enter the warehouse lending business, and also enable them to commit
higher amounts towards credit lines written through MRAs.
19Prior to the BAPCPA, since the early 1980s, safe harbored repos included only U.S. Treasury
and Agency securities backed by the government’s full faith and credit, certificates of deposits, and
bankers acceptances.
20The OCC in its 2012 memorandum has reiterated that warehouse repurchase agreements should
receive a 100% risk weight. Despite that, lenders still continue to account for them as “loans held
for sale”. See Texas Capital Bancshares Inc’s (a warehouse lender’s) 2012 10-K filing: https:
//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1077428/000119312513068855/d468799d10k.htm
21See Section 32.3 on Lending Limits at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/
8000-7400.html
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1.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The two main datasets used in this study are BlackBox Logic (BBx Logic) and Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). BBx data covers about 90% of the U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) non-agency market while HMDA covers the loan
originations by 99% of depository and non-depository financial institutions. BBx data
is mainly gathered from securitization trustees and contains information on borrower
credit scores, as well as loan characteristics such as the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio,
loan principal, maturity and variety of indicators identifying the purpose, occupancy
status, documentation type. It also maintains a time-varying record of the history
of the loan payoff status such as delinquency, modification, prepayment, loss from
liquidation etc. at a monthly frequency for each loan. However, the identity of the
loan originator – whether a loan has been originated by an independent or affiliated
mortgage company, or a depository – is recorded in the HMDA dataset.22 Thus the
BBx data is a richer dataset compared to HMDA.
Arguably a positive shock to credit supply in the mortgage industry leads to
the expansion of mortgage credit to borrowers with lower credit quality who were
previously rationed out ([142]).Furthermore, the incentive structures in the mortgage
market as discussed in Section 1.2 encourages the underwriting of complex and riskier
mortgages. Therefore the effect of an increase in mortgage credit due to the BAPCPA
act is conceivably more apparent in the non-agency market. Hence this also motivates
the use of the BBx dataset.
The matching of loans between BBx and HMDA databases is carried out based
on loan characteristics and the geography of the underlying mortgage property. BBx
reports data by zip-code while HMDA reports data by census-tract. Census-tract
22Although BBx data has a raw data field for the name of loan originator, it is missing for about
90% of the loans. As a result, BBx does not provide a cleaned and standardized version of this data
field.
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and zip-codes are not uniquely identified and intersect each other. Census-tract clas-
sification can change when every decennial census is conducted whereas zip-codes
are relatively stable. To merge BBx and HMDA based on geographic information,
I use the zip-code to census-tract crosswalk files. The variable used for determining
the portion of a census-tract region that overlaps with a given zip-code region is the
number of housing units (according to the 1990 or 2000 census 23). This is an in-
tuitive weight especially when one is trying to gauge the probability of a mortgage
origination in a given census-tract to be in a particular zip-code 24. Loans BBx and
HMDA are matched exactly on four loan characteristics loan amount, loan purpose,
occupancy type and lien type, but coarsely on the geography of the property. Details
of the matching algorithm are provided in A.3.
The HMDA dataset is augmented to the “HMDA Lender File” compiled by Robert
Avery from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System which provides
information used to identify the type of originator/lender. Originators are broadly
classified into (i)independent depository institutions which include commercial banks,
savings banks and credit unions; (ii) affiliated depository institutions which are typi-
cally subsidiaries thrift or bank holding companies; (iii) independent mortgage com-
panies (IMCs); and (iv) affiliated mortgage companies which are typically subsidiaries
or affiliates of holding companies or depository institutions.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the matched BBx-HMDA datasets in
the pre- and post-BAPCPA periods. On an average IMC issue mortgage loans with
a smaller loan amount compared with AMCs in both periods. This is consistent
with IMCs being more financially constrained compared to AMCs. Panel A shows
that the number and dollar volume of loans for both IMCs and AMCs increased in
the post-BAPCPA period. The table also shows that the initial interest rates at
23Census-tract definition in HMDA changed in 2003 to make use of the 2000 census classification.
Prior to 2003, the 1990 census classification was used.
24Census-tract (∼73,000 areas) has more granularity compared with zip-codes (∼43,000 areas).
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origination have increased in the post-BAPCPA period. Although this is inconsistent
with a reduction in mortgage origination costs vis-á-vis increased repo financing after
BAPCPA, it is likely that the increase is due to originating riskier mortgages to low
credit-quality borrowers. Support for this is noted in Panel B which shows that the
fraction of low-documentation loans, Alt-A, and Subprime loans increased in the post-
BAPCPA period. However, these are univariate statistics and one needs to control
for county-level factors and time-varying risk factors to draw any useful conclusions
on the effect of the passage of BAPCPA on the expansion of mortgage credit.
1.5 Results: Mortgage credit growth via IMCs
This section tests the hypothesis that the 2005 BAPCPA act led to an expansion
of mortgage credit for the IMCs. As BAPCPA was a singular shock as opposed to
a series of staggered stocks, I use four sets of treated and control groups for my
identification strategy. This alleviates concerns that the results may be driven by
the choice of the control group rather than the treated group in the post-BAPCPA
period. Additionally, I also control for any time-varying common shocks influencing
the treatment and control groups by including County×Quarter fixed effects. While
the first set of treated and control groups in my identification strategy compares
IMCs with AMCs, the next three are comparisons within IMCs. Comparisons within
IMCs mitigate the concern that IMCs and AMCs might differ on certain unobservable
characteristics that might drive the results. Arguably, firms of the same kind are more
aligned on broader dimensions. The later subsections test alternate explanations and
carry out a host of robustness checks for the BAPCPA-led mortgage credit expansion.
1.5.1 Exploiting funding constraints: IMCs vs AMCs
In the first identification test, I use IMCs as the treated group and AMCs as the
control group. This choice of treated and control groups exploits the setting that
IMCs are more financially constrained compared to AMCs while being similar on
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other dimensions such as their core line of business and lack of regulatory oversight
as discussed in Section 1.2
To test for the growth in mortgage credit after the passage of the 2005 BAPCPA
act, I estimate the following difference-in-difference identification model on quarterly
data at the firm-county-quarter observation level:
Yict = α + β1dPostBAPCPAt × dIMCi + β2dIMCi + β3dPostBAPCPAt
+ θXc,t + λi + δct + εict (1)
where the subscripts i, c and t stand for firm, county and quarter respectively. dPost-
BAPCPA is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all quarters on or after the fourth quarter
of 2005 during which the provisions of the 2005 BAPCPA act started to apply, and
0 prior to that. dIMC is dummy variable equal to 1 if the mortgage company is an
independent mortgage company (IMC), whereas it is 0 if it a subsidiary or an affiliate
of a bank or a holding company and will be thereafter referred to as an affiliated
mortgage company (AMC) for the sake of convenience. Yict stands for one of the five
observed firm-county level activities in the mortgage market, namely the log-growth
rate in the number and volume of loans issued, the average FICO score, interest rate
and loan-to-income (LTI) ratio. Xict are the firm-specific controls I can explicitly
measure. As I only have information on the loan-mix at origination for each firm and
no other firm-level information, Xict mainly reflect the loan-mix of each firm and are
included in the interest rate and LTI regressions only.
Equation (1) also includes firm fixed effects (λi) to control for any time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity across firms and County×Quarter fixed effects (δct) to con-
trol for time-varying factors at the county-level that might drive credit expansion.
The coefficient on the interaction term dPostBAPCPA×dIMC is the difference-in-
difference (DID) estimator, and it is the key variable of interest while the base coef-
ficients dPostBAPCPA and dIMC are absorbed in the fixed effects. The coefficient
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on the term dPostBAPCPA×dIMC captures the change in the dependent variable of
interest between the IMCs (treated group) and the AMCs (control group).
Table 2 shows the results for the regression specification in Equation (1) wherein
I restrict the sample period to six quarters before and after the 2005 BAPCPA act.25
The positive and significant coefficient on dPostBAPCPA×dIMC in columns (1) and
(2) indicates that the growth rates in the total number and total volume of loans
increases when compared with AMCs. The median IMC firm during the sample
period from 2004-2006 issues close to $500 million in loan volume per county in a
given quarter. An 11% increase in growth rate amounts to a growth of $55 million in
loan volume per county over a given quarter.
The evidence presented in A.2 and Table A.1 suggests that the 2005 BAPCPA act
resulted in a positive supply shock by lowering the cost of funding a mortgage loan
as well as increasing the capacity of the warehouse line of credit to IMCs. Consistent
with that notion, columns (3) and (4) show that the growth rate in the number
and volume of jumbo loans26 increases for IMCs after the 2005 BAPCPA act when
compared to AMCs. Column (5) shows that IMCs also originated mortgages with
lower interest rates controlling for the types of mortgage issuance by each firm. In
line with expectations, column (5) shows that higher loan-to-value ratios, higher
percentage of Alt-A, subprime and low-doc loans, and loans to lower quality borrowers
increase the average issuing mortgage interest rate by a firm. Similarly column (6)
shows that a higher mortgage loan was made for a given income level of the borrower
by IMCs in the post BAPCPA period when compared to AMCs.
25I drop singleton groups in regression. Singleton groups are groups which have only one observa-
tion and hence will not contribute to any “within-group” variation when fixed effects are included.
However, adding singleton groups to the total observations may lower the standard errors and bias
the t-statistics upwards.
26The jumbo loan limits form 2004, 2005 and 2006 were 333700, 359650 and 417000 respectively.
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1.5.1.1 Variation across borrower quality
Next I examine the variation of mortgage credit growth across borrower quality. If
lower credit quality borrowers are typically rationed out ([142]) when credit supply
is tight, then one expects to see larger growth for them with the loosening of credit
supply. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 1.2, the saturation of the prime market
and broker incentives in the form of higher commissions for non-prime loans leads
to the effect of a positive credit supply shock to manifest in the lower credit quality
borrower category.
Following [120] I divide the mortgage origination sample into three groups based
on borrower credit quality measured using FICO scores: low quality (FICO ≤ 620),
medium quality (620 ≤ FICO ≤ 680), and high quality (FICO ≥ 680). To test the
above hypothesis, I run the baseline regression model in equation 1 for the above
three groups defined based on FICO scores. In line with expectations, columns (1)
and (2) in Panels A, B, and C in Table 3 show that the mortgage credit growth is
higher for the low FICO category along with a larger reduction (11 basis points) in
the average interest rate of an originated mortgage loan. The growth in mortgage
credit and the reduction of mortgage rates show a monotonic decreasing relationship
with FICO scores consistent with an increase in credit supply relieving the constraints
of lower credit quality borrowers.
1.5.2 Exploiting funding constraints: Small vs large IMCs
In the second identification test, I exploit that notion that small IMCs are more
financially constrained compared to large IMCs ([151]). To classify IMCs as small and
large, I divide the sample of IMC issuers based on total mortgage issuance volume
from 2001 to 2003 (prior to the sample period of my analysis). A dummy variable
dSmallIMC is created to be equal to 1 if the total issuance volume is below the
median (small IMCs), and equal to 0 if it above the median (large IMCs). Arguably,
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IMCs that are more financially constrained have lower mortgage issuance volumes.
They are likely to rely on traditional sources of financing such as lines of credit from
warehouse lenders as opposed to other sophisticated means. Therefore, a positive
shock to the funding structure of IMCs should affect the small IMCs more than the
large IMCs.
I run the baseline specifications in Table 2 for IMCs to test the above hypothe-
sis in Table 4. The positive and significant coefficient on the DID estimator dPost-
BAPCPA×dSmallIMC for all columns (1)–(4) confirms that the positive supply shock
to funding leads to a higher growth in loan volume, loan number, and jumbo loans for
small IMCs compared to the large IMCs. In line with positive funding supply shock
hypothesis, column (5) shows that the reduction in the average interest rate of the
originated loans by small IMCs is also greater compared to large IMCs. Furthermore,
comparing small and large IMCs as opposed to IMCs and AMCs is advantageous as it
rules out any plausible unobservable differences (such as implementation of regulatory
oversight) between IMCs and AMCs that might be driving the results.
1.5.3 Exploiting securitization propensity
In the third identification test, I exploit a specific rule of thumb in the lending market
that generates an exogenous variation in the ease of securitizing mortgages around
certain FICO scores. This was first documented by [94] (henceforth KMSV) who show
that although the distribution of the population of potential borrowers with respect
to FICO scores is continuous, there is a discontinuity in the number of originated
mortgages at the FICO score of 620 (600) for low-doc (full-doc) loans.27
Following KMSV, I plot the number and volume of loans originated by IMCs
27Generally homeowners are required to provide information on their assets, liabilities, income,
credit history, employment history and personal information. Low documentation loans are loans
where borrowers with acceptable payment histories are not required to provide any information
regarding income. Thus such loans potentially rely significantly on soft information as noted in
KMSV.
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at each FICO score for low-doc loans and full-doc loans for the periods before and
after the BAPCPA. First, Figure 3 plotted for low-doc loans confirms the results
in KMSV, showing that there is indeed a discontinuous increase in the number and
volume of originated loans around the 620 FICO score. Given that IMCs rely on
securitizing their originated mortgages, as long as the propensity to securitize around
the FICO threshold remains constant, a positive shock to the supply of credit should
result in a higher growth in loan volume for borrowers with FICO score just above
the threshold compared to the borrowers just below the threshold. Sub-figures 3a
and 3b compare the number of mortgage originations six quarters before and after
the BAPCPA respectively. As it can be seen, the discontinuity in the number of
originations is higher in the post-BAPCPA period compared to the pre-BAPCPA
period. Moreover, the total originations at each FICO score in the post-BAPCPA
period is higher than the pre-BAPCPA period, consistent with the increase in the
supply of mortgage credit. One can note a similar pattern for the volume of mortgage
originations in Sub-figures 3c and 3d. Figure A.4 plots the same graphs for full-doc
loans with a discontinuity at the FICO score of 580.28 The plots for the full-doc loans
also indicate an increase in the number and volume of loans at the 580 FICO score
after the BAPCPA.
However, the increase in the discontinuity in the post-BAPCPA period could be
due to a secular increase in supply or demand of credit at each FICO score.29 In order
to control for this, I compute the growth in mortgage credit at each FICO score from
the pre- to post-BAPCPA period and test whether or not there is a discontinuity at
620 and 580 for low-doc and full-doc loans respectively. In similar spirit to KMSV’s
28While KMSV find a discontinuity at the FICO score of 600 for full-doc loans, I find the discon-
tinuity threshold to be at 580 similar to [75].
29In other words, even if there is a K% increase in the number/volume of loans at each FICO
score, then the discontinuity in the post-BAPCPA period will be greater than the pre-BAPCPA
period. In the absence of any other supply shock, such as BAPCPA, which has heterogeneous effects
around the FICO threshold, a plot of the growth of loans against the FICO score will be a constant
K% without a discontinuity at the threshold.
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empirical setup, I collapse the data on each FICO score and estimate the following
regression:
Yi = α + βdThreshold+ θf(FICO(i)) + δdThreshold× f(FICO(i)) + εi (2)
where Yi is the growth in number or volume of loans at the FICO score i from
the pre- to post-BAPCPA period, dThreshold is a dummy variable that is equal to
1 if the FICO score is greater than 620 (580) for low-doc (full-doc) loans, and 0
otherwise. f(FICO(i)) is a flexible fifth-order distance polynomial for a smooth fit
estimated on the left side of the threshold, and while dThreshold× f(FICO(i)) is
estimated on the right side of the threshold. The main coefficient of interest is the
term dThreshold, which is the average treatment effect (ATE) for the growth of loans
around the discontinuity.
Table 5 Panel A reports the results of the regressions using Equation 2. The ATE
(coefficient on dThreshold) is estimated to be about 21% in mortgage credit growth
at the threshold in six quarters after BAPCPA for low-doc loans, but is insignificant
for full-doc loans. The increase in growth of only low-doc loans is in line with the
documented incentives which reward mortgage brokers with higher commissions for
low-documentation risky loans as discussed in Section 1.2. I also fit a non-parametric
local linear polynomial around an optimal bandwidth computed using the method in
[28].30 Table 5 Panel B reports these results and shows that there is an estimated
11% (13%) increase in mortgage credit growth at the threshold in six quarters after
BAPCPA for low-doc (full-doc) loans. As this estimation method is typically sensitive
to the choice of bandwidth, in Table A.10 I also report the results for half and twice
the optimal bandwidth. Additionally, I plot the results for the local linear polynomial
fit around the discontinuity thresholds in Figure 4. In all these scenarios, ATE for
low-doc loans is robust and significant compared with full-doc loans. Overall, these
30[76] emphasize using non-parametric local polynomial regressions as opposed to global flexible
polynomials for regression discontinuity designs.
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results provide support for the BAPCPA-led mortgage credit growth. Moreover, these
results also show that the growth in mortgage credit was higher for risky loans such as
low-documentation loans compared to the relatively safer full-documentation loans.
1.5.4 Exploiting variation in anti-predatory lending laws
In the final identification test, I consider a subsample of only IMC loans which were
originated in counties along a state border such that one of the bordering states has
a stronger anti-predatory lending (APL) laws compared to the other. This approach
alleviates any potential unobserved heterogeneity across counties as economic forces
tend to be quite similar across such neighboring geographic areas. Thus the bordering
counties enable the effect of BAPCPA resulting from the differences in the legal
framework across these geographic areas to be captured.
APL laws vary considerably across states in terms of their coverage, restriction
and enforcement. The coverage category includes regulation on the type of loans,
APR triggers on first and higher lien loans, and points and fees on loans. The re-
striction category entails prohibitions and limits on prepayment penalties and bal-
loon payments during specific periods after mortgage origination, credit counseling
requirements and restrictions of mandatory arbitration. The enforcement category
mainly covers the strength of assignee liability and enforcement against creditors (see
[81, 25]). These different categories of APL laws have been shown to have different
effects in the mortgage market. On one hand these laws can alleviate borrower con-
cerns about fraudulent lenders and increase demand for mortgage credit, while on
the other hand these laws can ration credit to the lower credit quality borrowers. For
instance, [81, 25] find that a broader coverage category is associated with an increase
in mortgage origination, while a stringent restriction category is associated with a
decrease in mortgage credit.
In this paper however, I mainly focus on the enforcement category for the following
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reason - the assignee liability clause makes securitization trusts and investors who
acquire loans, liable for statutory violations committed by the original lender. The
liability in such cases may result in the imposition of monetary fines. For this reason,
Moodys’ analysis of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) takes into account
the likelihood that a lender may have violated anti-predatory lending laws, which may
lower the proceeds available to repay securitization investors ([45]). Thus the presence
and the strength of assignee laws is expected to be critical for IMCs given that their
primary business model is to originate mortgages and sell them off for securitization.
Therefore a funding shock to IMCs such as BAPCPA, will lead them to expand
mortgage credit in areas with weaker APL laws concerning assignee liabilities and
enforcement against creditors.
To test the above hypothesis, I gather data on anti-predatory laws from [25] for
all the states in the U.S. with APL laws in effect until 2005. This data is presented in
Table A.5. I further sort states based on the strength of the enforcement of APL laws
and classify the states in the top half as weak-APL states and the bottom half strong-
APL states. I then define “neighboring counties” across weak and strong APL state
borders to be within 30 miles of each other.31 This yields a sample of 195 counties
in weak-APL states (treated) and 207 counties in strong-APL states (controls). To
test for the BAPCPA-led increase in mortgage credit supply, I run the following
difference-in-difference identification model on IMCs’ quarterly origination data at
the firm-county-quarter observation level:
Yict = α + β1dPostBAPCPAt × dWeakAPLCountyc + β2dWeakAPLCountyc
+ β3dPostBAPCPAt + θXc,t + λi + δc + τt + εict (3)
where all the variables are the same as in the baseline specification in Equation 1
31While smaller distances ensure greater similarity in economic forces governing areas across state
borders, they also reduce the sample size and power of the tests considerably – thus a trade-off
exists. However I find that the results are qualitatively robust to using a cut-off of 50 and 100 miles
and cross-sectionally across entire states as well.
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except for two changes – dWeakAPLCounty is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if counties belong to weak-APL states and 0 otherwise. I also use County and
Quarter fixed effects as opposed to County×Quarter fixed effects in order to identify
the coefficient on dPostBAPCPA×dWeakAPLCounty which is at the county-quarter
level. dPostBAPCPA×dWeakAPLCounty is the difference-in-difference (DID) esti-
mator and it is the key variable of interest.
Table 6 presents the results for the regression specification in Equation 3, which
shows that counties with weaker APL enforcement laws indeed experienced a higher
growth in mortgage credit in the post-BAPCPA period. Consistent with the supply
hypothesis, the results also show that there was a decrease in the average mortgage
interest rate and the loan-to-income ratio after controlling for the risk of the origi-
nated loans. As robustness, I conduct these tests by defining neighboring counties
to be within a distance of 50 miles, 100 miles, and cross-sectionally across states
by including all the counties. These results which are presented in Table A.11 are
qualitatively similar, but get weaker as distance increases. This is likely due to the
increasing time-varying heterogeneity among counties that are geographically farther
apart.
Overall the results documented in Section 1.5 indicate an increase in supply of
mortgage credit after BAPCPA went into effect.
1.5.5 Testing alternate hypotheses
In this section, I test two potential alternate hypothesis which might drive the results
so far. The first alternate hypothesis is the income-based demand hypothesis which
argues that the increase in mortgage credit is due to the growth in incomes of the
borrowers who respond by increasing their demand for mortgages ([65]). To test
this hypothesis, I gather the publicly available county-level income data from the
U.S. Census Bureau. Using this data, I compute the growth in per-capita income
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and median income for each county from 2004-2006 as this period covers most of
event window around the BAPCPA. The counties are then divided into four quartiles
based on the computed growth rates. The lowest and the highest quartile counties
based on the growth rate of per-capita income (median income) have average annual
growth rates of 1.4% (1.8%) and 10.1% (7.7%) respectively. The average inflation rate
during this period was 3.3%, which implies that the average real growth in wages for
the counties in the lowest quartile was -1.9% (-1.5%). If the results in this study are
driven by income growth, then the counties in the lowest income growth quartiles,
which have a negative real growth in wages, should be less likely to experience a
growth in mortgage credit.
I test the above income-based demand hypothesis in Table 7 Panel A. Columns
(1), (2) and (4), (5) run the baseline specification in Equation 1 for the counties in
the lowest quartiles of per-capita and median income growth rates respectively. The
results show that there is an expansion of mortgage credit even in these counties which
experienced negative real growth rates in wages. Furthermore, I classify borrowers
in my dataset as low-income borrowers if their income is lower than 80% of the
median income in their counties. The results for this subset which are provided in
specifications (3) and (6) also show a growth in mortgage credit. The magnitude of
the coefficient of dPostBAPCPA×dIMC in all the specifications are similar to those
in the full sample regressions in Table 2. Overall, the results in Table 7 Panel A
suggest evidence against the income-based demand hypothesis.
The second alternate hypothesis for the expansion in mortgages credit could be
due to an expectation of the increase in future house prices. As [105] note, higher
house prices lower the estimated loss given default, and hence the lenders would be
more willing to lend to lower quality borrowers. [68] note that house price run-ups
occur mainly in areas with an inelastic housing supply. Whereas in areas where hous-
ing supply is elastic, any pressure on house prices will lead to increased construction
27
thereby keeping the house prices in check.32 If the increase in mortgage credit, espe-
cially to the low quality borrowers, is due to the increasing house price expectation
hypothesis, then areas with a higher housing supply elasticity should not see a growth
in mortgage credit.
To test the above hypothesis, I gather data on housing supply elasticity from
[131] at the MSA level. This measure of elasticity is based on the percentage of land
which cannot be developed for housing, either due to the presence of water bodies or
uneven terrain. Finally, this elasticity measure takes into account both the physical
and regulatory land constraints.33 [131] computes and ranks the measure of supply
elasticities for 95 MSAs. I classify the counties overlapping with the MSAs into
two samples: (i) very high housing supply elasticity areas (where the rank of supply
elasticity lies between 72 and 95) and (ii) high housing supply elasticity areas (where
the rank of supply elasticity lies between 48 and 95). Table 7 Panel B provides results
for these subsamples after running the baseline regression in Equation 1. The results
show an expansion in mortgage credit of the same order as the full sample results
in Table 2 for the two subsamples of high land supply elasticity. Thus, overall these
tests also suggest evidence against the increasing house price expectation hypothesis.
1.5.6 Robustness
I use growth rates in equation 1 to test for the increase in mortgage credit (volume and
number of mortgages) as opposed to levels for two main reasons. First, the levels in
mortgage credit and county-level variables may exhibit heterogeneous trends. Taking
the first difference cancels out any time-invariant trend at the firm-county level for the
mortgage credit variables. Thus, any type of county fixed effects would be guaranteed
to capture county-specific trends (see [116] and [59]). Second, a law change such as the
32See [105] who demonstrate this fact by comparing the house price growth in elastic and non-
elastic housing supply MSAs
33See [131] for more details on the construction of this measure
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2005 BAPCPA act can be argued to be a permanent shock as opposed to a temporary
shock to credit supply. Permanent shocks are commonly modeled as shocks to the
first-difference in the level rather than the level itself (temporary shocks).
Regardless, in Table A.9 Panel A, I test for an alternate specification using levels
instead of first differences. Specifically, I regress the logarithm of the number and
volume of loans and control for any auto-dependence in the levels by including the
lagged dependent variable in the regressions as well. Columns (1) and (2) show
that there was a 3% and 4% overall growth in loan origination volume and number
respectively for IMCs over AMCs in the six quarters after the BAPCPA act compared
to the six quarters before. As an additional check, in Panel B, columns (1)–(4), I test
using different time-periods before and after the BAPCPA law change and find that
the results are qualitatively the same for an event window of four and eight quarters.
However, I stick to the event window of six quarters for the rest of the paper as the
window is long enough to capture the effect of the law, and the post-event window
ends in 2007-Q1 which is just before the period when the financial crisis began to
materialize.34 I also test using a placebo law change date 12 quarters before the
implementation of BAPCPA in 2005-Q4 so that the event window is non-overlapping
with the event window around the actual law change date. In this case, I do not find
any significant difference between the loan volume and loan number growth rates of
IMCs and AMCs.
Overall, the results thus far support the hypothesis that the 2005 BAPCPA act
resulted in a positive supply shock to the funding of the IMCs, which in turn resulted
in the expansion of mortgage credit. In the next section, I focus on the consequences
of this credit expansion and test for the types of originated mortgages and their
ex-post delinquency rate.
34[124] documents a disruption to the securitization market after 2007-Q1 which would have
affected the mortgage companies as they primarily rely on securitizing their originated mortgages.
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1.6 Results: Consequences of IMC mortgage credit growth
1.6.1 Types of mortgage issuance
I use the information in the BBx dataset to classify loans as Alt-A, Subprime, Com-
plex and Low-doc loans. Alt-A, which stands for Alternative-A, are loans which are
typically originated to moderate and good credit quality borrowers, who would oth-
erwise qualify for a prime loan (see [136]), with an aggressive underwriting compared
to conforming or jumbo classes. These loans typically have no income documen-
tation and/or have higher loan-to-value ratios due to which they do not qualify as
conforming mortgages. Subprime loans are loans mainly made to lower credit qual-
ity borrowers (see [13]) who have impaired or incomplete credit histories. I classify
complex mortgages to be either Interest Only, Hybrid ARM, Pay-option ARM, and
Negative Amortizing mortgages.
Since the early 2000s, there has been a rapid growth in these non-traditional
mortgages. For instance, IOs and Pay-option ARMs represented only 3% of the total
non-prime mortgage originations in 2002, but rose to more than 50% at the end of
2005 ([11]). Hybrid ARMs, which were the most common non-traditional mortgages,
represented about 75% of the loans in subprime securitizations from 2004 to 2006
([55]). Hybrid ARMs were a combination of fixed and adjustable rate mortgages that
had a fixed interest rate in the initial period followed by an adjustable rate period.35
Pay-option ARMs allowed investors to choose among 3 payment options each month:
(i) paying the monthly principal and interest according to the amortization schedule,
(ii) paying the interest only (IOs), or (iii) paying a minimum amount that is less than
the interest owed (Negative Amortization). Borrowers found Pay-option ARMs and
Hybrid ARMs attractive as a result of the teaser rates that were offered in the form of
35A 2/28 hybrid ARM meant that it has 2 years of a fixed rate and 28 years of adjustable rates
typically adjusting every six months.
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minimum initial payments. However, at the end of the initial period for these ARMs,
the mortgage payments went up substantially after accounting for any missed and
lower interest payments.36 Furthermore, with the advent of automated underwriting,
Subprime and Alt-A loans with low- or no-documentation rose significantly from 11%
in 2003 to about 33% of all mortgage originations in 2005 ([11]).
The effect of a positive funding shock to IMCs can manifest itself in the form of
origination of riskier mortgage types. As Section 1.2 discuses, this is especially likely
in the presence of a saturated prime mortgage market and the broker incentives in
the form of higher commissions for non-prime loans and low-doc loans. Moreover, the
increased protection and seniority for warehouse lenders in the post-BAPCPA period
likely reduced their due diligence for mortgage collateral placed under repo financ-
ing agreements. Without adequate due diligence, originators (possibly in collusion
with the borrowers) can have significant incentives to misreport information on the
loan applications. For instance [89] showed that the income in low-documentation
loans had been overstated by 20% to 25%. [121], and [75] document misreporting
of mortgage characteristics for loans in the non-agency market. These misreported
loans eventually had over a 50% higher likelihood of defaulting compared to the loans
without any misreporting.
I test whether the positive funding shock to IMCs resulted in the origination
of risky mortgage types in Table 8. I run the baseline regression specification in
Equation 1 with the dependent variables as the growth in the number and volume
of different types of mortgages loans. Panel A shows the results for the full sample,
which indicates that the growth of Alt-A, Subprime, Complex and Low-doc mortgages
rose significantly after BAPCPA for the IMCs compared to the AMCs. Moreover,
the growth in Alt-A, Low-doc, and Complex loans is larger than the growth in overall
36Borrowers were also assured that they could refinance the loan with a new teaser rate when
their monthly payments went up. However, a major assumption was that the house price would be
higher for the refinance.
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loans reported in Table 2.
1.6.2 Mortgage defaults
I now compare the performance of the loans originated by IMC before and after the
BAPCPA. As argued in the previous section, if the funding shock to IMCs led to
the origination of riskier mortgages, then loans in the post-BAPCPA period should
underperform loans in the pre-BAPCPA period. Following KMSV I define a default
to occur if any of the following three conditions are true: (i) The loans are 60+ days
delinquent as defined by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS),37 (ii) the loan is in
foreclosure, or (iii) the loan is real estate owned (REO). I compute the frequency of
defaulted loans that were originated every quarter around the BAPCPA and regress
it on dPostBAPCPA×dIMC after controlling for the difference in loan-mix of each
institution that might drive defaults ([102]). Additionally, I compute the frequency of
defaults over multiple horizons, namely early defaults (loans that became delinquent
within 6 months of the first payment date), 15 months, 18 months, 2 years, 3 years
after origination and until the end of 2010.
The plot of the fraction of loan defaults within 2 years after origination between
IMCs and AMCs is presented in Figure 5. The default rates of IMCs and AMCs in
the pre-BAPCPA period do not differ significantly from each other, thus establishing
parallel trends between the treated (IMCs) and control (AMCs) groups prior to the
law change. This is also indicates that IMCs and AMCs did not differ in the riskiness
of their mortgage issuances prior to the passage of BAPCPA. However in the post-
BAPCPA period, the default rate of IMCs is significantly greater than that of AMCs
and trends upward over time.
37As KMSV point out, there are two different definitions of default used in the industry – the OTS
definition and the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) definition. The OTS starts counting the
days of delinquency one month after the missed payment whereas MBA starts counting it from the
day after the payment is missed. Thus, OTS’s delinquency definition is more stringent compared to
MBA’s.
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Next, I analyze the time variation of defaults in Table 9. The dependent variable
for these specifications are early default rates (default rates within 6 months of the
first payment date), and defaults within 15 months, 18 months, 2 years, 3 years and
until the end of 2010. The rate of defaults increases over time for IMCs compared
to AMCs in the post- vs pre-default period. This is consistent with the origination
of complex mortgages such as Interest Only, Hybrid ARM, Pay-option ARM, and
Negative Amortizing mortgages. These mortgages tend to have lower payments in
the initial periods before the monthly payments spike up. The typical reset period
for such loans is around two years. That is arguably why default rates peak after two
years (2.24%) for the IMCs in the post BAPCPA period, as seen by the magnitude
of the coefficient on dPostBAPCPA×dIMC in Column (4).
In Table 10, I run the default regressions with the percentage of defaults in 2 years
as the dependent for subsamples of borrower credit quality based on FICO scores
as defined in Section 1.5.1.1. The results show that the frequency of defaults was
the highest for medium credit quality borrower (3.69%) followed by the high credit
quality borrower (3.01%). This is likely to be a result of the ease of securitization and
issuance of Alt-A loans in the medium and good credit quality categories. Moreover,
it indicates risk-shifting by originators within these better quality borrowers which is
consistent with the notion of lower due diligence after BAPCPA. Finally, in Table 11
I analyze the default frequency subsamples based on high and low income, growth
in per-capita income, and competition. Columns (3) and (4) show that the default
frequency is higher for individuals with a higher income (3.31%) and for those counties
with a higher growth in per-capita income (3.36%) just as the results in Table 10.
To classify counties as high and low competition counties, I construct a Herfind-
ahl index (HHI) of loan origination concentration at the county-level using the entire
HMDA dataset by aggregating the loans by each originator in a given county. Coun-
ties with HHI below (above) the median county HHI are then classified as high (low)
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competition counties. Column (6) in Table 8 shows that the default frequency in coun-
ties with greater competition is 2.11% higher in the post-BAPCPA period compared
to the pre-BAPCPA period. However, the default frequencies for the low competition
counties are not significantly different between the pre- and post BAPCPA period as
shown in column (5). This suggests that the expansion of risky mortgage credit took
place in counties with higher competition.
Overall, the performance of loans originated by IMCs after BAPCPA is lower
compared to the loans originated before the BAPCPA. The subsample analyses are
in line with the origination of riskier mortgages due to the incentives of the mortgage
brokers in the form of higher commissions for riskier loans.
1.6.3 Effect on house prices
Recent literature has focused on the effect of credit supply on house prices. For
instance, [59] use the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act (IBBEA) of 1994 to show the casual effect of an increase in credit availability
on house prices; [6] use the exogenous changes in the conforming loan limit on house
prices; while [45] exploit OCC’s federal preemption for national banks from predatory
lending on house price growth. In similar spirit, I test the effect of an increase in credit
availability after the BAPCPA on house prices. However, for this study I now limit
my sample to counties with a significant presence of IMCs and AMCs lending and
aggregate the originations of IMC and AMC firms at the quarter level. Specifically, I
use a subsample of counties in which IMCs and AMCs together originate more than
50% of all the mortgages in the event window around BAPCPA. Further, I classify
these counties every quarter by creating a dummy variable dHighIMC, which takes
the value 1 if the growth in the volume of mortgage loans issued is higher for IMCs
than AMCs in a given county and quarter. House prices at the county-quarter level
are gathered from zillow.com. I collect the median estimated house price for single
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family homes, median estimated house prices for the bottom, middle and top tier
homes in each county. Tiers in zillow are defined by dividing the house prices in a
region into terciles.
To test for the growth in house prices after the passage of the 2005 BAPCPA act,
I estimate the following model on quarterly data at the county-quarter observation
level:
gHc,t = α+β1dPostBAPCPA×dHighIMCc,t+β2dHighIMCc,t+β3dPostBAPCPA
+ θgXc,t−1 + λc + δt + εct (4)
where gHct is the log growth rate in house prices in county c and quarter t in annual
terms, and gXc,t−1 are the current and lagged control variables which include county
c’s growth rates in population, per-capita income and competition in mortgage origi-
nation. dHighIMCc,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the growth rate
of the aggregated IMC loans in county c and quarter t is greater than the growth rate
of the aggregated AMC loans, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, I also include county
and quarter fixed-effects in all the regressions. The assignment of dHighIMCc,t to
counties cannot be argued to be completely exogenous, hence the following results
indicate the association of credit growth due to BAPCPA and house prices rather
than a causal interpretation.38
Table 12 presents the regression results and the coefficient on dPostBAPCPA×
dHighIMC determines the consequence of credit expansion on house price growth.
Column (1) indicates that the median house price growth for single family homes
was higher by 1.97% per year in counties which had a higher growth in mortgage
originations due to IMCs in the post BAPCPA period. Columns (2)-(4) indicate that
the house price appreciation is higher for the middle (2.44%) and top (2.97%) tercile
38For example, if IMCs have a greater propensity to expand in counties with rising house prices
compared to AMCs, then this omitted variable can introduce a positive bias while estimating coef-
ficients involving dHighIMCc,t.
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of house prices. This is in line with the higher default rates observed for the medium
and good quality borrowers in Table 10, which are likely explained by the boom and
the subsequent bust of house prices in these counties.
As robustness, I also test within the subsample of counties with high and low
housing supply elasticities39 in Table 13 as the effect of credit supply on house prices
are expected to be more pronounced in the areas with a low housing supply elasticity.
Consistent with expectation, the growth in house prices in the post BAPCPA period
in the high-IMC mortgage origination counties with low housing supply elasticities
is more than twice as high when compared to Table 12 and is significant for all
specifications. The house price growth per year are 6.33% for the median single
family homes and 4.82%, 6.73% and 5.57% for median house prices in the bottom,
middle and top tiers respectively. On the other hand, high-IMC mortgage origination
counties with high housing supply elasticities do not experience any significant growth
in house prices post-BAPCPA compared with pre-BAPCPA.
1.7 Conclusion
The past decade saw an unprecedented growth in mortgage credit which eventually
led to the 2008 housing crisis and the recent economic downturn. Since then there
has been a push to understand the role of the mortgage industry and its interplay
with regulation in leading to the 2008 financial crisis. This paper provides evidence
for one such channel that induced credit expansion in the recent decade. Specifically,
this paper documents an increase in risky mortgage credit due to the unintended
consequences of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA) which expanded the safe harbored repos to include mortgage related
securities.
BAPCPA effectively increased repo creditors’ protection thereby subsidized repo
39I define low supply elasticity counties as ranks 1 to 47 and high supply elasticity counties as 48
to 95 from [131]
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financing, and triggered the use of repurchase agreements by Independent Mortgage
Companies (IMCs) to finance their mortgage originations. Using BAPCPA as an
exogenous shock to IMCs’ funding, and multiple identification strategies based on
funding constraints, discontinuity in securitization propensity, and geographic dis-
continuity in anti-predatory lending laws, I document an increase in the growth of
mortgage credit in the post-BAPCPA period compared with the pre-BAPCPA pe-
riod. Consistent with a supply shock that reduces credit rationing, I find that the
growth in mortgage credit is not uniform across all borrowers, but is higher among
borrowers with lower credit quality. In line with a reduction in mortgage financing
costs, I also find that IMCs charged lower interest rates on their originated mortgages
after controlling for the risk of mortgage loans.
Further analysis of the types of mortgages originated in the post-BAPCPA by
IMCs reveals a higher degree of growth in risky mortgage types which culminated in
higher ex-post defaults rates. Interestingly, the default rates, when compared to those
of a control group, are higher for medium and high quality borrowers. This suggests
risk-shifting by IMCs within good quality borrowers, potentially due to greater cred-
itor protection in the post-BAPCPA period which disincentivized warehouse lenders’
due diligence. Furthermore, in line with the recent literature showing a causal link
between credit growth and asset prices, I find that counties experiencing a higher
growth in mortgage credit through IMCs also experienced a higher growth in house
prices. The growth in house prices also has a similar pattern as defaults, wherein it
is higher for medium and higher house price indexes.
The early 2000s saw an exponential growth in technology (automated under-
writing) and financial engineering (option ARMs, IOs, MBS, CDOs etc). We also
witnessed public policy promoting homeownership and the eventual saturation of
the prime market. In the midst of this environment, I document the unintended
and unanticipated consequences of a financial regulation namely BAPCPA. Although
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BAPCPA was intended to reduce systemic risk, it ironically increased the U.S. house-
hold leverage by encouraging the underwriting of riskier mortgages enabled by the
incentive structure of certain mortgage lenders. This conceivably, at least in part,
enabled the boom and eventual bust of the U.S. mortgage market. Specifically for
BAPCPA, there still exists a debate on the costs and benefits of privileged status of
derivatives in bankruptcy. The results in this paper enrich that debate by furnishing
new evidence on the real costs of BAPCPA related to the safe harbor exemptions
for repos. Thus, the results of this paper also contribute to the literature exploring
regulatory design by documenting the unanticipated real costs of BAPCPA.
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Figure 1: 8-K Filings Parsing
The figure presents the number of occurrences of master repurchase and master loan agreements
in the 8-K filings for firms belonging to the SIC codes 6162 (Mortgage Bankers and Loan Corre-
spondents), 6163 (Loan Brokers), 6798 (Real Estate Investment Trusts) from 2004 to 2007. These
SIC codes are assigned to most Independent Mortgage Companies (IMCs). The dashed vertical line
indicates the passage of BAPCPA while the solid vertical line indicates the quarter since BAPCPA
went into effect.
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Figure 2: IMC vs AMC Quarterly Growth Rates Trend
The figure presents the quarterly growth rates for IMCs compared with AMCs before and after the
2005 BAPCPA. The figure plots the point estimates for the leading and lagging indicators over 2
years before and after BAPCPA using the following specification: Yict = α + β−3dIMCQtri,−3 +
β−2dIMCQtri,−2 +β0dIMCQtri,0 + · · ·+β7dIMCQtri,7 +λi+δct+εict. Yict is the log growth rate
in the volume of loans issued by firm i, in county c and quarter t. dIMCQtri,t ∀t ∈ {−2, 0, 1, . . . , 7}
is a dummy variable set to 1 if firm i is an IMC and t is the number of quarters before/after the
quarter in which BAPCPA takes effect, and 0 otherwise. dIMCQtri,−3 is a dummy variable set to 1
from the eighth quarter up to and including the third quarter prior to the quarter in which BAPCPA
takes effect. λi and δct are firm and county×quarter fixed effects respectively. The vertical bars
correspond to the 95% confidence intervals of the point estimates. The solid black vertical line at
0 represents 2005-Q4 which is when the BAPCPA regulation took effect. The dot-dashed red line
is the best fit line in the pre- and post-BAPCPA period indicating the trend of growth rates over
time. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level.
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Figure 3: Discontinuity in Low-Doc Loan Issuance : Around 620 FICO Threshold
The figure shows the number and volume of low-documentation mortgages issued at each FICO
score in blue dots. The black solid line fits a flexible seventh-order polynomial as in Equation 2 on
either side of the cut-off FICO score of 620. The red lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The
black dashed line passes through the 620 FICO score point.
(a) Pre-Bankruptcy Act: Number of
Loans
(b) Post-Bankruptcy Act: Number of
Loans
(c) Pre-Bankruptcy Act: Volume of Loans
(d) Post-Bankruptcy Act: Volume of
Loans
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Figure 4: Discontinuity in Loan Growth
The figure shows the growth in the number and volume of low- and full-documentation mortgages
issued at each FICO score in blue dots. The threshold for low-documentation loans is 620 and for
full documentation loans is 580. The black solid line fits a non-parametric local linear polynomial
using a triangular kernel within a bandwidth of 30 around the threshold. The red long-dashed lines
are the 95% confidence intervals. The black dashed line passes through the threshold FICO score
point.
(a) Growth in Number of Low-doc Loans (b) Growth in Volume of Low-doc Loans
(c) Growth in Number of Full-doc Loans (d) Growth in Volume of Full-doc Loans
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Figure 5: IMC vs AMC Quarterly Default Rates Trend
The figure presents the quarterly default rates for IMCs compared with AMCs before and after the
2005 BAPCPA. The figure plots the point estimates for the leading and lagging indicators before and
after BAPCPA using the following specification: Dict = α+β−3dIMCQtri,−3+β−2dIMCQtri,−2+
β0dIMCQtri,0+· · ·+β5dIMCQtri,5+λi+γc+δt+Xict+εict. Dict is the percentage of defaulted loans
issued by firm i, in county c and quarter t. dIMCQtri,t ∀t ∈ {−2, 0, 1, . . . , 5} is a dummy variable
set to 1 if firm i is an IMC and t is the number of quarters before/after the quarter in which BAPCPA
takes effect, and 0 otherwise. dIMCQtri,−3 is a dummy variable set to 1 from the eighth quarter up
to and including the third quarter prior to the quarter in which BAPCPA takes effect. Xict are a set
of controls including the perentage of ARM and Low-Doc loans, loans with a prepayment penalty,
and average borrower FICO, loan amount, LTV ratio and interest rate computed for issuances by
firm i, in county c and quarter t. λi and δct are firm and county×quarter fixed effects respectively.
The vertical bars correspond to the 95% confidence intervals of the point estimates. The solid black
vertical line at 0 represents 2005-Q4 which is when the BAPCPA regulation took effect. The dot-
dashed red line is the best fit line in the pre- and post-BAPCPA period indicating the trend of
growth rates over time. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the 2005
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) for IMCs (independent
mortgage companies) and AMCs (affiliated mortgage companies). The BAPCPA was signed into
law on April 14th 2005 and took effect in October 2005. The Pre-BAPCPA period refers to six
quarters from 2004Q2 to 2005Q3, and the Post-BAPCPA period refers to six quarters from 2005Q4
to 2007Q1. Loan-types are defined in A.1.
Panel A:Main Loan Variables
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA
IMC AMC IMC AMC
Total Number of Loans (1000s) 385.82 144.27 469.20 199.98
Total Loan Dollar Volume ($ Billions) 86.31 37.20 118.41 54.81
Average Loan Amount (1000s) 223.70 257.84 252.37 274.06
Average Loan-to-Income Ratio 2.75 2.75 2.74 2.64
Average Loan-to-Value Ratio 82.36 81.95 81.84 81.43
Average FICO Score 671.45 679.74 665.93 671.99
Average Borrower Income (1000s) 84.74 98.44 96.54 109.47
Average Initial Interest Rate (%) 6.67 6.45 7.61 7.41
Panel B:Loan Types
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA
IMC AMC IMC AMC
Low Documentation Loans (%) 52.77 56.30 61.40 62.57
Alt-A Loans (%) 19.60 17.58 19.95 19.13
Subprime Loans (%) 26.13 22.90 32.92 27.57
ARM Loans (%) 80.08 76.58 77.41 71.48
Loans with Pre-payment Penalty (%) 53.38 46.04 53.12 49.74
Complex Loans (%) 43.13 48.61 41.51 53.24
Jumbo Loans (%) 17.58 25.17 16.52 22.87
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Table 2: Mortgage Credit Growth: Exploiting Funding Constraints – IMCs vs AMCs
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the 2005
BAPCPA between IMCs and AMCs. The dataset is at the mortgage originating firm-county-quarter
level. The dependent variables in columns (1)–(4) are quarterly growth rates in total volume of loans
(g LoanVol), total number of loans (g LoanNum), total volume of jumbo loans (g JumboVol), total
number of jumbo loans (g JumboNum) made by a mortgage originating firm in a given county
and quarter. The dependent variables in columns (5) & (6) are the average initial interest rate
(AvgIntRate) in percentage terms, and the average loan-to-income ratio (AvgIntRate). The Indicator
variable dPostBAPCPA takes the value 1 for six quarters from 2005Q4 to 2007Q1 and 0 for six
quarters from 2004Q2 to 2005Q3. The Indicator variable dIMC is equal to 1 if the mortgage
originating firm is an IMC, and 0 otherwise. Other regression loan-mix controls are defined in A.1.
All regressions include Firm FE and County×Quarter FE. T -statistics displayed in parentheses are
robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%,
and 1% respectively.
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum g JumboVol g JumboNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.08*** 0.04***
(11.57) (13.18) (2.95) (3.09) (-8.89) (6.17)




ARM Loans(%) 0.01 0.07***
(0.53) (11.35)
Alt-A Loans(%) 0.33*** -0.02**
(24.80) (-2.50)
Subprime Loans(%) 0.86*** -0.04***
(51.68) (-4.06)
LowDoc Loans(%) 0.23*** -0.06***
(25.58) (-12.97)
Firm FE X X X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X X X
N 295932 295932 53194 53194 267885 264277
Adj. R2 0.051 0.053 0.054 0.060 0.603 0.369
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Table 3: Mortgage Credit Growth: Variation Across Borrower Quality
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the
2005 BAPCPA between IMCs and AMCs across subsamples of low (FICO ≤ 620), medium (620 ≤
FICO ≤ 680), and high (FICO ≥ 680) quality borrowers. The dataset is at the mortgage originating
firm-county-quarter level. The dependent and independent variables are the same as in Table 2.
All regressions include Firm FE and County×Quarter FE. T -statistics displayed in parentheses are
robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%,
and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Low Borrower Quality – FICO Category 500–619
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.17*** 0.16*** -0.11*** 0.02*
(9.91) (10.17) (-5.99) (1.65)
Loan-mix Controls X X
Firm FE X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X
N 121216 121216 114141 112937
Adj. R2 0.028 0.026 0.392 0.298
Panel B: Medium Borrower Quality – FICO Category 620–680
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.13*** 0.14*** -0.04** 0.06***
(8.97) (9.71) (-2.38) (6.54)
Loan-mix Controls X X
Firm FE X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X
N 143013 143013 134569 132634
Adj. R2 0.036 0.035 0.379 0.312
Panel C: High Borrower Quality – FICO Category 681–800
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.12*** 0.12*** -0.02 0.05***
(7.82) (8.69) (-1.22) (5.30)
Loan-mix Controls X X
Firm FE X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X
N 152638 152638 142277 140433
Adj. R2 0.047 0.048 0.325 0.338
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Table 4: Mortgage Credit Growth: Exploiting Funding Constraints within IMCs
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the 2005
BAPCPA between small and large IMCs. Large IMCs (Small IMCs) are defined as IMCs which
are above (below) the median in terms of the aggregate volume of mortgage origination between
2001–2003. The Indicator variable dPostBAPCPA takes the value 1 for six quarters from 2005Q4 to
2007Q1 and 0 for six quarters from 2004Q2 to 2005Q3. The Indicator variable dSmallIMC is equal
to 1 if the mortgage originating IMC is a small IMC, and 0 otherwise. The dependent and rest of the
control variables are the same as in Table 2. All regressions include Firm FE and County×Quarter
FE. T -statistics displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and
*** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum g JumboVol g JumboNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dPostBAPCPA×dSmallIMC 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.04*** 0.01
(6.62) (6.56) (3.42) (3.08) (-4.81) (1.63)




ARM Loans(%) -0.00 0.06***
(-0.07) (8.88)
Alt-A Loans(%) 0.33*** -0.02**
(22.13) (-2.02)
Subprime Loans(%) 0.86*** -0.03***
(48.57) (-3.10)
LowDoc Loans(%) 0.23*** -0.06***
(22.22) (-10.02)
Firm FE X X X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X X X
N 205458 205458 36240 36240 184967 182617
Adj. R2 0.053 0.056 0.056 0.062 0.601 0.364
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Table 5: Mortgage Credit Growth: Exploiting Securitization Propensity
Panel A of this table presents the estimates in the regression specification Equation 2 in which a
fifth degree distance polynomial is fitted on either side of the threshold value. Panel B fits a non-
parametric local linear polynomial using a triangular kernel within an optimal bandwidth proposed
by [28]. The dependent variable in both panels is either the growth in number or volume of mortgage
originations at each FICO score from the pre- to post-BAPCPA period covering 2004Q2 to 2007Q1.
The Indicator variable dThreshold is equal to 1 if the FICO score is greater than 620 (580) for low
(full) documentation loans, and 0 otherwise. T -statistics displayed in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Flexible fifth degree polynomial fit
Low-Doc Loans (FICO Threshold=620) Full-Doc Loans (FICO Threshold=580)
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum g LoanVol g LoanNum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dThreshold 0.21*** 0.22** 0.02 0.03
(2.82) (2.52) (0.39) (0.50)
N 301 301 301 301
Adj. R2 0.597 0.562 0.939 0.900
Panel B: Local linear polynomial fit within optimal bandwidth
Low Doc Loans (FICO Threshold=620) Full Doc Loans (FICO Threshold=580)
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum g LoanVol g LoanNum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d Threshold 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.08*
(4.30) (5.68) (3.45) (1.83)
N 57 57 41 41
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Table 6: Mortgage Credit Growth: Exploiting APL Laws Across State Borders
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of IMC loan origination before and after
the 2005 BAPCPA between counties bordering states with weak and strong anti-predatory lend-
ing (APL) laws. The dataset is at the mortgage originating firm-county-quarter level. States are
sorted in ascending order based on the strength of the enforcement of APL laws presented in Ta-
ble A.5. States in the top and bottom half are classified as weak-APL states and strong-APL states
respectively. Neighboring counties are defined as counties within 30 miles across borders of states
with weak and strong APL laws. The dummy variable dWeakAPLCounty is equal to 1 if a county
belongs to a weak-APL state and is 0 otherwise. The dependent variable and rest of the control
variables are the same as in Table 2. All regressions include Firm FE, County, and Quarter FE.
T -statistics displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and ***
indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dWeakAPLCounty 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.06* 0.04**
(2.96) (2.96) (-1.66) (2.32)




ARM Loans (%) 0.10*** 0.04**
(3.28) (2.50)
Alt-A Loans (%) 0.27*** -0.04*
(7.28) (-1.82)
Subprime Loans (%) 0.75*** -0.03
(20.39) (-1.13)
LowDoc Loans (%) 0.28*** -0.05***
(12.96) (-3.63)
Firm FE X X X X
County FE X X X X
Quarter FE X X X X
N 31786 31786 28387 28069
Adj. R2 0.033 0.034 0.562 0.353
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Table 7: Mortgage Credit Growth: Testing Alternate Hypotheses
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the
2005 BAPCPA between IMCs and AMCs across different subsamples to test the borrower demand
hypothesis and the house-price appreciation hypothesis. The dataset is at the mortgage originating
firm-county-quarter level. The subsamples in Panel A columns (1), (4) and (2), (5) are counties with
the lowest per-capita income growth (LowPCI g) and lowest median income growth (LowMedInc g).
The lowest group in each case is defined as the 1st quartile of growth rates computed over the
2004–2006 period for each county and then ordered from the smallest to the largest value. The
LowIncome subsample in Panel A column (3), (6) consists of borrowers whose income is below
0.8×their median county income. The VHighSupElas and HighSupElas subsamples in Panel B are
defined as counties that overlap with MSAs (metro statistical areas) ranked based on land supply
elasticities between 72–95 and 48–95 respectively from Table VI in [131]. The dependent variable in
Panel A columns (1)–(3) and Panel B columns (1)–(2) is the quarterly growth rate in total volume
of loans (g LoanVol). The dependent variable in Panel A columns (4)–(6) and Panel B columns
(3)–(4) is the quarterly growth rate in total number of loans (g LoanNum). The Indicator variable
dPostBAPCPA takes the value 1 for six quarters from 2005Q4 to 2007Q1 and 0 for six quarters from
2004Q2 to 2005Q3. The Indicator variable dIMC is equal to 1 if the mortgage originating firm is
an IMC, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include Firm FE and County×Quarter FE. T -statistics
displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Testing the Demand Hypothesis
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum
Subsample: LowPCI g LowMedInc g LowIncome LowPCI g LowMedInc g LowIncome
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.07** 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.06** 0.05** 0.13***
(2.49) (3.20) (7.13) (2.12) (2.38) (7.18)
Firm FE X X X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X X X
N 31329 63354 85537 31329 63354 85537
Adj. R2 0.032 0.044 0.070 0.033 0.041 0.091
Panel B: Testing the House Price Appreciation Hpothesis
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum
Subsample: VHighSupElas HighSupElas VHighSupElas HighSupElas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.05* 0.08*** 0.04 0.07***
(1.97) (4.71) (1.63) (3.90)
Firm FE X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X
N 40162 75530 40162 75530




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Consequences of Mortgage Credit Growth: Loan Defaults – Time Variation
This table examines the percentage of defaulted loans among the loans that were originated around
the 2005 BAPCPA period over different time horizons. The dependent variable for each column is
the percentage of defaulted loans within a given time-period after origination as specified by the
header of the column. A loan is classified as under default if any of the conditions are true: (a)
payments on the loan are 60+ days late as defined by the Office of Thrift Supervision; (b) the loan
is in foreclosure; or (c) the loan is real estate owned (REO), that is, the bank has retaken possession
of the home. Early default (Early) is defined as the loan which defaults within six months from the
first payment date. The Indicator variable dPostBAPCPA takes the value 1 for six quarters from
2005Q4 to 2007Q1 and 0 for six quarters from 2004Q2 to 2005Q3. The Indicator variable dIMC is
equal to 1 if the mortgage originating firm is an IMC, and 0 otherwise. Rest of the control variables
are defined in A.1. All regressions include Firm FE and County FE and Loan Origination Quarter
FE. T -statistics displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and
*** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Depvar: Default Percentage Early 15 Mons 18 Mons 2 Yrs 3 Yrs Until 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.11 0.57** 0.96*** 2.24*** 1.67*** 1.03**
(0.92) (2.28) (3.17) (5.53) (3.20) (2.08)
ARM Loans(%) 0.85*** 2.97*** 4.00*** 6.09*** 10.69*** 8.47***
(7.53) (14.53) (16.89) (20.87) (29.72) (21.86)
Low-Doc Loans(%) 1.10*** 2.68*** 3.36*** 4.56*** 6.50*** 8.97***
(9.86) (13.65) (15.79) (17.33) (20.51) (28.23)
PPt-Penalty Loans (%) 0.66*** 0.96*** 1.56*** 2.80*** 4.23*** 5.12***
(5.92) (3.62) (5.50) (8.57) (10.39) (10.99)
Avg FICO (log) -17.51*** -54.90*** -67.87*** -88.98*** -112.30*** -120.95***
(-25.57) (-46.19) (-52.46) (-58.75) (-60.96) (-57.40)
Avg LoanAmt (log) 0.88*** 2.30*** 2.67*** 3.49*** 3.97*** 3.09***
(6.83) (9.78) (9.83) (11.01) (10.64) (7.23)
Avg LTV 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.24***
(5.21) (4.45) (4.89) (5.77) (9.81) (12.56)
Avg IntRate(%) 0.33*** 1.24*** 1.43*** 1.77*** 1.94*** 1.48***
(11.05) (21.56) (21.98) (24.73) (21.97) (15.48)
Firm FE X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X
Origination-quarter FE X X X X X X
N 276568 276568 276568 276568 276568 276568
Adj. R2 0.051 0.112 0.133 0.174 0.240 0.225
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Table 10: Consequences of Mortgage Credit Growth: Loan Defaults Across Borrower
Quality
This table examines the percentage of defaulted loans among the loans that were originated around
the 2005 BAPCPA period over subsamples of different borrower quality. The dependent variable
in each column is the percentage of defaulted loans within two years after origination. A loan is
classified as under default if any of the conditions are true: (a) payments on the loan are 60+ days
late as defined by the Office of Thrift Supervision; (b) the loan is in foreclosure; or (c) the loan is
real estate owned (REO), that is, the bank has retaken possession of the home. Loans are classified
based on borrower credit quality namely: low (FICO ≤ 620), medium (620 ≤ FICO ≤ 680), and high
(FICO ≥ 680) quality. The Indicator variable dPostBAPCPA takes the value 1 for six quarters from
2005Q4 to 2007Q1 and 0 for six quarters from 2004Q2 to 2005Q3. The Indicator variable dIMC is
equal to 1 if the mortgage originating firm is an IMC, and 0 otherwise. Rest of the control variables
are defined in A.1. All regressions include Firm FE and County FE and Loan Origination Quarter
FE. T -statistics displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and
*** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Borrower Quality
Depvar: Default Percentage FullSample Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 2.24*** 1.22** 3.69*** 3.01***
(5.53) (2.17) (6.60) (7.61)
ARM Loans(%) 6.09*** 3.00*** 6.37*** 6.66***
(20.87) (5.90) (16.28) (19.74)
Low-Doc Loans(%) 4.56*** 4.96*** 5.97*** 5.59***
(17.33) (10.34) (16.73) (20.29)
PPt-Penalty Loans (%) 2.80*** 1.58** 2.96*** 1.04***
(8.57) (2.19) (5.43) (3.33)
Avg FICO (log) -88.98*** -12.57*** -16.38*** -13.50***
(-58.75) (-5.05) (-7.22) (-7.40)
Avg LoanAmt (log) 3.49*** 2.18*** 4.50*** 2.69***
(11.01) (4.51) (10.51) (7.59)
Avg LTV 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.11***
(5.77) (4.34) (3.00) (7.88)
Avg IntRate(%) 1.77*** 1.29*** 1.63*** 1.23***
(24.73) (9.16) (15.20) (14.86)
Firm FE X X X X
County FE X X X X
Origination-quarter FE X X X X
N 276568 176714 188738 168855
Adj. R2 0.174 0.083 0.146 0.157
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Table 11: Consequences of Mortgage Credit Growth: Loan Defaults in Subsamples
This table examines the percentage of defaulted loans among the loans that were originated around
the 2005 BAPCPA period over various subsamples. The dependent variable in each column is the
percentage of defaulted loans within two years after origination. A loan is classified as under default
if any of the conditions are true: (a) payments on the loan are 60+ days late as defined by the Office
of Thrift Supervision; (b) the loan is in foreclosure; or (c) the loan is real estate owned (REO),
that is, the bank has retaken possession of the home. The header for each column indicates the
subsample of loans. The LowIncome (HighIncome) subsample consists of loans made to borrowers
whose income is below (above) 0.8×their median county income (1.2×their median county income) .
The g LowPCI (g HighPCI ) subsample consists of loans made in counties with the lowest per-capita
income growth. The lowest (highest) group in each case is defined as the 1st (4th) quartile of growth
rates computed over the 2004–2006 period for each county and then ordered from the smallest to the
largest value. The HighComp (LowComp) subsample consists of loans made to borrowers in counties
with lending competition above (below) the median lending competition. Lending competition in a
county is computed using the entire HMDA dataset from 2004–2006. It is defined as the Herfindahl
index of loan originations by firms in a county. The Indicator variable dPostBAPCPA takes the
value 1 for six quarters from 2005Q4 to 2007Q1 and 0 for six quarters from 2004Q2 to 2005Q3. The
Indicator variable dIMC is equal to 1 if the mortgage originating firm is an IMC, and 0 otherwise.
Rest of the control variables are defined in A.1. All regressions include Firm FE and County FE
and Loan Origination Quarter FE. T -statistics displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at
the County level. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Depvar: Default Percentage LowIncome g LowPCI HighIncome g HighPCI LowComp HighComp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC -0.58 -0.24 3.31*** 3.36*** -1.65 2.11***
(-1.10) (-0.26) (7.16) (5.64) (-1.28) (5.27)
ARM Loans(%) 2.51*** 5.79*** 6.73*** 6.38*** 3.90*** 6.14***
(4.44) (6.73) (20.40) (13.43) (4.08) (20.32)
Low-Doc Loans(%) 2.83*** 4.63*** 4.96*** 4.53*** 0.99 4.54***
(5.48) (5.31) (15.88) (10.39) (1.00) (16.65)
PPt-Penalty Loans (%) 0.77 4.78*** 2.19*** 3.06*** 3.63* 2.64***
(1.04) (4.60) (5.47) (5.93) (1.90) (8.09)
Avg FICO (log) -83.35*** -95.30*** -81.47*** -84.10*** -88.10*** -87.91***
(-26.85) (-21.32) (-46.06) (-32.96) (-15.26) (-55.76)
Avg LoanAmt (log) 4.09*** 3.16*** 2.90*** 3.61*** 1.21 3.59***
(7.69) (3.29) (7.79) (6.83) (1.10) (10.83)
Avg LTV 0.03 0.04 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.02 0.08***
(1.17) (0.93) (5.48) (4.04) (-0.32) (5.63)
Avg IntRate(%) 1.62*** 1.86*** 1.75*** 1.72*** 1.82*** 1.79***
(9.37) (7.63) (20.50) (14.71) (6.00) (24.12)
Firm FE X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X
Origination-quarter FE X X X X X X
N 90157 31864 196810 95279 15985 250266
Adj. R2 0.108 0.153 0.164 0.199 0.106 0.176
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Table 12: Consequences of Mortgage Credit Growth: House Price Growth
This table examines the changes in house price growth before and after the 2005 BAPCPA be-
tween IMCs and AMCs. The dataset is at the county-quarter level. Median house prices at the
county-quarter level are gathered from zillow.com. The dependent variables in the regression are the
quarterly growth rates in house prices (g HP) in every county. SFH stands for the median single
family house price in a given county, quarter. While Bottom, Mid and Top are the median estimated
house price for the bottom, middle and top tier homes in each county, quarter respectively. Tiers in
zillow are defined by dividing the house prices in a region into terciles. The sample in this table is
limited to counties in which IMCs and AMCs together originate more than 50% of all the mortgages
issued in a county over the event window around BAPCPA. These counties are then classified every
quarter by comparing the growth rate in the volume of loans issued by IMCs with that of AMCs.
dHighIMC is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the growth in the volume of mortgage
loans issued is higher for IMCs than AMCs in a given county and quarter. The Indicator variable
dPostBAPCPA takes the value 1 for six quarters from 2005Q4 to 2007Q1 and 0 for six quarters from
2004Q2 to 2005Q3. Lagged values of county population growth and county per-capita income (PCI)
are included as controls in all specifications. All regressions include County FE, and Quarter FE.
T -statistics displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and ***
indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Depvar: g HP(SFH) g HP(Bottom) g HP(Mid) g HP(Top)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dHighIMC 1.88** 0.97 2.30** 2.82***
(2.00) (0.94) (2.46) (3.67)
dHighIMC -1.16* -0.35 -1.34* -1.90***
(-1.69) (-0.44) (-1.92) (-3.30)
Pop. growth(%) 2.24*** 2.56*** 2.52*** 2.35***
(6.67) (7.40) (8.26) (8.50)
PCI growth(%) 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.25***
(3.62) (3.50) (5.28) (3.25)
HHI growth(%) -3.90*** -3.80*** -3.35*** -2.35***
(-4.01) (-3.27) (-3.61) (-2.62)
Lagged Pop growth(%) 1.51*** 1.47*** 1.27*** 1.05***
(3.39) (3.91) (2.88) (3.43)
Lagged PCI growth(%) 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.36***
(3.61) (3.05) (4.10) (3.96)
Lagged HHI growth(%) 1.07 0.38 0.03 -0.51
(1.00) (0.30) (0.03) (-0.57)
County FE X X X X
Quarter FE X X X X
N 9656 8526 9128 9829
Adj. R2 0.381 0.395 0.419 0.370
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Table 13: Consequences of Mortgage Credit Growth: House Price Growth in Subsam-
ples
This table examines the changes in house price growth before and after the 2005 BAPCPA between
IMCs and AMCs in subsamples of high and low housing supply elasticities. The Low Housing Supply
Elasticity (Panel A) and High Housing Supply Elasticity (Panel B) subsamples are defined as counties
that overlap with MSAs (metro statistical areas) ranked based on land supply elasticities between
1–47 and 48–95 respectively from Table VI in [131]. The dependent and independent variables are
the same as in Table 12. All regressions include County FE, and Quarter FE. T -statistics displayed
in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Low Housing Supply Elasticity
Depvar: g HP(SFH) g HP(Bottom) g HP(Mid) g HP(Top)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dHighIMC 5.51** 4.04** 5.92*** 4.79***
(2.54) (1.98) (3.05) (2.97)
dHighIMC -3.30* -0.89 -3.05* -2.55*
(-1.75) (-0.48) (-1.72) (-1.74)
Pop. growth(%) 4.12*** 3.16*** 4.11*** 3.21***
(5.80) (5.37) (6.89) (4.91)
PCI growth(%) 0.94*** 0.81*** 0.96*** 0.76***
(5.87) (4.76) (7.29) (5.43)
HHI growth(%) -5.80** -6.99*** -3.26 -6.31***
(-2.34) (-2.61) (-1.62) (-2.93)
Lagged County controls X X X X
County FE X X X X
Quarter FE X X X X
N 2001 1967 1981 1994
Adj. R2 0.623 0.653 0.658 0.621
Panel B: High Housing Supply Elasticity
Depvar: g HP(SFH) g HP(Bottom) g HP(Mid) g HP(Top)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA*dHighIMC -0.74 -2.66 -0.15 1.01
(-0.49) (-1.33) (-0.09) (0.82)
dHighIMC 0.60 1.69 0.09 -0.40
(0.47) (1.00) (0.06) (-0.38)
Pop growth(%) 1.96*** 1.76** 1.91*** 1.03**
(3.38) (2.26) (3.48) (2.16)
PCI growth(%) -0.07 0.06 0.05 -0.01
(-0.41) (0.31) (0.40) (-0.08)
HHI growth(%) 1.13 -1.60 1.04 0.01
(0.69) (-0.72) (0.56) (0.01)
Lagged County controls X X X X
County FE X X X X
Quarter FE X X X X
N 2228 2026 2256 2297
Adj. R2 0.316 0.262 0.309 0.294
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CHAPTER II
ARE CREDIT RATINGS STILL RELEVANT?
2.1 Introduction
Credit rating agencies that specialize in assessing the credit worthiness of bond is-
suers are an integral component of the financial landscape. Investors, regulators, and
managers have historically relied on credit ratings, yet they are also frequently criti-
cized for their slow response in predicting corporate defaults (e.g., Enron, Worldcom),
accuracy of their ratings, and the conflicts of interest inherent in the agencies’ busi-
ness model (see [150]). As a consequence of these criticisms, regulators have initiated
proposals in the Dodd-Frank Act to reduce regulatory and supervisory reliance on
credit rating agencies.
A firm’s credit rating is the opinion of a particular credit rating agency about
the firm’s credit worthiness, and it reflects the agency’s view on the firm’s physical
default probability PDP. The prevailing consensus is that such opinion by a rat-
ing agency is relevant as documented by negative stock market reactions to rating
downgrade announcements (see for examples [77]; [47]; [90]). In contrast, CDS con-
tracts are a market-based measure of a firm’s default risk, and provide an estimate
of the firm’s risk-neutral default probability PDQ (see [98]). Although credit ratings
and CDS spreads provide an assessment of the firm’s default risk under two differ-
ent probability measures (P versus Q), insights based on Merton’s (1974) structural
model suggest they share common information about the firm’s fundamentals. If
CDS spreads provide information about the underlying firm, in lieu of, or in addition
to that conveyed by credit ratings, rating change announcements should become less
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pricing relevant to equity investors. In this paper, we analyze whether the stock mar-
ket still reacts to credit rating agencies’ downgrade announcements after CDS trades
on their underlying firm’s debt.
We use a comprehensive sample of credit rating change announcements from three
major credit rating agencies — Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, and find
that, consistent with the prior literature, stock and bond markets react significantly
negatively to credit rating downgrades. However, when CDS contracts are introduced
on the firm’s debt, the stock market reaction to credit rating downgrades is muted
compared with the period before CDS contracts start trading on a firm’s debt. Also,
stock and bond prices of firms with traded CDS contracts react significantly less to
rating downgrades relative to those of firms without traded CDS contracts. These
results are robust to a number of tests such as instrumental variable regressions and
propensity score matching analysis, which were used to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
In order to understand the information content of CDS contracts relative to credit
ratings, we first construct CDS-implied credit ratings non-parametrically following the
approach in [26] and [97] and find that they start deteriorating 180 days prior to a
downgrade. Second, using a semi-parametric hazard model (See [139] and [32]), we
find that CDS spreads contain information that significantly predict the likelihood
of rating downgrade announcements. In the same vein, we show that information in
CDS spreads complements credit ratings by enhancing corporate default prediction
models.
Bond yields also reflect the market’s assessment of a firm’s default risk. How-
ever, CDS contracts are standardized credit derivative contracts that generally trade
more liquidly than bonds and allow investors to more easily short or hedge credit
risk. Further, [98] and [56] show that CDS spreads are a “more pure” measure of a
firm’s default risk than corporate bond spreads (also see [147] and [144]). Using the
Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share measure, we show the CDS market, on average,
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dominates the bond market in credit price discovery (see also, [21]). However, before
rating downgrades, the CDS market’s information share increases substantially to
about 90% relative to the bond market. Thus, the CDS market is a leading venue for
credit price discovery before rating downgrade announcements.
The presence of the CDS market also helps improve equity valuation. Examining
the information flow between the CDS and stock markets, we find that unantici-
pated changes in CDS spreads lead stock returns, predominantly before firms are
downgraded. In support of our main conclusion, we find evidence suggesting that
stock prices react less to rating change announcements because a bulk of their price
adjustment occurred in the pre-announcement period.
An important channel through which the CDS market improves equity pricing
is by providing investors with information that can be used to better estimate the
default risk premium. In particular, [15] find that the distress risk puzzle, i.e., lower
rated firms earn lower returns, is most pronounced around rating downgrades.1 We
test this implication by examining the value of the CDS market in explaining the
cross-section of stock returns for firms that are about to be re-rated. We follow the
method developed in [62]. Their general idea is that the firm’s equity risk premium can
be extracted using the term structure of CDS spreads over time. Our results, based
on portfolio sorting, show a strong, positively monotonic relationship between CDS-
implied equity risk premia and average one-year equity returns. Importantly, this
finding holds when we focus our samples on firms that are about to be downgraded.
However, we observe the opposite pattern — i.e., firms with higher default risk have
lower returns, when sorting firms based on credit rating levels.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first is the literature
documenting abnormal stock and bond market returns to credit rating downgrades,
1For the review of literature, see [29] and [34].
59
but not for upgrades.2 [90] argue that the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) might
have bestowed upon the credit rating agencies an informational advantage because
the rating agencies were exempted from the regulation.3 Our results show that even
after Reg FD, the onset of CDS trading significantly reduces the importance of these
rating change announcements.
The second strand of literature to which we contribute is related to studies that
examine whether the CDS market helps in price discovery. For example, [85], and
[114] show that CDS spreads anticipate credit rating downgrades, and some evidence
exists that CDS spreads lead the stock ([4]) and bond market ([21]) in price discovery.
Motivated by these studies, we examine whether stock and bond markets perceive
credit rating announcements to be less pricing relevant when the underlying firm has
a CDS contract traded on its debt.
Any market based benchmark of default risk, such as CDS, provides a risk-neutral
assessment of default risk. However, credit ratings which convey the agency’s objec-
tive view of a firm’s default risk are built “through the cycle” and may be more suit-
able from a corporate policy or a risk-management perspective. So, without making
additional assumptions, CDS contracts and credit ratings are not completely equiv-
alent and hence not a perfect substitute. Similar to credit ratings, CDS can convey
many false positives. Furthermore, as with any market-based measures, changes in
CDS spreads can be volatile, which may make them less suitable for use as a bench-
mark in financial contracts such has bond covenants or rating triggers. Credit rating
agencies can still play an important role in financial markets, but the increased com-
petition from the CDS market and the availability of a market-based benchmark for
default risk can potentially improve the performance of rating agencies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops hypotheses
2For examples, see [83], [77], [69], and [47].
3We confirm the finding in [90] on the effect of Reg FD introduced in August 2000.
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that motivate empirical tests in this paper. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section
2.4 presents the main empirical tests of stock price reactions to rating revisions.
Sections 2.5 and 2.6 examine why stock prices react significantly less to credit rating
downgrades in the presence of CDS contracts. Section 2.7 examines the value of CDS
contracts for explaining the cross-section of stock returns in relation to default risk
premia. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Hypotheses development
In this section, we develop hypotheses that motivate subsequent empirical tests using
insights based on the Merton’s (1974) structural model, which assumes the firm value
V follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ. The model
values equity E as a call option on the firm value with the strike price equal to the
face value D of a non-coupon paying bond with maturity T. The firm can default only
at the maturity T of its debt. It can be shown that the expected excess equity return
over the risk-free rate µE − r (i.e. equity risk premium), and the equity volatility σE
are given by














where EV denotes the partial derivative of E with respect to V . Using standard call
option pricing notation for E, and noting that EV is the call option delta, we can
rewrite equation (5) as










is the firm’s leverage, and Φ denotes the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the standard normal random variable.4 Equation (7) shows that the firm’s











equity risk premium (ERP) is a function of its asset return, asset return volatility,
and leverage. For instance, ceteris paribus, a shock to the firm’s asset return µ is
amplified when translated to a change in the firm’s equity return due to the leverage
effect.
The default probabilities under the physical measure (PDP) and the risk-neutral























Combining equations (8) and (9) and using the relationships shown in equations (5)
and (6), we can write the equity risk premium as
µE − r =
(




Equation (10) shows that changes to PDP and PDQ can affect the equity risk pre-
mium thereby resulting in the stock price reaction. Therefore, we expect the stock
price to react to new information about the firm’s physical and risk-neutral default
probabilities.
A credit rating, by definition, conveys the rating agency’s opinion about the firm’s
ability to meet its financial obligations on time.5 Therefore, a rating change reflects
the change of an agency’s view on the firm’s physical default probability PDP. A
related question is, what new information about the firm’s fundamentals does it con-
tain? Equations (7) and (8) provide some insights. For instance, a rating downgrade,
which corresponds to an increasing PDP can be due to a deterioration in the firm’s
performance (decreasing µ, ∂PD
P
∂µ




> 0), or both. As a result, stock prices react negatively to unanticipated bad
5For instance, Standard & Poor’s website states that credit ratings express the agency’s opinion
about the ability and willingness of an issuer, such as a corporation or state or city government, to
meet its financial obligations in full and on time.
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news about µ and σ because ∂ERP
∂µ
> 0, and ∂ERP
∂σ
< 0. An increase in PDP can




between which information change conveyed by rating agencies is more relevant to
equity investors can be difficult.6 As we do not observe the exact reason in terms of
the change in fundamentals that drives the rating change event, we include all the
rating change announcements in our analysis.
Our first hypothesis relates to the information relevance of credit rating agen-
cies. If credit ratings provide equity investor with pricing-relevant information about
that firm’s physical default probability, then rating change events should elicit stock
market reactions.
Hypothesis 1 The stock market reacts to a firm’s credit rating change announce-
ment as the news reveals changes in the firms physical default probability.
The simple structural model offers us insights into how the presence of the CDS mar-
ket may affect the value of credit rating changes. CDS spreads embody a risk-neutral
assessment of the firm’s default probability PDQ. Taking partial derivatives of PDP
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These relationships suggest that the risk-neutral default probability PDQ and the
physical default probability PDP contain correlated information about the firm’s
fundamentals (i.e., regarding σ and L). Therefore, if the CDS market provides infor-
mation about the underlying firm’s fundamentals, in lieu of, or in addition to that
conveyed by credit ratings (through PDP), then rating change announcements should
become less pricing relevant to equity investors.
6[69] documented that rating changes – specifically downgrades – due to a deterioration in firm’s
financial prospects are informative and produce a negative abnormal stock return while those due
to an increase in leverage are uninformative.
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Hypothesis 2 Stock market reactions to a firm’s rating change events are attenuated
if CDS contracts trade on the underlying firm’s debt.
The hypothesis above tests for the effect of CDS trading on the information value
of rating changes, which is the main conclusion of this paper. In the remaining
hypotheses, we focus on how and why the CDS market may affect the magnitude of
stock market reactions to credit rating changes.
As discussed previously, static analyses of the structural model show that CDS
spreads and credit ratings convey common information about the firm’s fundamentals.
If CDS spreads contain information about the firm that anticipates changes in PDP
associated with rating revisions, then rating change announcements should become
less informative about the firm’s equity risk premium. This, in turn, implies a smaller
stock market reaction to rating change announcements.
Hypothesis 3 CDS spreads contain information that predict credit rating revisions.
We test the above hypothesis by examining whether CDS spreads predict credit rating
changes on a firm, and whether they improve the model for predicting defaults.
The presence of the CDS market can improve equity valuation, if it contains new
information about the firm’s risk-neutral default probabilities (see equation (10)).
Although CDS and corporate bond spreads provide a risk-neutral assessment of their
underlying firm’s default risk, existing evidence suggests that the CDS market leads
the bond market in credit price discovery (see [21]). CDS contracts also provide a
feasible way to short credit risk, thereby helping complete the credit risk market.7
Until then, shorting corporate bonds was limited to the repo market which typically
has a very short maturity. Whereas, CDS contracts are standardized and can be used
for shorting credit risk for longer periods ranging from one to ten years. Further, the
CDS market generally trades more frequently relative to the corporate bond market.
7See [60] for supporting arguments.
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This enables market participants to construct high frequency estimates of risk-neutral
default probability.
Equity prices also contain information about the firm’s credit risk. However, [4]
find that changes in CDS spreads lead stock returns especially around negative credit
events. They argue that unlike the stock market, trading in the CDS market is
dominated by large institutions, mostly banks, which explains why the information
revelation may occur in the CDS market before the equity market. In relation to credit
rating changes, if the CDS market provides new information about the firm’s credit
risk before rating change announcements, we expect unanticipated changes in CDS
spreads to lead stock and bond returns during this period. As a result, stock prices
react less to rating change announcements because a bulk of their price adjustment
occurred in the pre-announcement period.
Hypothesis 4 CDS spreads lead other market measures that embody risk-neutral
default probabilities before rating change announcements.
We test the hypothesis above by examining whether the CDS market contributes to
price discovery in the stock and bond markets before rating change announcements.
Arguments in Hypotheses 2–4 posit that the presence of CDS market improves
equity valuation by providing investors with new (or more reliable) information about
the firm’s credit risk. This statement has an important implication in light of the well
documented distress risk puzzle, i.e., lower rated firms earn lower returns, because the
structural model shows that risk premia in equity and credit markets are related (see
equation (10)). In particular, [15] find that the puzzle is most pronounced around
rating downgrades. Therefore, if the CDS market provides information that improves
equity valuation, we expect equity risk premia estimated using CDS information to
relate better to firms’ default risks than credit ratings, particularly for firms that are
about to be re-rated. We test this important implication in the next hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 5 The CDS market provides investors with a more reliable measure of
default risk premium than credit ratings for firms undergoing rating revisions.
To test the hypothesis above, we examine whether the equity risk premia extracted
from CDS data can explain the cross-section of stock returns of firms that are under-
going rating revisions.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
We use a CDS database that is widely used among financial market participants
(CMA Datavision database (CMA)) to identify all firms for which we observe CDS
quotes on their debt. CMA contains consensus data sourced from 30 buy-side firms,
including major global investment banks, hedge funds, and asset managers which is
disseminated through Bloomberg since October 2006.8 We further ensure the accu-
racy in the coverage of CDS quotes by augmenting the CMA database with CDS data
obtained from Bloomberg. The earliest quotes were then taken as the first sign of
active CDS trading on a firm’s debt.
Data on bond ratings were gathered from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities
Database (FISD). FISD provides comprehensive data on issue-level details on over
140,000 corporations, U.S. agencies, and U.S. Treasury debt securities. The data
contains detailed information for each issue, including the issuer name, rating date,
rating level, agency that rated the issue, and credit watch status, etc. We include
only those ratings issued by the top three NRSROs – S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch.
We restrict our sample to U.S. domestic corporate debentures, and exclude yankee
bonds, and bonds issued via private placements, preferred stocks, mortgage-backed,
trust preferred capital, convertible bonds and bonds with credit enhancements. We
also consider only the issuers whose stocks are traded on either the NYSE, AMEX,
8[103] compare the data qualities of the six most widely used databases – GFI, Fenics, Reuters,
EOD, CMA, Markit and JP Morgan – and find that the CMA database quotes lead the price
discovery process.
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or NASDAQ. Approximately 18% of the ratings are from Fitch, and the remaining
ratings are split evenly between S&P and Moody’s.
We consider a rating change for an issuer as one observation. When there are
rating changes on multiple bond issues for an issuer on the same day, we use the
issue with the greatest absolute rating scale change because such changes are likely
to create the strongest impact on bond and stock prices. We consider only the rat-
ing announcements that are associated with either “DNG” (downgrade) or “UPG”
(upgrade), which constitute about 90% of the total rating events.9 The main sample
is from January 1996 to December 2010 and consists of 4665 downgrades and 2171
upgrades; we refer to it as the “Full sample” for the remainder of this paper. The
Full sample consists of 1142 unique firms, of which 390 have CDS trading at some
point during the sample period. There are about 2.1 downgrades for every upgrade,
which is line with the findings in [47]. More details on the sample are provided in the
internet appendix.
Many of the firms in our sample never experienced CDS trading over the 1996-
2010 period. In order to control for the differences between firms with and without
CDS contracts traded on their debt, we consider a subsample of firms for which CDS
starts trading at some point during our sample period. We refer to this sample as
the “Traded-CDS”. We use firms’ rating changes in this subsample to compare their
stock reactions to rating change announcements made between their pre-CDS and
post-CDS trading periods. The average size of rating change for this sample is 1.45
before CDS trading starts and 1.49 after CDS trading starts. The distribution of the
rating changes are provided in the internet appendix.
We obtain corporate bond price data from TRACE, which contains individual
bond transactions starting on July 1, 2002. Corporate bond data prior to July 2002
9The FISD ratings database reports the reason for the rating change on an issue. About 4.8% of
the total rating change reasons are “IR” (Internal Review), while about 2% are “AFRM” (Affirmed).
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is obtained from Mergent FISD historical NAICS database. We apply a number of
standard filters to the data set. Following [17], we eliminate trades that have been
canceled or corrected, trades that have commissions, and non-institutional trades
because they show that they help increase the power of the test for detecting abnormal
performance. Therefore, consistent with [51], we remove observations in which the
par value of the transaction is less than or equal to $100, 000 as smaller trades tend
to be non-institutional trades.10
2.4 Stock price reaction to rating changes
This section tests Hypotheses 1 and 2 of the paper. First we provide univariate
evidence that the stock market reacts to rating downgrades, but the magnitude sig-
nificantly decreases when CDS contracts trade on the firm’s debt. We then confirm
our results using multivariate regressions. Subsequently, we address endogeneity con-
cerns regarding the timing of the CDS introduction.
2.4.1 Abnormal stock returns
We study changes in daily abnormal stock returns on the date of rating change an-
nouncements for CDS and non-CDS firms. We carry out the analysis separately for
upgrades and downgrades. We define the daily abnormal stock return of firm i on
day t, ARit, as the residual estimated from the market model:
ARit = Rit − (α̂i + β̂iRmt),
where Rit is the raw return for firm i on day t, and Rmt is the value-weighted
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return. We examine whether the mean cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) around the event period is significantly different from zero.
10The prices reported in the TRACE bond database are the “clean” prices. They do not include
the accrued coupon payment. We add the accrued coupon payment to the clean prices by merging
in variables from the Mergent FISD database. The final bond prices that we use are therefore
settlement prices.
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Following [83], we compute CAR using the three-day window centered on the an-
nouncement date. That is, CARi(−1, 1) =
∑+1
t=−1ARit. [96] show that short–horizon
event studies such as ours are not highly sensitive to the assumption of cross-sectional
or time-series dependence of abnormal returns, as well as the benchmark model used
for computing abnormal returns.11
2.4.2 Univariate analysis
Table 14 presents the mean of cumulative adjusted return (CAR) for the pre- and post-
CDS trading periods. The results in Panel A are based on the “Full-sample” which
consists of traded-CDS and non-traded-CDS firms. The results in Panel B are based
on the “Traded-CDS–sample”. Traded-CDS firms are those that have CDS traded at
some point during our sample period. However, non-traded-CDS firms are those that
do not have CDS trading in our sample period, which is from 1996 to 2010. Results
obtained using the “Traded-CDS–sample” can be usefully thought of as fixed-effects
tests because only firms that experience CDS trading are considered. Consistent
with previous studies, Panel A shows that overall, stock price reacts significantly to
downgrades (-4.31%) but only weakly to upgrades (0.14%).12 This finding supports
of Hypothesis H1.
The results in Panel A show the mean CARs over the three-day window around
rating downgrades is negative and significant at the 1% level for the pre- and post-CDS
periods. However, the magnitude is significantly weaker for the post-CDS period. The
mean CAR in the post-CDS period is -2.51%, compared to -5.10% in the pre-CDS
period. The difference in CAR between these two groups is 2.58% and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, we do not find that stock prices react
11We estimate α̂i and β̂i using a rolling window over a period of 255 days from -91 to -345 relative
to the event date. Using a shorter estimation window and a different factor model do not affect our
conclusions. Table I.A1 in the Internet Appendix shows that we obtain similar findings when using
the Fama-French 3-factor model to calculate abnormal return.
12The magnitude of CAR to rating downgrades is in line with existing studies that examine
announcement returns to rating changes using the more recent sample, e.g. [90].
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significantly differently to rating upgrades in the post-CDS period. The difference
in CAR to credit rating upgrades do not differ significantly between the pre- and
post-CDS periods.
In Panel B of Table 14, we report univariate results for firms that eventually
have CDS contracts traded on its debt. Restricting our analysis to the Traded-CDS
sample mitigates the concern that traded-CDS firms are inherently different from non-
traded-CDS firms. We find that stock price reaction to credit rating downgrades is
significantly weaker in the post-CDS period. The difference in the mean CAR values
is 0.95% between the post-CDS and pre-CDS periods, and is statistically significant.13
2.4.3 Regression analysis
We employ multivariate regressions to control for factors that could affect stock price
reactions to rating changes. Following previous studies (e.g., [83]), we run the regres-
sions separately for upgrades and downgrades. The results are reported in Table 15.
The regression model that we estimate is





φiCDS-trading control it + εi
(11)
where for bond issue i, CAR is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the
date of rating change announcements – i.e., event window (-1,1). The main variable
of interest is dCDS, an indicator variable equal to one if the rating change takes
place when CDS trades on the underlying firm and 0 otherwise. Panel A of Table
15 reports results for rating downgrades, while Panel B reports results for rating
upgrades. Each panel reports results for three regression specifications. Regression
models (I) and (II) are run on the full sample, while regression model (III) is estimated
13[90] find that stock price reactions to rating downgrades is significantly stronger after Regulation
Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was implemented in Oct 2000 because rating agencies are exempt from
Reg FD and could still access private information on the rated firms. For a robustness check, we
eliminate rating changes prior to the year 2001 (before Reg FD was put in place) and find that our
conclusions remain unchanged.
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using the traded-CDS sample. All variables are defined in Appendix B.14
If rating changes are less informative in the presence of CDS trading, we would
expect the coefficient of dCDS in equation (11) to be positive for downgrades and
negative for upgrades. Panel A of Table 15 shows the coefficients on dCDS are posi-
tive and statistically significant across the three regression specifications. Controlling
for industry- and year-fixed effects in specification (II), we find the difference in CARs
between firms that have and do not have CDS trading is 1.70%. Looking only at the
traded-CDS sample, (i.e. model (III)), we find the evidence is stronger. Stock prices
react significantly less to credit rating downgrades by an average of 2.59% in the
traded-CDS sample. The results in Panel B, however, show that all three coefficients
on dCDS are not significantly different from zero. Overall, our regression results in
Table 15 confirm our univariate results (see Table 14) that stock price reaction is sig-
nificantly weaker to credit rating downgrades, and not upgrades, when CDS contracts
trade on the firms’ debt.
The coefficients on the control variables are in line with the results documented
in the literature (see [77], and [90]). Table 15 shows the coefficients on Previous
Rating and AbsRating Change are negative and highly significant, suggesting that
ratings downgrades on lower-rated firms, as well as downgrades across multiple car-
dinal scales, lead to larger stock price reactions. The time since the previous credit
rating does not seem to impact how the new rating change influences stock response.
However, rating downgrades accompanied by firms’ earnings announcements elicit a
larger stock price reaction. Among the firm-level characteristics, we find that firms’
14All regression models include three sets of control variables to account for potential factors
affecting the magnitude of stock price reactions. The first set of control variables are rating-level
characteristics: previous rating level, the size of rating change, how long has the previous rating
been outstanding for, and whether rating change occurs in relation with the company’s earnings
announcement. The second set of control variables includes various firm-level characteristics. The
third set of control variables account for characteristics that may be related to the propensity that
firms that have CDS trading. All variables are defined in Appendix B. All firm-level characteristics
and CDS-trading controls are lagged by one period, i.e. a month or a quarter, depending on the
frequency of data sources.
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recent return performance, (i.e. Avg Return), robustly predict the magnitude of stock
price reactions to rating downgrades. Leverage, as well as Avg Trading Volume appear
to be negatively related to CAR for downgrades, though, their statistical significance
disappears when we restrict our regressions to traded-CDS firms.
We confirm that our regression results are robust to a series of robustness checks,
which are reported in the Internet Appendix. Table B.6 Panel A reports regression
results showing that our main conclusion holds when we allow for Industry×Year fixed
effects, which helps controlling for time-varying industry risk factors. Table B.6 Panel
B shows our regression results hold when using a subsample of only non-financial
firms. We find that the coefficients on dCDS are slightly larger in magnitude for
downgrades when we focus our analysis only non-financial firms. Further, to ensure
that our results are unaffected by the financial crisis, we focus on rating changes prior
to 2008 and find that our conclusions remain intact. Table B.7 Panel A replicates
the results in Table 15 using the Fama-French 3-factor model to compute CARs and
Table B.7 Panel B conducts a pooled analysis on downgrades and upgrades together.
In both cases we verify that our results are robust.
2.4.4 Instrumental variable analysis
A potential concern with any study on the impact of the CDS market is that the
timing of CDS introduction is not exogenous. CDS contracts may have been intro-
duced during a period when the firm’s credit quality improves, thereby affecting how
its stock price reacts to rating changes. In this section, we address the concern that
the emergence of the CDS market is not exogenous using the instrumental variable
method.
We follow [132] to find an instrument that correlates with the firm’s likelihood
of having CDS contracts traded on its debt, while being directly unrelated to how
the firm reacts to its credit rating changes. [132] use the foreign exchange derivatives
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traded for hedging purposes by banks that have a lending relationship with a given
firm as the instrument for CDS market introduction. The choice of this instrument
is motivated by [110] who show that banks that use interest rate, foreign exchange,
equity, and commodity derivatives are more likely to be net buyers of CDS, and hence
are related to the emergence of the CDS market. Among banks’ various derivatives
activities, their foreign exchange position is arguably least likely to directly influence
the credit risk of firms with which they conduct business. Importantly, the amount
of foreign exchange derivatives used by banks reflect their hedging need for macro
risk, and hence should not affect the credit risk of domestic firms (i.e., U.S. entities)
in our sample. We further exclude non-financial firms from the instrumental variable
regression results for two reasons. First, financial firms are more likely to act as
borrowers and lenders amongst themselves and with several banks simultaneously,
which makes their nature and the extent of relationship difficult to identify. Second,
we want to maintain consistency with [132] who motivated the use of the instrumental
variable.
Our instrumental variable, Forex Derivative Hedging, is defined as the average
foreign exchange derivatives amount used for hedging (i.e., non-trading purposes)
relative to total assets by the lead syndicate banks and bond underwriters that the
firm has conducted business with over the past five years. We use the Dealscan
syndicated loan database to identify firms’ lenders (i.e., lead syndicates), and Mergent
FISD database to identify firms’ bond underwriters. Banks’ derivatives usage data
is obtained from the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Y9-C filings. We lag Forex
Derivative Hedging by one quarter when including it in the instrumental variable
(IV) estimation. The average Forex Derivative Hedging at the firm-level in our full
sample is 1.98% of the total assets with a standard deviation of 1.54%. These values
are in line with [132].
In order to address concerns that CDS introduction is endogenous, we re-estimate
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the main regression results using Foreign Derivative Hedging to instrument for dCDS.
We follow [152] and apply the fitted variable from a probit model for dCDS to the
regression model in equation (11); see also [18] and [132] for similar applications. We
include firm-level characteristics and CDS-trading controls in the probit model. The
instrument that we use is available quarterly and therefore the model is estimated at
the firm-quarter level. Table B.2 in the Appendix reports the probit model from the IV
estimation. After accounting for various firm-level characteristics and variables that
may influence CDS trading, we find that the amount of foreign exchange derivatives
usage significantly predicts the likelihood that a firm will have CDS trading on its
debt (t-statistic of 4.84).15
Table 16 reports the regression results using the fitted instrumental variable, dCDS
IV for 1966 downgrades and 886 upgrades belonging to 609 unique firms. The number
of observations are lower compared to Table 15 because we restrict our sample to non-
financial firms with lending or underwriting relationships with banks that are active
in the forex derivatives market. Further, bank forex derivatives activities are reported
in the BHC Y-9C filings and call reports are from 2001 onwards.
Table 16 shows the coefficients on dCDS IV are positive and statistically signif-
icant for downgrades, but not for upgrades, which is consistent with our previous
findings. A one-standard deviation change in the dCDS IV is related to a 2.26 and
2.01 percent attenuation in CAR response to credit rating downgrades for the regres-
sions specifications with industry-fixed effects (I) and year and industry-fixed effects
(II), respectively. Overall, we conclude that our main results hold when using Foreign
Derivative Hedging as an instrument to address the potential bias associated with the
endogeneity of CDS market introduction.
15The incremental psuedo-R2 of the instrument is about 1.1%. The economic impact of foreign
exchange derivatives usage on the probability of CDS trading is reasonably large. We find that a
one-standard deviation increase in Forex Derivative Hedging increases the likelihood that a firm has
CDS traded on its debt by 4.2. Overall, consistent with [132], we find that the instrument is not
weak.
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2.4.5 Matched sample analysis
In addition to the instrumental variable regression, we carry out a matched-sample
analysis to mitigate concerns that traded-CDS and non-traded-CDS firms are differ-
ent on some observable dimensions. A traded-CDS firm is matched with a firm that
does not have a CDS traded on its debt at any point in our sample period (i.e., a
non-traded-CDS firm). We use a propensity score matching method that can incor-
porate a large number of matching dimensions ([130]). The matching is carried out
in the month when CDS starts trading on a traded-CDS firm based on 14 observ-
able characteristics. These matching characteristics are motivated by [12], [132], and
include other factors that might affect the introduction of CDS trading.
We estimate firms’ propensity of having CDS trading using a probit model. The
dependent variable in the model, dCDS, is an indicator variable equal to one starting
on the month when CDS begins trading on the firm, and zero otherwise. All explana-
tory variables in the probit model are lagged by one period and defined in Appendix
B. We require that firms entering the matching sample have complete time-series
information on their observable variables from 2001 onwards, which is when we first
observe CDS trading in our sample. This requirement leaves us with 382 traded-
CDS firms and 492 non-traded-CDS firms for estimating the propensity score model,
which we refer to as the before-matching sample. In the Appendix, Table B.3 reports
diagnostics of the propensity score matched sample. In Panel A, the column labeled
“Before matching” reports results for the probit model estimated at the firm-month
level using the before-matching sample. Most of the estimated coefficients are sig-
nificant with the magnitude roughly in line with the probit model estimated using
firm-quarter observations for the instrumental variable estimator (see Table B.2). The
fitted probability from the probit model is then used as the propensity score to match
traded-CDS firms to non-traded-CDS firms.
For each traded-CDS firm, we use its propensity score in the month that CDS
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starts trading to identify a non-traded-CDS firm with the closest propensity score in
the same month. We require that the propensity score of the matched non-traded-
CDS firms be within ±2% of the propensity score of the traded-CDS firm. The
matching technique used for this is the nearest-neighborhood caliper method of [37].
We match one traded-CDS (treated) firm with five non-traded-CDS firms (control),
i.e., one-to-five matching, in order to increase our sample of matched pairs (see [42],
and [140]). The matching is carried out with replacement.16 This exercise leaves us
with 286 unique traded-CDS firms each matched to five eligible control firms.
We report various diagnostics of the matched sample in Table B.3 in the Appendix.
The column labeled “After matching” in Panel A reports results derived from esti-
mating the probit model using the matched observations. Overall, the explanatory
power of the probit model decreases significantly with the pseudo R2 of 9% relative to
49% observed in the “Before matching” sample. We find that some observable char-
acteristics remain statistically significant in the probit model for the matched sample.
Given the large observable dimensions used for matching, we do not expect to find
a perfect match. Nevertheless, Panel A shows that all the probit coefficients in the
after-matching sample either lost statistical significance or have become substantially
less significant relative to the before-matching sample. We further report the quality
of our matched sample in Panels B and C in the Appendix Table B.3. In Panel B,
we report univariate means of the 14 observable dimensions for the before-matching
and after-matching samples. The findings echo the results reported in Panel A, which
show that the propensity-score matching significantly reduces observable differences
between the traded-CDS firms (treatment group) and the non-traded-CDS firms (con-
trol group). Nevertheless, traded-CDS firms in the matched sample still tend to be
16We also verify that our results are similar when using one-to-one matching without replacement.
In this case, we have 162 uniquely matched pairs. Table B.8 in the Internet Appendix reports
difference-in-difference regression results verifying our main finding using the one-to-one matched
sample too.
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larger, better rated, and have greater bond debt outstanding. In order to control for
remaining differences in these observable dimensions, we include all matching charac-
teristics as control variables in the matched sample regression. Additionally, in Panel
C we report the industry distribution of firms in the treatment and control samples.
Overall, we find that industry distributions of the two samples do not differ greatly.
Using the matched sample, we estimate the following difference-in-difference re-
gression








φiCDS-trading control it + εi,
(12)
where the dependent variable CARi is the cumulative abnormal stock return of firm
i to a credit rating downgrade. Table 17 reports the results. To save space, we do not
report results for credit rating upgrades as our previous evidence suggests that CAR
to credit rating upgrades are, on average, not significant. The above regression model
in (12) is similar to the baseline regression model in (11), with the additions of two new
variables. The first is dTreatment i, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm corresponding to the observation is from the treatment group, i.e. a traded-CDS
firm in the matched sample, and zero otherwise. The second variable we introduce is
dTreatment i×dCDSi, which is the difference-in-difference (DID) estimator and is our
key variable of interest. It is an interaction term of the dTreatment i with the indicator
variable for CDS trading, dCDSi. For firms in the treatment group, dCDSi simply
takes the value of 1 when CDS starts trading on the firm’s debt, and zero otherwise.
Control-group firms are assigned counterfactual dCDSi variables that are identical
to their matched traded-CDS firms. The coefficient on the DID estimator therefore
captures the difference in CARs to credit rating downgrades between the traded-CDS
firms and their matched non-traded-CDS firms over the two periods: before and after
CDS introduction.
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Panel A of Table 17 reports difference-in-difference regression results using the
matched sample. Industry-fixed effects are included in the first regression specification
(I), while both industry- and year-fixed effects are included in the second regression
specification (II). In both cases, we find the coefficient on the DID estimator is positive
and highly significant. Looking at a more conservative regression specification (II),
the coefficient on DID estimator is 2.16. This finding suggests that stock prices
of firms with CDS trading react less to credit rating downgrades by about 2.16%
relative to firms sharing similar observable characteristics, but without CDS trading.
Overall, the results suggest that the information content in rating announcements has
decreased for downgrades after the onset of CDS trading.
In Panel B of Table 17, we run regression diagnostics based on equation (12)
for four different subsamples. The regression model (III) reports results for firms
that are in the treatment group (dTreatment = 1), while regression model (IV)
reports results for firms that are in the control (dTreatment = 0). Because the
regressions are estimated separately for the treatment and control groups, the variable
dTreatment is dropped from the regressions as it is not identified. In these two
subsamples, the variable of interest is dCDS, which examines the impact of the dCDS
variable on CAR to bond downgrades for treatment-group firms and control-group
firms, respectively. We expect coefficients on dCDS to be positive and significant
for the treatment group because this dummy variable indicates when the firms have
CDS trading. In fact, the regression model (I) is similar to the regression model (III)
for the traded-CDS sample in Table 15. However, we do not expect dCDS to be
significant for the subsample consisting only of control-group firms because they do
not actually have CDS trading. The coefficients on dCDS in the regression models
(III) and (IV) confirm our expectation. We do not find that firms in the control
sample, which have similar characteristics as traded-CDS firms, experience weaker
stock price reactions to credit rating downgrades.
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The regression models (V) and (VI) in Table 17 report results for firms in both the
treatment and control groups estimated using two different subsample periods. The
regression model (V) uses only firms that are in the post-CDS period (dCDS = 1),
while the regression model (VI) uses firms in the pre-CDS period (dCDS = 0).
In these two regression models, the variable dCDS is excluded because it is not
identified. The main variable of interest is dTreatment which tests for the difference
in CAR values between treatment-group firms and control-group firms in the post-
CDS period (V) and pre-CDS period (VI). We expect the coefficient on dTreatment
to be positive and significant for the post-CDS period, if CAR to rating downgrades
is weaker for firms that have CDS trading relative to control-group firms. Recall that
control-group firms do not actually have a traded CDS but are assigned to the post-
CDS period because their observable characteristics resemble those of traded-CDS
firms. The positive coefficient on dTreatment in the regression model (V) is 2.27 and
statistically significant, which confirms our expectation. However, the statistically
insignificant coefficient on dTreatment in the regression model (VI) shows that firms
in the treatment and control groups do not react differently to rating downgrades,
and thus suggest parallel trends in the pre-CDS period and also shows the efficacy of
our matching procedure. Overall, results in the regression models (VI) suggest that
firms the in the treatment and control groups are well matched in how they respond
to rating changes in the pre-CDS period, while results in (V) suggest the difference in
post-CDS CARs between the treatment and control groups is due to the introduction
of CDS contracts in the treatment-group firms.
2.5 Information in CDS spreads about credit ratings
This section tests Hypothesis 3 of the paper. Insights from the simple structural
model show that CDS spreads and credit ratings convey common information about
the firm’s fundamentals. If CDS spreads contain information that anticipates changes
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in the physical default probability PDP associated with rating revisions, then rating
change events should become less informative. We provide three sets of empirical
results to support Hypothesis 3. First, we back out CDS-implied ratings using a non-
parametric method and show that they significantly lead rating downgrades issued
by credit rating agencies. Second, we show the predictive power of CDS spreads on
credit rating downgrades in a multivariate framework using a hazard model. Third,
we show that information in CDS spreads improve the model for predicting historical
defaults.
2.5.1 CDS-implied ratings
One reason why CDS spreads appear more information-relevant than credit ratings
is their timely response to changes in the underlying firm’s credit condition. [4] find
that information discovery occurs in the CDS market prior to negative credit news. In
this subsection, we back out the rating levels implicit in CDS spreads (CDS-implied
ratings) and compare them with those issued by rating agencies. Our objective is to
examine the dynamics of CDS-implied ratings around rating downgrades. If trading
in the CDS market reveals information about changes in a firm’s default risk, we
expect CDS-implied ratings to significantly change prior to a downgrade issued by
credit rating agencies.
We calculate CDS-implied ratings following the approach in [26] and [97]. The
basic idea is to estimate the CDS boundaries separating two adjacent rating classes in
a non-parametric manner. Once the boundaries are determined, we assign each firm
to a rating class corresponding to its CDS spread level. We estimate CDS boundaries
by minimizing the penalty function with the objective of reducing the number of
misclassifications, which we define as the discrepancy between the firm’s CDS spread
level and its rating class. For instance, missclassification occurs when the CDS spread
of a higher-rated firm is greater than the spread of a lower-rated firm. Following this
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intuition, the penalty function for estimating the boundary between the A and BBB












where si,A is the CDS spread of A-rated firm i, and sj,BBB is the CDS spread of
BBB-rated firm j. When the spread of A-rated firm is higher than the boundary
bA−BBB, the firm’s CDS spread is considered misclassified with the error equal to their
difference. Similarly, when the spread of BBB-rated firm is lower than the boundary
bA−BBB, the firm’s CDS is considered misclassified. The objective is then to minimize
the error from misclassifications by minimizing the penalty function described in
equation (13). The numbers of firms in the A and BBB rating classes are denoted as m
and n, respectively, and the penalty function for estimating boundaries between other
adjacent rating classes are defined similarly. We estimate CDS spread boundaries for
all adjacent rating classes.17 The estimation uses all CDS spreads on firms that have
CDS spreads traded on each day.
Figure 6 plots average CDS-implied ratings over the interval [-360,180] days cen-
tered on the rating change events. The solid line plots the official ratings issued
by credit rating agencies and the dotted line plots average CDS-implied ratings. The
rating levels are plotted on the rating class scale. A higher rating class corresponds
to a higher credit risk. To save space, we plot the results for three adjacent rating
classes that have the most rating change events: A-BBB, BBB-BB, and BB-B. Fig-
ure 6 shows that CDS-implied ratings started increasing at least 180 days prior to a
downgrade announcement. This finding suggests that the CDS market responds to
the firm’s deteriorating credit quality significantly faster than credit rating agencies.
17The mapping between rating codes and rating classes is shown in the Appendix Table B.1. Due
to the large number of daily observations required to precisely estimate the boundary, we do not
consider adjacent rating levels that are in the same rating classes. For instance, AA+, AA, AA- are
considered to be rated AA. Fitch estimates CDS-implied ratings based on a method similar to ours
but with a slightly different penalty function. As a robustness check, we implement Fitch’s penalty
function and obtain roughly the same boundaries.
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However, Figure 6 shows that CDS-implied ratings do not change significantly prior
to an upgrade announcement. In fact, CDS-implied ratings were already at the level
that represents the future rating class of the soon-to-be upgraded firm. This finding
is consistent with the prevailing consensus, as well as our previous results that rating
upgrades have little pricing relevance.
2.5.2 Predictability of credit rating changes
So far, we have visually shown in Section 2.5.1 that credit ratings backed out from
CDS spreads anticipate rating downgrades issued by credit rating agencies. An im-
portant question is whether CDS spreads provide additional predictability of rating
downgrades after controlling for variables such as accounting measures and bond
spreads that have been shown to anticipate credit rating changes. We test the hy-
pothesis that information derived from the CDS market can predict future downgrades
using a hazard model.18
We estimate the extended Cox model commonly used for survival analysis in
epidemiological studies (e.g. Platt et al. (2004)). The survival time in our analysis
is the number of months from current time to the next rating change event. Let t be
the current time period, and T ≥ t be when rating change occurs, the hazard rate
associated with future rating changes is given by
h(t) = lim
y→0
P(t ≤ T < t+ y|T ≥ t)
y
.
In our analysis, the hazard function is represented by










where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xp1)
′ is a time-independent vector of variables, i.e., industry,
18Our approach is similar to [85] who use a logistic model to show that changes in CDS spreads
increase the likelihood of future rating events. However, our analysis differs from theirs as we use
a much longer and more extensive set of firms in our sample, and control for a number of variables
that can potentially predict future rating changes.
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rating agency, and year-fixed effects, and z (t) = (z1(t), z2(t), . . . , zp2(t))
′ is a time-
dependent vector of covariates affecting the hazard rate of having rating changes (i.e.,
CDS spreads, bond spreads, and accounting variables). When δj = 0 for all j’s, the
above equation (14) is known as the Cox proportional hazard (Cox PH) model, where
hq(t) is the baseline hazard function. The baseline function is semi–parametric and
hence we do not need to define the functional form for hq(t). We further allow hq(t)
to be different for different rating levels, i.e. strata. Arguably, a one unit rating
change for a lower-rated firm and a higher-rated firm may be perceived differently by
investors. This intuition is supported by our results in Table 15, which shows that
Previous Rating robustly explains the difference in firms’ stock price reactions to
credit rating downgrades. Therefore, credit rating agencies may use a different model
to decide when to revise their ratings on a lower-rated firm relative to a higher-
rated firm. The use of stratification controls for a predictor that does not satisfy
the proportional hazard assumption.19 In our estimation, we allow firms in different
rating levels to have different baseline hazard functions hq(t), while sharing the same
coefficients βi and δj. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood at the issue-
month level.
Table 18 presents the results from estimating the hazard model in equation (14)
separately for downgrades (Panel A) and upgrades (Panel B). All explanatory vari-
ables are described in Appendix B and are lagged by one period. We also control
for credit watch announcements in all regression models using the indicator variable
Credit watch dummy , which indicates whether the firm (or bond issue) is put on credit
watch prior to a credit rating change.20
19We confirm the importance of using rating scale as the strata by testing whether the proportional
hazard (PH) assumption holds. Following the test of [74], we reject the PH assumption when using
rating scale as a predictor for downgrades at the 5% level.
20This monthly indicator variable is equal to one from the month of the watch announcement
to the month of the rating change event, or until “Off Watch” or “Not On Watch” is announced.
For downgrades, only negative watches are considered while for upgrades, only positive watches
are considered. Credit watch announced 180 days or more prior to when a firm is re-rated is not
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The variables of interest in Table 18 are average CDS spreads, bond yields and
their changes. Bond yields are calculated as the trade-weighted average monthly bond
yield at the issue level. We require that firms in the estimation sample have CDS
spreads currently traded on their debt. We use 5-year to maturity CDS spreads as
they are the most liquid. Our primary CDS data are from CMA Datavision. We also
supplement CMA data with CDS quotes from Markit. We obtain corporate bond
data from TRACE, which contains individual bond transactions starting from July
1, 2002. Corporate bond data prior to July 2002 is obtained from Mergent FISD
historical NAICS database. We also include industry, year and rating agency-fixed
effects in all hazard model regression specifications.
In Table 18 regression model (I), we test whether recent changes in CDS spreads
and bond yields are informative about future rating changes. We find a positive and
significant coefficient on CDS Spread Change, suggesting that an increase in CDS
spreads in the prior month increases the likelihood that the firm will be downgraded.
The coefficient on CDS Spread Change is negative, but not statistically significant for
upgrades. Our findings that CDS spread changes are predictive of rating downgrades,
but not upgrades, are consistent with prior results shown in Figure 6. Interestingly,
we find that the coefficient on Bond Yield Change is negative and weakly significant
for downgrades, which is counter-intuitive from the credit risk perspective. A pos-
sible explanation could be the relatively low liquidity and high trading costs in the
corporate bond market, which might cause the prices between these two instruments
to diverge. Because of the relative liquidity advantage, the CDS market is likely the
more attractive trading venue for hedgers, speculators, and short-term investors as
opposed to long-term investors in the bond market (see [115]). The heterogeneous
investor base in these two markets and their different trading frequencies in response
considered to be related to the rating change event. Credit watch data is obtained from Mergent
FISD and Moody’s Default Risk Database (MDRS).
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to information-related events could further render bond yields stale.
Regression model (II) in Table 18 compares the predictive power of CDS spreads
versus bond yields on rating downgrades and upgrades. We again find that the
coefficient on CDS spread is positive and significant only for downgrades, but not
upgrades. This suggests that a higher CDS spread level in the current month increases
the likelihood that the firm will be downgraded in the following month. However,
the coefficient on CDS spread is negative for predicting rating upgrades, which is
consistent with the general observations that higher rated firms have lower CDS
spreads, though it is not statistically significant. The sign on the coefficient for Bond
Yield, for both upgrades and downgrades, is somewhat unexpected. As discussed
previously, this could be due to the low bond market liquidity. The regression model
(III) includes both CDS spreads, bond yields and their changes. Overall, the results
remain qualitatively similar for this specification too. We conclude that the level of
CDS spread and the change in CDS spreads have incremental predictive power for
future rating downgrades, after controlling for credit watch events and other standard
accounting variables.
2.5.3 Predicting default
We examine whether the information embedded in CDS spreads can improve the
estimation of default risk under the physical measure using a hazard model. We follow
the approach similar to the hazard model for predicting rating changes described in
Section 2.5.2, however, the event of interest here is the firm’s actual default date.
Data on firms’ default history is obtained from Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database
(Moody’s URD), which contains information on all bonds rated by Moody’s during
our sample period 1996–2010. Moody’s URD has information on default history of
the bonds and recovery rates in the event of default ([49], and [36]). We restrict our
attention to firms that are in the intersection of Moody’s URD, CRSP, COMPUSTAT,
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and the CDS databases during 1996-2010. We use Moody’s definition of default in our
analysis. The sample includes 616 firms of which about 6 percent of them experienced
default.
We estimate the extended Cox model similar to equation (14) at the firm-month
level. Because the number of defaults observed is small, we do not allow for stratifica-
tion. Table 19 reports the results. All regression models include accounting variables
that have been shown to predict default. The first regression model (I) shows that
credit rating levels, defined as the average ratings of the three agencies, significantly
predict future default. The pseudo R2 is about 69% suggesting that credit ratings
along with standard accounting variables can explain a significant variation of default
risks across firms.
In the regression models (II)–(IV), we test whether the level of CDS spread, and
the change in CDS spread can improve default risk estimation. Based on the R2,
we find that each of these two pieces of information extracted from CDS spreads do
not improve default risk modeling relative to the model that relies on credit ratings
(model (I)). The coefficients CDS Spread and CDS Spread Change are positive and
significant, which is consistent with the prediction of the structural model that the
risk-neutral and physical default probabilities are positively correlated (see equations
(8) and (9)).
The regression model (V) in Table 19 reports estimation results of the hazard rate
model when both credit ratings and CDS-related variables are included. We find a
substantial increase in pseudo R2 from 69% to about 78%. Importantly, we find the
coefficients on credit ratings, as well as on the two CDS variables are mostly significant
with their signs consistent with the prediction of the structural model. Overall, the
results in Table 19 show that both credit ratings and CDS spreads carry important
information for modeling default probability. In other words, information extracted
from CDS spreads substantially improves the default prediction model when used
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jointly with credit ratings.
2.6 Price discovery before rating change announcements
This section tests Hypothesis 4 of the paper. We examine whether the CDS market
leads other market measures embodying risk-neutral default probabilities, e.g., stock
and bond prices. We first show that the CDS market’s information share of credit
price discovery relative to the bond market increases substantially before credit rating
downgrades. After, we show that unanticipated changes in CDS spreads lead stock
returns particularly before rating downgrade announcements.
2.6.1 Credit price discovery in the CDS and bond markets
We examine how much the CDS market contributes to credit price discovery par-
ticularly in the period prior to credit rating downgrades. We follow the method in
[21] and study lead-lag dynamics of CDS and bond spreads using the Vector Error
Correction Model (VECM). We choose the VECM approach because the approach
conveniently allows us to examine which of the two markets is more important for
credit price discovery using the Hasbrouck’s (1995) “information share” measure.
Further, the theoretical equivalence between CDS and corporate bond spreads sug-
gests that the two time-series are cointegrated through a long-run relationship. The
VECM is therefore a suitable technique because it adjusts for their long-run changes,
as well as deviations from equilibrium.
We estimate the VECM in two steps. First, we estimate the following first-stage
regression model for each firm individually using all daily oberservations:
CDSi,t = α0i + α1iCSi,t + Ei,t, (15)
where CDSi,t and CSi,t are CDS and corporate bond spreads of firm i with the
same maturity observed on day t. The residual term, Ei,t, represents daily deviation
from the long-run relationship between CDS and corporate bond spreads. It is also
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referred to as the error correction term. Next, we apply residuals from the first-stage
regression in equation (15) to estimate the following panel regression specification:






γ1j∆CSi,t−j + ε1i,t (16)






γ2j∆CSi,t−j + ε2i,t, (17)
where ∆CDSi,t and ∆CSi,t are diferences in CDSi,t and CSi,t spreads for firm i
between days t and t− 1, respectively.
In equations (16) and (17), we are interested in the estimated coefficients λ1 and
λ2, which show how CDS and bond spreads adjust after a deviation to their long-run
relationship. When Ei,t−1 is positive, equation (15) suggests the CDS spread is too
high relative to the bond spread and their long-run relationship predicts that the CDS
spread will decrease (λ1 < 0), while the corporate bond spread will increase (λ2 > 0).
A similar logic holds when Ei,t−1 is negative. The sign and magnitude of coefficients λ1
and λ2 are used to infer the information-flow direction and the adjustment speeds of
the two securities. If both coefficients are significant with correct signs, i.e. λ1 < 0 and
λ2 > 0, then both markets contribute to price discovery. However, when only λ2 is
positive and significant, the CDS market is the main contributor to price discovery
because it suggests that corporate bond spreads adjust to reconcile their deviation
from CDS spreads. Analogously, when only λ1 is negative and significant, the bond
market leads in the credit risk’s price discovery.
We estimate the VECM system using daily CDS and bond spreads with constant
5-year maturity. We use CDS contracts that are written on senior debt and with no
restructing clause. Unlike CDS contracts, corporate bonds do not trade at standard-
ized maturities. Therefore, we need 5-year bond yields to match the constant 5-year
CDS spreads. We follow the procedure similar to [21]. On each day and for each
reference entity, we search for a bond with maturities between three and five years,
and another bond with maturity of 6.5 years of more. We then linearly interploate
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between these yields to estimate a 5-year yield to maturity bond. Bond spread is
calculated by subtracting bond yield with the constant 5-year Treasury rate.
In order for firms to enter our sample, we require that they have CDS and bond
data traded simultaneously and continuously for at least two calendar years. This
filter ensures that we can precisely estimate the first-stage regression in (15). This
requirement leaves us with 305 firms. In order to use VECM analysis, we apply the
Johansen trace test for cointegration between CDS and bond spreads. We find for
210 reference entities, their CDS and bond spreads are cointegrated with order one,
i.e., I(1). Our empirical analysis in this section is therefore based on 210 reference
entities.
Table 20 reports results from the second-stage panel regression model in equa-
tions (16)–(17). We report results estimated from three estimation samples.21 The
first estimation sample uses all 249, 306 daily observations. The second estimation
sample uses only daily observations that fall in the window [-90,-2] days relative to
firms’ rating downgrade announcements. This estimation period is used to examine
credit price discovery prior to rating downgrade announcements. Finally, the third
estimation sample uses only daily observations that fall in the window [-90,-2] days
relative to firms’ rating upgrade announcements.
Using all observations, we find the coefficient estimates of λ1 and λ2 are −0.017
and 0.033, respectively, and are statistically significant. This finding suggests that, on
average, CDS and corporate bond spreads adjust toward their long-run relationship
consistent with [21] who apply the VECM approach to 33 investment-grade firms.
Using the VECM estimates in Table 20, we calculate the lower and upper bounds
of Hasbrouck’s (1995) measure of the CDS market contribution to price discovery.
21The first-stage regression (see equation (15)) is estimated for each firm individually using all
available observations. To save space, we do not report their estimates.
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1 − 2λ1λ2σ12 + λ21σ22
, (18)
where HAS1 and HAS2 are the two bounds of Hasbrouck’s measures. The remaining
variables σ21, σ
2
2, and σ12 in (18) are the covariance matrix terms between ε1i,t and
ε2i,t in equations (16)–(17).
Table 20 shows that for the first estimation sample, the CDS market’s contribution
to price discovery of credit risk is between 81 and 85 percent, which is roughly in line
with [21]. However, prior to rating downgrades, the contribution from the CDS
market increases to between 90 and 91 percent. We also find that the coefficient
λ2 = 0.037 is positive and significant, while the λ1 is no longer significant. This
finding suggests that prior to rating downgrades, bond spreads always adjust toward
CDS spreads in order to maintain their equilibrium relationship. In other words, the
CDS market is the leading venue for credit price dicovery prior to rating downgrades.
Given our finding that bond prices adjust following CDS spreads before credit rating
downgrades, we expect firms with CDS trading to experience a weaker bond price
reaction to rating downgrade announcements. We test this conjecture in the Internet
B.1.8 section. Using the event-study method similar to our analysis for stock price
reactions, we find that bond price reacts less to credit rating downgrades for firms
with CDS trading.
We next turn to the VECM results for the period prior to rating upgrades. Table
20 shows the contribution of the CDS market to credit price discovery falls substan-
tially, ranging between 51 and 56 percent. We also find the coefficient λ1 = −0.024
is significant and negative, while λ2 is not significant. This finding suggests that the
bond market leads the CDS market in credit price discovery prior to rating upgrades.
Overall, the lead-lag analyses using the VECM show that on a day-to-day basis,
both the CDS and corporate bond markets contribute to price discovery of their firm’s
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credit risk. The contribution of the CDS market however, significantly increases over
the quarter-period prior to rating downgrades where CDS spreads lead bond spreads
in their daily changes. Whereas, in the quarter-period prior to rating upgrades,
we find the opposite relation holds. Collectively, our results in Table 20 strongly
support the main conclusion of this paper that the CDS market provides important
information to equity and bond investors prior to rating downgrades, which explains
why stock and bond prices react less to rating downgrades for firms with CDS trading
on their debts.
2.6.2 Does information flow from the CDS to equity markets?
Following the empirical framework in [4], we study how the information flows between
the CDS and equity markets by looking at the lead-lag relationship between CDS and
stock returns. The objective is to test whether there is any incremental information
in the CDS market that is not already contained in the equity market. An important
concern with the lead-lag study between the credit and equity markets is that the two
markets could be highly dependent. It is therefore important to remove components
in CDS changes that are predictable using lagged CDS returns, contempraneous stock
return, and lagged stock returns.
We regress daily CDS returns (i.e., percentage changes) for each firm i using past
information up to five lags as follows:














δi,t−kCDS returni,t−k + ui,t (19)
Besides lagged CDS, lagged stock returns, and contemporaneous stock returns, we
include the ratio of past stock return to the current CDS spread in equation (19) to
capture the nonlinear elasticity between CDS spread and equity value. The above
regression is estimated for each firm separately. The residuals ui,t from the regression
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represent the unexpected change in CDS spreads that is unanticipated by both the
equity and CDS markets. We refer to ui,t as CDS innovation, which is used in the
second-stage regression for studying the information flow from the CDS market to
the stock market. Consistent with [4], we find that R2 from the unreported first-stage
regressions are mostly in the single digits.
Next, we test whether the unanticipated component in CDS spread changes can
predict future stock returns. We estimate the following panel regression specification:





















× Stock returnt−k + εt
(20)
where ui,t−k is the CDS innovation on day t−k estimated from equation (19). We also
include lagged stock returns in the above equation to ensure that any relationships
between past CDS innovations and future stock returns are not artifacts of stock
return autocorrelations. We introduce two new variables in the above regression
specification. Rating-downgradet is an indicator variable equal to one on day t if it
is within [-90,-2] days of credit rating downgrades, and zero otherwise. This variable
is designed to capture information flow from the CDS to equity markets that occurs
before rating downgrade announcements. Similarly, Rating-upgradet is an indicator
variable equal to one on day t if it is within [-90,-2] days of credit rating upgrades,
and zero otherwise.22 For our analysis, we use CDS spreads with the constant 5-year
maturity because they are the most liquid. We also consider only CDS spreads that
are written on senior debt and those without a restructuring clause. Table 21 reports
results based on the regression model in equation (20).
22We obtain similar conclusions when replicating the results with rating condition dummies defined
over the following event windows [-60,-2], [-60,+30], and [-30,+30] relative to rating change events.
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The regression model (I) in Table 21 reports results based on equation (20) with-
out Rating-downgradet and Rating-upgradet. In this case, the coefficient
∑5
k=1 bk
quantifies the amount of information discovered through the CDS market that is in-
formative of future stock prices on the day-to-day basis. Table 21 shows that
∑5
k=1 bk
= −0.0074, which is negative and significant at the 10 percent confidence level. The
negative sign on the sum of coefficients is consistent with [104], which shows that
as default risk increases equity price falls. However, the magnitude of 0.74% is eco-
nomically trivial, suggesting that the CDS market, on average, is not substantially
informative of the equity price. On the other hand, we find that past stock returns
significantly predict future stock returns with the coefficient of −7.23%. This strong
negative auto-correlation that we observe is consistent with the well-established mean-
reversion characteristic of stock returns.







k quantify information flow from the CDS to equity
markets in the periods that are outside and during rating-downgrades, respectively.







ative and statistically significant, indicating an approximate 4.3% transmission of
information from CDS innovation to future stock returns. We find the information




is no longer significant,
suggesting that the CDS market is not very informative of future stock returns out-
side the rating-downgrade period. Interestingly, estimates from regression model (II)
show that past stock returns do not significantly predict future stock returns dur-






Lastly, the regression model (III) reports results based on the model in equation




k captures the information flow
from the CDS to equity markets during the rating-upgrade period. We do not find
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that the CDS market provides new information to the equity market during the
period around credit rating upgrades. However, it is interesting to point out that
stock returns are quite persistent when the firm experiences rating upgrades, which





Overall, the results in Table 21 show that there exists significant information
flow from the CDS to equity markets before the firm is being downgraded. We
conclude that the CDS market is an important venue for equity price discovery prior
to credit rating downgrades, providing support to explain why stock prices of firms
with CDS trading react significantly less to credit rating downgrades. These results
are consistent with [4] who document insider trading by privately informed parties in
the CDS markets around negative events.23
2.7 CDS spreads and the cross-section of stock returns
The distress risk puzzle, i.e., lower-rated firms earn lower returns, has been docu-
mented by a number of empirical studies. In particular, [15] find that the puzzle is
most pronounced around rating downgrades. In this section, we test Hypothesis 5
by examining the value of the CDS market in explaining the cross-section of stock
returns for firms that are about to be re-rated.
We are motivated by [62] who estimate the equity risk premia from CDS spreads
and show that they positively correlate with firms’ stock returns. Their general idea
is that the firm’s equity risk premium is related their CDS spread dynamics under the
risk-neutral (Q) and physical (P) measures, which can be extracted using the term
structure of CDS spreads over time, i.e., panel CDS data. Building on the insight
of the Merton’s structural model, the equity risk premium, µE − r, is related to the
23For instance, these informed parties could be banks that have relationships with firms and
simultaneously act as intermediaries in the CDS market.
94
CDS excess return by







where µPs − µQs is the CDS spread excess return defined as the difference between the
drifts under the physical and risk-neutral probability measures.24 Equity volatility
and CDS spread volatility are denoted by σE and σS, respectively. [62] suggest that
equation (21), can be inferred from the CDS spread dynamics with constant maturity
T as follows
ERP Tt+τ ≡ −














denote the conditional time-t expectation of CDS
spread at the future time t + τ under the Q and P-measure, respectively. The de-
nominator in the above equation (22) refers to the volatility of CDS spreads across
the interval [t, t+ τ ], and
∫ t+τ
t
σ2E,udu is the equity variance calculated over the same
period. The term in brackets on the right-hand side of equation (22) can be usefully
thought of as the Sharpe ratio of CDS spreads with constant maturity T .
We estimate equation (22) using the term structure of CDS spreads at various
points in time. The method is based on the well-established approach of [38] in the
fixed income literature. To save space, we describe the procedure in Internet B.1.10.
We estimate one-year CDS-implied equity risk premium on a daily basis for each firm
in the sample, i.e., τ = 1 in equation (22). We refer to the estimate as ERP . In
order for firms to be eligible for the equity risk premia estimation, they must have
sufficient CDS quotes traded at maturities 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. In Table B.12,
we report portfolio characteristics sorted based on ERP , credit ratings, and CDS
spreads. The sorting is done at the beginning of each month. We find that ERP
positively and monotonically increases with average portfolio returns. This positively
24The risk-neutral drift of the CDS spread µQs does not need to be equal to the risk-free rate as
the CDS spread is not a traded asset, only the CDS contract is.
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monotonic relationship, however, does not hold for portfolios sorted by either credit
ratings or CDS spreads, confirming the findings in [62].
We next examine whether CDS implied ERP can explain the cross-section of
equity returns of firms that are about to be downgraded. Panel A of Table 22 reports
average one-year portfolio returns of firms before credit rating downgrades quintile–
sorted based on ERP , credit ratings, and CDS spreads. Only firms that will be
downgraded by one of the three rating agencies within the next 30 calendar days
are kept in the sample. The average one-year returns of all portfolios in Panel A
are negative, which is consistent with [47] who documented negative stock returns
persisting for a year after downgrades. However, importantly for this sample, we
find that ERP monotonically increases with average one-year equity returns. The
difference in average one-year returns between the highest and lowest ERP -sorted
portfolio is 29.2% and statistically significant at the one percent level. On the other
hand, we do not find that sorting firms prior to rating downgrades based on their
rating scales result in a cross–sectional difference in one-year equity returns. The
relationship between credit ratings and one-year equity returns is not monotonic, and
the difference in equity returns between the worst-rated group and the best-rated
group is not statistically significant.
Similar to sorting based on credit ratings, we do not find that CDS spreads alone
can explain the cross-section of equity returns before rating downgrade announce-
ments. Interestingly, sorting portfolios based on credit ratings and CDS spreads pro-
duces results that are synonymous with the distressed puzzle, i.e., firms with higher
CDS spreads (worse credit ratings) have lower expected equity returns.
We replicate the results in Panel A using firms that will be upgraded in the next
30 days, i.e. prior to rating upgrade announcements. The results are reported in
Panel B of Table 22. Sorting based on either ERP , credit ratings or CDS spreads,
we do not observe a strictly monotonic relationship in returns unlike in the case
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of downgrades. Overall, the results in this section show that the ERP estimated
from CDS spreads perform better than credit ratings in explaining equity returns,
especially before rating downgrade announcements.
2.8 Conclusion
We present evidence that firms’ stock prices react significantly less to credit rating
downgrades when they have CDS contracts trading on their debt. Our results are
robust to different model specifications such as the instrumental variable regression
and the propensity-score-matched difference-in-difference analysis. Drawing insights
from the simple structural model, we examine various economic channels that can
potentially explain our results. We show that CDS spreads contain information that
anticipates credit rating downgrades as far as 180 days ahead of the revision date.
Using a hazard model for default, we find that CDS spreads provide information that
significantly helps improve historical default prediction. Further, the CDS market
significantly contributes to price discovery in the stock and bond markets before
rating change announcements, and CDS term structures contain information that
allow equity investors to construct a more reliable measure of default risk premium
than credit ratings.
Overall, our findings suggest that the CDS market leads, and provides new and
complementary information to that already conveyed by credit rating agencies. There-
fore, it may also be beneficial for regulators to design policies that can enhance the
transparency and liquidity in the CDS market instead of focusing solely on regulating
the credit rating agencies.
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Figure 6: CDS-implied credit ratings
We plot daily averaged CDS-implied ratings over the interval [-360,180] days centered
on the rating change events. The left (right) panels plot results for downgrades (up-
grades) for three adjacent rating classes: A-BBB, BBB-BB, and BB-B. On each day,
we classify firms according to their CDS spread into six rating classes; see Table B.1
in the appendix for the mapping. The CDS spread boundaries used to classify firms
into rating classes are estimated non-parametrically following the method in [26] and
[97]. The plotted CDS-implied ratings are daily averaged values across rating–change
events. The y-axis in each panel indicates the credit rating classes. Higher credit
rating classes imply higher default probability. The x-axis indicates event days rela-
tive to the rating change date. In each panel, the solid line plots the official ratings,
in rating class scale, issued by credit agencies, while the dotted line plots average
CDS-implied ratings.
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Table 14: Stock price reactions to rating changes
This table reports stock price reactions to bond downgrades and upgrades. The sample consists
of credit rating downgrades and upgrades on taxable corporate bonds issued by U.S. firms from
January 1996 to December 2010. Panel A reports results for the full sample, while Panel B reports
results for the traded-CDS sample. The full sample consists of 4,665 credit rating downgrades and
2,171 credit rating upgrades. The traded-CDS sample (Panel B) consists only of firms that have
CDS trading at any point in our sample period, i.e from 1996 to 2010. In each panel, we report
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) calculated over the 3-day event window (-1,+1), where day 0
represents the rating change event day. CAR is calculated using the market model. Count reports
the number of rating change observations used in each CAR calculation. We report averaged CAR
values separately for the Pre-CDS period and the Post-CDS period. Rating changes that occur in
the presence of CDS trading are considered to be in the post-CDS period, while rating changes that
occur in the absence of CDS trading are considered to be in the pre-CDS period. Difference reports
the difference in averaged CAR values between the Pre-CDS period and the Post-CDS period. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full sample
Downgrades Upgrades
Mean CAR(%) Count Mean CAR(%) Count
Pre-CDS -5.10*** 3249 0.16* 1482
(-19.72) (1.60)
Post-CDS -2.51*** 1416 0.09 689
(-6.42) (0.61)
Difference (Post−Pre) 2.58*** -0.07
(5.51) (-0.39)
Total -4.31*** 4665 0.14* 2171
(-19.93) (1.67)
Panel B: Traded-CDS sample
Downgrades Upgrades
Mean CAR(%) Count Mean CAR(%) Count
Pre-CDS -2.87*** 803 0.18 300
(-7.23) (0.85)
Post-CDS -1.92*** 1029 0.06 574
(-5.48) (0.39)
Difference (Post−Pre) 0.95* -0.12
(1.79) (-0.46)
Total -2.34*** 1832 0.10 874
(-8.89) (0.82)
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Table 15: Regression analysis of stock price reactions to rating changes
This table reports regression results of stock price reactions to bond rating changes. The dependent
variable is CAR (-1,+1) calculated over the 3-day event window around a rating change event using
the market model. All the variables are defined in B.1. Robust t-statistics are clustered at the
firm-level and reported in bracket. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
confidence levels, respectively.
Panel A: Downgrades Panel B: Upgrades
Full sample Traded-CDS Full sample Traded-CDS
(I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III)
dCDS 2.08*** 1.70** 2.59*** -0.14 0.03 0.08
(3.38) (2.39) (3.73) (-0.65) (0.11) (0.19)
Rating-level controls
Prev Rating (log) -3.04*** -3.19*** -3.48*** -0.16 0.02 -0.41
(-3.42) (-3.45) (-2.99) (-0.40) (0.05) (-0.69)
Abs Rating Change -2.24*** -2.27*** -1.87** 0.03 0.01 0.04
(-5.03) (-5.08) (-2.22) (0.33) (0.16) (0.20)
Days Since Last Rating (log) 0.13 0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.10 0.18
(0.54) (0.50) (-0.09) (0.74) (0.84) (1.10)
Earnings Ann Related -2.09** -2.15** -1.44 0.78 0.80 0.12
(-2.20) (-2.25) (-1.20) (1.34) (1.36) (0.13)
Firm-level controls
Sales (log) 0.62 0.66 -0.27 -0.14 -0.17 -0.27
(1.55) (1.61) (-0.63) (-1.11) (-1.30) (-1.55)
Profitability 0.44 0.38 -0.59 0.85 0.79 0.66
(0.32) (0.28) (-0.39) (1.08) (1.00) (0.59)
Leverage -3.38 -3.73* 2.18 0.20 0.11 0.59
(-1.58) (-1.71) (0.75) (0.32) (0.18) (0.59)
Mkt-to-Book 0.19* 0.20** 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00
(1.96) (2.07) (0.85) (-0.94) (-1.00) (-0.08)
Avg Volatility (log) -0.78 -0.68 -0.33 0.19 -0.04 0.53
(-1.52) (-1.01) (-0.43) (0.83) (-0.19) (1.53)
Avg Trading Volume (log) -0.81*** -0.86** -0.52 0.15 0.18 0.01
(-2.64) (-2.51) (-1.06) (0.94) (1.09) (0.03)
Avg Return 7.16*** 6.71*** 8.02*** -1.38 -1.20 -1.98
(4.33) (4.11) (2.71) (-1.25) (-1.05) (-1.29)
CDS-trading controls
Analyst Coverage (log) 0.12 0.22 -0.19 -0.06 -0.06 0.08
(0.28) (0.51) (-0.26) (-0.44) (-0.38) (0.43)
Analyst Dispersion 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*
(1.20) (1.28) (0.47) (-0.42) (-0.49) (-1.80)
Institutional Ownership 1.32** 1.31** -1.12* -0.22* -0.19 -0.10
(1.99) (1.98) (-1.77) (-1.75) (-1.41) (-0.43)
Stock Illiquidity 1.33 1.51 -3.39 0.87 0.94 10.25
(0.56) (0.64) (-0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (1.10)
Bond Illiquidity -0.28 -0.23 -0.39 0.11 0.11 0.32**
(-0.68) (-0.57) (-0.85) (1.01) (0.96) (1.99)
Debt Outstanding (log) -0.44 -0.44 -0.14 0.05 0.06 0.31
(-1.17) (-1.16) (-0.28) (0.42) (0.45) (1.65)
Fixed effects Ind Ind & Year Ind Ind Ind & Year Ind
Observations 4176 4176 1775 1972 1972 834
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.124 0.091 -0.000 -0.004 0.000
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Table 16: Instrumental variable regression of stock price response to rating changes
This table reports instrumental variable regression results of stock price reactions to bond rating
changes. The dependent variable is CAR (-1,+1) calculated over the 3-day event window around a
rating change event using the market model. All the variables are defined in B.1. Robust t-statistics
are clustered at the firm-level and reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
Panel A: Downgrades Panel B: Upgrades
(I) (II) (I) (II)
dCDS IV 6.10*** 5.44* 0.13 1.44
(4.44) (1.76) (0.17) (1.23)
Rating-level controls
Prev Rating (log) -2.91** -2.96** -1.07 -0.76
(-2.36) (-2.35) (-1.50) (-0.99)
Abs Rating Change -1.06* -1.10* 0.20 0.23
(-1.87) (-1.94) (1.35) (1.57)
Days Since Last Rating (log) 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.27
(0.75) (0.71) (1.13) (1.30)
Earnings Ann Related -1.25 -1.32 0.72 0.65
(-1.01) (-1.07) (0.87) (0.77)
Firm-level controls
Sales (log) 0.15 0.11 -0.22 -0.38*
(0.29) (0.18) (-1.02) (-1.67)
Profitability 6.49* 6.52** -0.03 -0.33
(1.96) (2.00) (-0.02) (-0.21)
Leverage -0.01 -0.53 -0.14 -0.40
(-0.00) (-0.21) (-0.16) (-0.42)
Market-to-Book 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.29) (0.33) (1.16) (1.34)
Avg Volatility (log) -0.31 -0.35 0.96** 0.72*
(-0.45) (-0.44) (2.39) (1.83)
Avg Trading Volume (log) -1.02** -0.93** -0.04 -0.02
(-2.25) (-1.99) (-0.19) (-0.09)
Avg Return 8.71*** 8.15*** -0.97 -0.66
(3.89) (3.56) (-0.63) (-0.42)
CDS-trading controls
Analyst Coverage (log) 0.40 0.45 -0.04 -0.02
(0.74) (0.83) (-0.18) (-0.06)
Analyst Dispersion 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(1.10) (1.19) (-0.90) (-0.91)
Institutional Ownership -0.02 0.08 -0.84*** -0.75***
(-0.03) (0.12) (-3.22) (-2.66)
Stock Illiquidity -3.22 -2.70 -8.28 -8.03
(-0.76) (-0.63) (-1.08) (-0.95)
Bond Illiquidity -0.77 -0.71 0.13 -0.02
(-1.47) (-1.14) (0.67) (-0.09)
Debt Outstanding (log) -1.04** -0.96 0.21 0.11
(-2.04) (-1.61) (0.93) (0.45)
Fixed effects Ind Ind & Year Ind Ind & Year
Observations 1966 1966 886 886
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.133 0.014 -0.017
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Table 17: Diff-in-diff regression of stock price reactions to downgrades
This table reports difference-in-difference regression analysis of stock price response to bond down-
grades for the 1:5 propensity-score matched sample with replacement. The dependent variable is
CAR (-1,+1) calculated over the 3-day event window around a rating change event using the market
model. All the variables are defined in B.1. Robust t-statistics are clustered at the firm-level and
reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Matched sample Panel B: Subsamples (diagnostics)
Treatment Control Post-CDS Pre-CDS




dCDS 0.00 -0.93 2.50*** 0.10
(0.00) (-1.06) (3.22) (0.12)
dTreatment -0.17 -0.27 2.27*** 0.04
(-0.25) (-0.40) (2.97) (0.05)
Rating-level controls
Prev Rating (log) -3.72** -3.76** -2.69*** -3.69 -4.89* -2.88***
(-2.32) (-2.32) (-2.75) (-1.41) (-1.89) (-2.59)
Abs Rating Change -1.26*** -1.19*** -1.45** -1.11*** -1.10* -1.60***
(-3.80) (-3.46) (-2.30) (-2.91) (-1.89) (-6.25)
Days Since Last Rating (log) 0.45 0.33 -0.08 0.72 1.36** -0.63
(1.20) (0.93) (-0.29) (1.31) (2.55) (-1.49)
Earnings Ann Related -4.42*** -4.26*** -2.29 -5.59** -5.05** -2.61**
(-2.87) (-2.87) (-1.51) (-2.49) (-2.29) (-2.07)
Firm-level controls
Sales (log) -0.41 -0.37 0.22 -0.52 -0.64 -0.09
(-0.72) (-0.69) (0.48) (-0.62) (-0.75) (-0.16)
Profitability -4.17** -4.55*** -5.95*** -2.50 -5.10** -2.65
(-2.52) (-2.80) (-3.31) (-1.01) (-2.31) (-1.26)
Leverage 0.40 0.85 1.90 -0.85 0.30 -1.26
(0.17) (0.38) (0.59) (-0.27) (0.11) (-0.40)
Mkt-to-Book 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.22
(1.48) (1.16) (1.41) (1.22) (0.72) (1.28)
Avg Volatility (log) -0.71 -0.23 -0.89 -0.49 -2.00** 2.00*
(-1.13) (-0.28) (-1.24) (-0.51) (-2.45) (1.70)
Avg Trading Volume (log) -0.39 -0.62 -0.30 -0.39 0.56 -1.67***
(-1.06) (-1.56) (-0.64) (-0.68) (1.00) (-3.06)
Avg Return 8.19*** 8.58*** 3.62 10.60*** 9.19*** 7.10***
(3.62) (3.90) (1.38) (3.49) (3.12) (3.13)
CDS-trading controls
Analyst Coverage (log) 0.06 0.36 -0.09 -0.03 -0.23 -0.13
(0.13) (0.77) (-0.12) (-0.05) (-0.32) (-0.23)
Analyst Dispersion 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01**
(2.52) (2.54) (1.40) (2.04) (1.43) (2.17)
Institutional Ownership 0.44 0.07 -0.55 1.24 0.68 -0.02
(0.82) (0.13) (-0.85) (1.38) (0.89) (-0.03)
Stock Illiquidity 8.05 6.83 8.98 11.13 32.06* -17.87
(0.80) (0.67) (0.48) (0.82) (1.73) (-1.35)
Bond Illiquidity -0.42 -0.35 -0.92** -0.10 -0.93 0.14
(-1.04) (-0.86) (-2.18) (-0.16) (-1.37) (0.34)
Debt Outstanding (log) -0.77 -0.67 -0.12 -1.14 -0.81 -0.56
(-1.36) (-1.11) (-0.23) (-1.36) (-0.96) (-1.16)
Fixed effects Ind Ind & Year Ind Ind Ind Ind
Observations 4899 4899 1518 3381 2585 2314
Adjusted R2 0.153 0.162 0.079 0.194 0.161 0.181
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Table 18: CDS, and the predictability of rating changes
This table reports results from estimating the extended Cox model for predicting bonds’ credit rating
change events. The sample consists of corporate bonds issued by U.S. firms that have CDS contracts
trading on its debt. We estimate the hazard rate function (see equation (14)) for the time-to-rating
change events (in months) at the bond-issuance level. We allow the baseline hazard functions to
differ between different credit rating levels, i.e. strata. Panel A reports results for downgrades, while
Panel B reports results for upgrades. Observations and Nob. events indicate the number of issuance-
month observations and the number of rating change events used in the estimation, respectively.
CDS spread is the average 5-year CDS spread in the prior month (in %). Bond Yield is the trade-
weighted average bond yield in the prior month (in %). CDS Spread Change is the log difference
in 5-year CDS spreads at the start and end of the previous month. Bond Yield change is the log
difference in trade-weighted average bond yields at the start and end of the previous month. Credit
Watch dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has been put on the credit watch
list. We obtain credit watch announcements data from FISD, as well as from Moody’s Default Risk
Database (MDRS). We only consider negative watches for downgrades, and positive watches for
upgrades. All remaining explanatory variables are described in B.1 and are lagged by one month.
All regressions include industry, rating agency and year fixed-effects. We report robust t-statistics
clustered at the firm level in brackets below each estimate.
Hazard rate of future rating change event
Panel A: Downgrades Panel B: Upgrades
(I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III)
CDS Spread Change 0.42** 0.38** -0.24 -0.23
(2.56) (2.36) (-0.73) (-0.68)
Bond Yield Change -0.14* -0.14* 0.11 0.05
(-1.75) (-1.75) (0.50) (0.23)
CDS Spread 0.01* 0.01* -0.02 -0.02
(1.95) (1.70) (-0.74) (-0.76)
Bond Yield -0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.01***
(-0.59) (-0.44) (4.19) (4.74)
Credit watch dummy 1.69*** 1.71*** 1.70*** 1.90*** 1.89*** 1.90***
(19.65) (20.11) (19.83) (11.44) (11.53) (11.43)
Market Cap (log) -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.54*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38***
(-6.30) (-6.48) (-6.21) (2.75) (2.83) (2.78)
Profitability -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.29 0.31 0.30
(-1.56) (-1.47) (-1.54) (1.47) (1.56) (1.48)
Long Term Debt-to-Assets -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 -0.67 -0.63 -0.65
(-0.04) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.71) (-0.66) (-0.68)
Leverage 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.03* 0.03** 0.03*
(2.76) (2.53) (2.70) (1.80) (1.99) (1.79)
Avg Trading Volume (log) 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.23* 0.22* 0.23*
(10.08) (10.23) (10.08) (1.88) (1.79) (1.84)
Avg Volatility (log) 0.24** 0.21* 0.22* -0.38 -0.37 -0.37
(2.05) (1.83) (1.92) (-1.62) (-1.62) (-1.62)
Avg Return 0.09 -0.13 0.08 -1.11* -1.03 -1.12*
(0.27) (-0.38) (0.24) (-1.75) (-1.59) (-1.76)
Observations 206338 211259 206338 113639 115610 113639
Nob. events 7541 7640 7541 2251 2273 2251
Pseudo R-sq 0.088 0.087 0.089 0.057 0.057 0.058
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Table 19: CDS and the predictability of defaults
This table reports results from estimating the extended Cox model for predicting default.
We estimate the hazard rate function (see equation (14)) for the time-to-default events (in
months) at the firm level. We obtain default and bankruptcy filing data from Moody’s Ulti-
mate Recovery Database (Moody’s URD), FISD and Bankrupcy.com. The sample consists
of U.S. firms that have CDS contracts trading on their debt at some point between January
1996 and December 2010 (i.e. traded-CDS firms). A firm is considered to be in default
in the month that it misses a disbursement of interest and/or principal, as well as when
it files for bankruptcy. Observations and Nob. events indicate the number of firm-month
observations and default events used in the estimations. Credit Rating is the credit rating
level, in cardinal scale, of the firm in the prior month averaged across the three rating
agencies. CDS spread is the firm’s average 5-year CDS spread in the prior month (in %).
CDS Spread Change is the log difference in 5-year CDS spreads at the start and end of the
previous month. All remaining explanatory variables are described in Appendix B and are
lagged by one period. All regressions include industry and year fixed-effects. We report
robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level in brackets below each estimate. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
Probability of default
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Credit Rating (Avg of 3 CRAs) 0.52*** 0.61***
(3.61) (3.57)
CDS Spread Level (5yr) 0.16** 0.17*** 0.12*
(2.12) (2.73) (1.65)
CDS Spread Change (5yr) 2.85** 3.23** 3.83**
(2.27) (2.13) (2.18)
Net Income-to-Assets -5.16 -8.08 -9.68* -12.64** -14.22
(-0.77) (-1.08) (-1.69) (-2.09) (-1.35)
Total Liabilities-to-Assets 3.52** 1.64 2.37 1.58 1.83
(2.24) (1.02) (1.54) (0.97) (0.85)
Relative Size 0.34 -0.14 -0.42* -0.21 0.24
(1.47) (-0.44) (-1.87) (-0.72) (0.50)
Excess Return -3.68*** -2.06 -1.52 -1.77 -4.13*
(-3.02) (-1.27) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.87)
Market-to-Book -0.15*** -0.39** -0.47*** -0.42*** -0.37***
(-2.79) (-2.54) (-2.87) (-2.67) (-3.28)
Avg Volatility (log) 2.58*** 1.55*** 2.08*** 1.31** 1.40*
(5.39) (2.79) (3.96) (2.35) (1.93)
Observations 54215 46470 45897 45897 45203
Nob. events 37 33 33 33 32
Pseudo R-sq 0.690 0.661 0.646 0.675 0.775
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Table 20: CDS contribution to credit price discovery
We report coefficient estimates from the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), and Hasbrouck
measures of CDS spreads’ contribution to the credit price discovery process. The sample consists of
210 reference entities for which the Johansen trace test statistics conclude that their daily secondary
bond yields and CDS spreads are cointegrated I(1) variables. Secondary bond yields data are
obtained from TRACE, which starts in July 2001. Our sample period ends in December 2010. We
use daily CDS spreads with a 5-year. We follow the method in [21] and estimate the constant 5-year
maturity bond yield by interploating the daily bond yields curve. Corporate bond spread is the
difference between the 5-year interpolated bond yield and the 5-year treasury yield. The coefficients















where ∆CDSi,t, and ∆CSi,t are daily diferences in CDS and corporate bond spreads for firm i
between days t and t − 1. The error correction term, Ei,t−1, is obtained from the following first-
stage regression estimated firm-by-firm using all daily oberservations:
CDSi,t = α0i + α1iCSi,t + Ei,t.
The residual term, Ei,t, represents daily deviation to the long-run relationship between CDS and
corporate bond spreads. This table reports from the second-stage panel regression for the three
estimation samples. The first estimation sample uses all daily observations available. The second
estimation sample uses daily observations over a quarter-period prior to the firm’s credit rating
downgrades, i.e. [-90,-2] days relative to the event date. Similarly, the third estimation sample uses
daily observations over [-90,-2] days prior to the firm’s credit rating upgrades. Hasbrouck’s measure
provides upper and lower bounds to the price discovery contribution made in the CDS market;
see equation (18). The coefficients λ1 and λ2 measure the relationship between changes in CDS
and corporate bond spreads in relation to their cointegrated relationship. Robust t-statistics are
clustered at the firm level and reported in brackets beneath the λ1 and λ2 estimates. Superscripts
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
Estimation sample Observations Coefficient estimates Hasbrouck share of CDS market
λ1 λ2 Lower Mid Upper
(1) All observations 249306 -0.017** 0.033*** 0.8143 0.8327 0.8511
(-2.24) (3.85)
(2) Prior to downgrades 22529 -0.011 0.037*** 0.9001 0.9073 0.9145
(-1.20) (2.90)
(3) Prior to upgrades 12449 -0.024* 0.094 0.5074 0.5324 0.5574
(-1.90) (1.46)
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Table 21: Lead-lag analysis of CDS and stock returns
This table reports results from the panel regression of daily stock returns on lagged CDS innovations,























× Stock returnt−k + εt.
We surpress firm-level notation above for brevity. Stock return at time t is calculated as the daily
difference between the log of stock prices. CDS innovationt represents daily changes to CDS returns
due to shock in the credit markets that is not anticipated by stock markets at time t. We estimate
CDS innovationt using the residual from the first-stage regression according to equation (19). We
interact lagged CDS innovations and stock returns with dummy variables indicating when the firm
is under different credit-rating conditions. Regression model (I) reports results for the baseline
regression without a rating-condition dummy. For the regression model (II), Rating-downgradet
is equal to one on days [-90,-2] relative to when the firm’s credit rating is downgraded, and zero
otherwise. For the regression model (III), Rating-upgradet is equal to one on days [-90,-2] relative to
when the firm’s credit rating is upgraded, and zero otherwise. We report robust t-statistics clustered
at the firm level in brackets beneath each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Stock returnt
(I) None (II) Downgrade (III) Upgrade
Intercept 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(8.58) (8.72) (8.38)∑5
k=1 CDS innovationt−k -0.0074* -0.0038 -0.0054
(-1.76) (-0.97) (-1.39)∑5
k=1 Stock returnt−k -0.0723*** -0.0672*** -0.0796***
(-4.41) (-4.65) (-4.83)∑5
k=1 Rating-downgradet×CDS innovationt−k -0.0428**
(-2.12)∑5
k=1 Rating-downgradet×Stock returnt−k -0.0306
(-0.48)∑5
k=1 Rating-upgradet×CDS innovationt−k -0.0513
(-0.93)∑5
k=1 Rating-upgradet×Stock returnt−k 0.2074***
(3.30)
Observations 286777 286777 286777
No. of clusters 345 345 345
Adj. R2 0.17% 0.31% 0.20%
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Table 22: CDS-implied equity risk premia and the cross-section of stock
returns: Before rating change announcements
This table reports means of one-year portfolio returns based on quintile monthly portfolio sorts. The
sample consists of U.S. firms that have CDS contracts traded with maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10
years. The portfolios are formed at the beginning of each month based on three dimensions: CDS-
implied equity risk premia (ERP), credit ratings, and CDS spreads. We calculate CDS-implied ERP
for each reference entity using its CDS term structures following the method in [62] (see Section 2.7
& B.1.10 for details). Average credit rating levels of the three rating agencies are used for portfolio
sorting based on credit ratings. The level of 5-year CDS spreads are used for portfolio sorting based
on CDS spreads. Panel A reports average one-year returns calculated using firms that are about to
be downgraded. In Panel B, average one-year returns are calculated using firms that are about to be
upgraded. Newey-West t-statistics adjusted for 11 lags are reported in brackets below the average
portfolio returns. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Portfolio-sorted average one-year returns before rating downgrades
Average one-year return
Sorted by ERP Sorted by Credit ratings Sorted by CDS spreads
1 (lowest) -0.456*** -0.386*** -0.139***
(-17.95) (-11.47) (-4.84)
2 -0.333*** -0.250*** -0.169***
(-8.94) (-8.16) (-5.55)
3 -0.326*** -0.366*** -0.320***
(-8.33) (-10.33) (-9.30)
4 -0.302*** -0.290*** -0.405***
(-8.53) (-7.98) (-12.19)
5 (highest) -0.164*** -0.454*** -0.492***
(-3.59) (-12.21) (-15.73)
5−1 0.292*** -0.068 -0.353***
(5.59) (-1.36) (-8.32)
Panel B: Portfolio-sorted average one-year returns before rating upgrades
Average one-year return
Sorted by ERP Sorted by Credit ratings Sorted by CDS spreads
1 (lowest) -0.027 -0.021 0.103***
(-0.61) (-0.30) (3.85)
2 0.083** 0.103*** 0.110***
(2.21) (2.81) (3.74)
3 0.160*** 0.114*** 0.088***
(4.97) (3.91) (2.58)
4 0.117*** 0.054** 0.102***
(4.57) (1.82) (3.11)
5 (highest) 0.254*** 0.241*** 0.220***
(9.07) (10.06) (7.10)




CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND MORAL HAZARD IN
BANK LENDING
3.1 Introduction
Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) are a relatively new financial instrument that allow
lenders to reduce exposure to the credit risk of their borrowers. Credit risk transfer,
through a CDS, can be used to hedge on-balance sheet asset credit risk. Commercial
banks and other lenders are natural buyers of CDS protection to mitigate credit risk
which helps free up regulatory capital,1 diversify risk, and potentially increase credit
supply to firms ([73, 119, 22, 133]). On the flip side, credit risk transfer through
a CDS can reduce the incentives of banks to screen and monitor their borrowers,
even though they still retain control rights2 ([43, 117]). This separation of cash flow
exposure and control rights could potentially give rise to an even stronger form of
incentive misalignment, the empty creditor problem ([84, 22, 145]).
In this paper, we focus on the private debt market to study whether the initi-
ation of CDS trading on borrowers’ debt misaligns incentives between lenders and
borrowers. Covenant violations and the consequent renegotiation between banks and
borrowers provide an ideal setting to understand whether lender moral hazard ex-
ists when lenders can easily engage in credit risk transfer. Covenant violations give
creditors contractual rights similar to those in the case of payment defaults – rights
1For instance, the Basel II regulation permits using a CDS as a hedge against loan credit risk if
the CDS reference obligation (typically a bond) is junior to the loan being hedged
2Banks may now originate a loan, hold the loan on their balance sheet, and continue to service
the loan without being exposed to the borrowing firm’s prospects. Servicing includes monitoring
the borrower and enforcing the covenants, even though economic exposure to credit risk is passed
on to the credit default swap insurance provider.
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include requesting immediate repayment of the principal and termination of further
lending commitments – enhancing the bargaining power of lenders vis-á-vis the bor-
rowers ([35, 112]). If the lenders are indeed empty creditors and intend to impose
harsher renegotiated loan terms to extract rents or if they intend to push borrowers
into bankruptcy, borrowers’ covenant violations give lenders an ideal opportunity to
do so. Covenant violations also allow us to employ a regression discontinuity design
to help with identification.
There are potential countervailing forces against moral hazard in the private debt
market that may not be as relevant for public bond holders. First, banks, in con-
trast to public bond holders, may face reputation costs if they push borrowers into
inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation. These reputation costs are two-fold and are not
directly modeled in the one period setup of [22]. One cost that lead-lenders face is
the damage to their reputation in the loan syndication market in the event that the
borrower files for bankruptcy ([70]). In addition, in a competitive lending market,
a lender with a reputation of being an empty creditor, who imposes harsh renegoti-
ated loan terms or pushes borrowers into bankruptcy, would be at a disadvantage.
Moreover, lenders risk losing all the relationship-specific information and future prof-
its in the case of borrower bankruptcy. These reputation costs may be large enough
to discourage banks from engaging in the aforementioned exploitative behavior in a
multi-period setting. Thus, whether or not lender moral hazard exists in the private
debt market, is ultimately an empirical question that we address in this paper.
In order to answer this question, we first analyze changes in corporate policies of
borrowers conditional on covenant violations in a regression discontinuity framework.
[35] and [112] document that lenders in the private debt market use their bargaining
power to influence borrowers’ corporate policies after a covenant violation, and this
type of creditor governance improves firm value ([113]). On the other hand, banks that
hedge borrower exposure with CDSs, may be prone to moral hazard and not expend
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costly effort in negotiating and influencing firm policies. We find that borrowers
with CDS trading on their debt do not reduce their investment after their covenant
violations. This is in contrast to firms without CDSs which experience a significant
reduction in firm investment. These results are broadly supportive of lender moral
hazard and suggest that lenders do not expend much effort on influencing investment
policies of borrowers after covenant violations when borrowers have CDS trading on
their debt.
In the absence of availability of data on the exact net credit risk exposure of the
lender to the borrower, we use other measures of lenders’ propensity to engage in
credit risk transfer and consequent lender moral hazard. We consider three proxies:
banks’ purchase of credit derivatives, their securitization activity, and their reliance
on non-interest income. Consistent with our hypotheses, when lenders are more likely
to lay off credit risk and exhibit moral hazard (i.e., banks that engage in credit risk
transfer through credit derivatives or securitization, or rely more on non-interest
income), we find that covenant violations do not have a material impact on a firm’s
investment policies.
A potential alternative explanation for our results could be that investment projects
of firms with CDSs are more valuable and, hence, investment is not cut even after
covenant violations. [35] show that there is a significantly larger decrease in firm
investment post covenant violation when borrowers have information asymmetry or
agency conflicts (as proxied by cash holdings and the length of the relationship with
the lender), highlighting that inefficient investment is reduced. In contrast, we find
that when lenders can purchase CDSs on borrowers, there is no significant drop in
investment even when borrowers are more exposed to information asymmetry and
agency problems. These results provide further support to credit risk transfer through
CDS causing lender moral hazard.
We next consider the result of debt renegotiations after a borrower violates a
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covenant and when the borrower has a CDS trading on its debt. As discussed before,
after the covenant violations, creditors can request immediate repayment of the prin-
cipal and terminate further lending commitments. Alternatively, creditors can use
their additional bargaining power and extract higher spreads on loans extended con-
sequent to the covenant violation. Consistent with the argument that the availability
of credit derivatives on the borrower’s debt increases the lender’s outside options
([22]) and, hence, their bargaining power vis-á-vis the borrower, we find that lenders
extract rents after covenant violations by imposing higher spreads on renegotiated
loans of borrowers with a traded CDS. These results suggest that the availability of
CDS on borrowers induces lender moral hazard, where lenders do not expend costly
effort to influence firm policies that increase firm value, but extract rents using their
stronger bargaining power.
We next examine the effect of lender intervention on the stock returns of the bor-
rowing firm after covenant violation in the presence of a traded CDS on the firm’s
debt. For non-CDS firms, we find that after a covenant violation, the actions taken
by creditors to influence borrowers’ policies increase the value of the firm ([113]).
However, for firms with traded CDSs, the post covenant violation cumulative abnor-
mal returns are not significantly different from zero and are negative in the long-run,
indicating deteriorating firm performance. Consistent with this evidence, we find that
firms with traded CDSs on their debt are more likely to experience a credit rating
downgrade consequent to a covenant violation. Overall, these results again support
the existence of lender moral hazard wherein the lender doesn’t expend costly effort
to influence firm policies to improve firm value. Instead, lenders renegotiate higher
loan spreads post-covenent violation using their enhanced bargaining power. Conse-
quently, firm performance deteriorates as evidenced by credit rating downgrades and
lower stock returns.
One implication of severe moral hazard problems is that CDS trading may lead
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to higher borrower bankruptcies (see [22, 145]). Our results from a Cox proportional
hazards model of the survival time of the firm after covenant violation suggests that
CDS firms are neither more nor less likely to make a distressed exit or go bankrupt
after a covenant violation than firms without CDS.3 These results indicate that banks
may not be actively causing firm bankruptcies due to overinsurance (empty creditor
problem). Rules regarding risk-weighting of bank assets, such as those prescribed by
Basel Accords, suggest why banks may not overinsure against borrowing firms. The
risk weights, determined based on the credit rating of a borrower, can be substituted
by those of the CDS protection seller when the CDS is used to hedge credit exposure
from the borrower. Typically, as the CDS protection/insurance seller is better rated
than the borrower, it leads to lower risk weights on the credit exposure. However, if
CDS purchases lead to overinsurance, they are deemed speculative assets and receive
higher risk weights. Thus, overinsurance can be quite costly for banks. Banks that
do not overinsure are less likely to be empty creditors. Another potential reason
could be the inability of banks, which are arguably more informed, to overinsure (as
opposed to partially insure) against the borrower due to increased adverse selection
problems making any marginal credit protection expensive, especially after a covenant
violation.
Finally, we explore whether these ex-post lender moral hazard problems in the
presence of CDS trading on borrowers are consistent with ex-ante loan announce-
ment returns. Theoretically, [46] suggests that bank monitoring improves firm value.
Empirical evidence that bank credit line announcements indeed generate positive ab-
normal borrower returns is presented in [109], [86], [101], and [20] among others. If
capital markets anticipate lender moral hazard in the presence of CDS trading and,
consequently, lower lender monitoring (see [43, 117]), then loan announcement returns
3Following [66] and [67], firms are identified as distressed if they are in the bottom 5% of the
universe of firms in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) on the basis of the past
three-year cumulative return.
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for a firm with CDSs, should be relatively lower than returns for firms without CDSs.
In the absence of any agency problems between banks and firms, the loan announce-
ment returns of firms with CDSs should be statistically indistinguishable from firms
without CDSs. We find that loan announcement returns for CDS firms are muted
and not statistically different from zero. However, the loan announcement returns for
non-CDS firms are positive and significant, which is in line with the previous studies.
Overall, our results complement and enrich our understanding of the impact of
CDSs on the credit risk of the borrowers. [145] show that CDS introduction leads to
a higher incidence of bankruptcy and credit rating downgrades for firms. However,
they do not distinguish between public and private debt. In a related paper, [41] an-
alyzes out-of-court restructurings of public debt and shows that firms with CDSs face
difficulties with reducing debt out-of-court, thus increasing the likelihood of future
bankruptcy. The dramatically different results that we document in the context of
bankruptcy incidents after covenant violations on bank loans suggest that lenders in
the private market behave very differently from public bond holders. In contrast to
public debt holders, reputational concerns, future lending and non-lending business
from established relationships, and lower debt renegotiation frictions due to concen-
trated ownerships are a few of the factors that can mitigate such severe moral hazard
concerns in the private debt market.
Our work is also related to the contemporaneous paper by [137] who find that
debt covenants are less strict if CDS contracts exist on the borrowing firm’s debt at
the time of loan initiation. Interestingly, we find that, even ex-post, lenders do not
influence CDS firms to reduce their investment after covenant violations.
Our paper is related to work that examines the impact of credit transfer mecha-
nisms on lenders.4 However, CDSs are not the only mechanism that lenders have to
4The CDS market has grown quickly to an outstanding notional value as high as 5 Trillion U.S.
dollars, or approximately 15% of the total over the counter derivative markets in the 2007–2008
period.
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reduce their exposure to the borrowers. Some other possibilities are loan syndication,
loan sales, and loan securitization. In the context of loan sales, [40] empirically show
that firms whose loans are sold by their banks suffer negative stock returns, and sug-
gest that a loan sale conveys the selling bank’s private negative information on the
borrower to the market. As [118] discuss, the broad difference between loan sales and
a CDS purchase on a loan is that in the former cash flows are bundled with control
rights, while in the latter they are not.
[148] show that banks impose less restrictive covenants in anticipation of securi-
tization. However, [48] show that sold loans have significantly more covenants than
loans that are not sold, reducing the financial flexibility of the borrowers. Secu-
ritization and hedging borrower exposure with a CDS have very different economic
implications for lenders.5 Our results contribute to this literature and highlight lender
moral hazard when banks maintain control rights (but not economic exposure).
Our work also relates to the literature on the special nature of banks as information
producers and monitors.6 We show that the market reaction to a loan announcement
is insignificant when there is a potential for lender moral hazard in the presence of
CDS trading on the borrower’s debt. However, the loan announcement returns for
non-CDS firms are positive and significant, consistent with the previous studies.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses sources of
data and summary statistics. Section 3.3 discusses our empirical specifications and
results. Section 3.4 concludes.
5Also, as [148], among others, point out, generally loans of borrowing firms with high leverage,
non-investment grade rating, and severe information problems are securitized. On the other hand,
as [133] and our paper among others find, firms with CDSs traded against them are in similar, if
not in better, financial health than other firms.
6[101] focus on the status of the lending relationship and find that new bank loans generate zero
average abnormal returns, while loan renewals have a positive effect. The type of lender also matters.
[86] finds that loans placed with banks have a higher announcement effect compared to loans placed
through private placements. In contrast, [123] find a smaller return for bank loans. The findings of
[20] suggest that the quality of the lender affects the market’s perception of firm value.
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3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data sources and sample selection
We utilize five main datasets for our analysis: (i) Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC)
Dealscan database; (ii) Credit Market Analysis (CMA) Datavision dataset; (iii)
Bloomberg; (iv) Markit; (v) Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding
Companies (FR Y-9C) and Bank Call Report data. We obtain firm-quarter level
financial data from COMPUSTAT and equity return-related information from the
CRSP.
Loan information is extracted from the Dealscan database. The basic unit of
loans reported in Dealscan is a loan facility. Loan facilities are grouped into pack-
ages. Packages may contain various types of loan facilities for the borrower. Loan
information such as loan amount, maturity, type of loan, and other information, is
reported at the facility level. The database consists of private loans made by bank
and non-bank lenders to U.S. corporations. The Dealscan database contains the ma-
jority of all commercial loans issued in the U.S. We construct our covenant violation
sample following [35] for the period between 1994 and 20127. We focus on loans of
non-financial firms with covenants written on current ratio, net worth, or tangible net
worth, as these covenants are more frequent and the accounting measures used for
these covenants are unambiguous, standardized and less susceptible to manipulation.
The data on the timing of CDS introduction is obtained from three separate
sources: Markit, CMA Datavision, and Bloomberg. The CMA Datavision database
collects data from 30 buy-side firms which consist of major investment banks, hedge
funds, and asset managers. [103] compare multiple CDS databases, namely GFI,
Fenics, Reuters, EOD, CMA, Markit, and JP Morgan, and find that the CDS quotes
in the CMA database lead the price discovery process. The CMA database is widely
7The covenant sample begins in 1994 as the information on covenants is limited before that period
in the Dealscan database
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used among financial market participants. We use the CMA database to identify all
firms for which we observe CDS quotes on their debt. To further ensure the accuracy
of CDS initiation dates on a firm, we augment the CMA database with the CDS
data from Bloomberg and Markit. We take the earliest quote date from those three
databases as the first sign of active CDS trading on a firm’s debt.
As discussed later, our primary variables of interest in the combined dataset are (i)
an indicator that shows if the firm violates a financial covenant, and (ii) an indicator
that shows if the firm has outstanding CDS trades in the corresponding quarter. We
do not have access to data regarding the exact firms against which lending banks
protect themselves using CDSs. However, since CDS protection can only be obtained
for firms with traded CDS, we divide firms based on traded CDS. We use the lead
bank’s Y9C and call report data to identify which lenders are active in the credit
derivatives market. Arguably, most stock market participants and investors also may
not have access to information on which specific bank loans are protected with a
CDS. Hence, we believe that our analysis based on the credit derivative exposure of
the bank and CDS trading for a firm is justified from a market investor’s point of
view. This is especially true when we try to assess the stock market reaction to loan
announcements and covenant violations.
3.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 23 summarizes the statistics for the loan announcement sample. Loan agree-
ments are significant external financing events: the median loan or commitment size
is 31% of the firm’s total assets, which also implies that the median loan announcer
is not a very large firm. The median maturity of a loan is approximately four years.
Panel B of Table 23 summarizes the number of loan announcements along with the
mean size of the loan each year. There are about 1,200 loan announcements per year,
which is consistent with previous studies. We observe that the number of loans issued
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increased from 1990 to 1997, before declining and plateauing thereafter. Since the
recent financial crisis, the number of loans issued per year has almost halved. The
increasing trend in the earlier part of the sample may be due to Dealscan’s increasing
coverage of issued loans over time. Panel B of Table 23 also shows that the average
size of loan announcements has also increased over the years. There are 3,074 loan
announcements for 507 unique firms where the borrowing firms have traded CDS
contracts. On the other hand, there are 24,375 loan announcements for 5,962 unique
firms when the borrowing firms have not traded CDS contracts. Table 23 also shows
that the median loan size for firms that have CDS contracts traded is larger than the
average loan size for firms that do not have CDS contracts traded. This difference in
loan size leads us to specifically control for loan size in the latter part of the analysis.
Table 24, Panel A summarizes the statistics for the current ratio and net worth
covenant samples from 1994 to 2012. The current ratio and net worth samples consist
of all firm-quarter observations of non-financial firms in the COMPUSTAT database.
These two samples are further divided based on whether a firm-quarter observation
is determined to be in covenant violation (denoted by “Bind”) or not in covenant
violation (denoted by “Slack”) for the corresponding covenant. Panel B displays
the same set of firm-quarter observations split by firms with CDSs and without CDSs
issued against them. The outcome variables and control variables used in the analysis
for changes in firm characteristics when a covenant violation occurs are defined in
the Appendix section. The distributions of the covenant violations and the control
variables are in line with data used in previous studies (see [35] and [113]).
3.3 Empirical results
This section provides evidence regarding the existence of lender moral hazard in the
presence of CDS trading on a borrowing firm’s debt. It also tests if an empty creditor
problem exists, and whether markets anticipate lender moral hazard. Sections 3.3.1,
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3.3.2, and 3.3.3 test for moral hazard based on (i) lender intervention in the firm’s
operations, (ii) loan renegotiations after covenant violation, and (iii) the realized stock
market returns in the post covenant violation period respectively. Section 3.3.4 tests
for the presence of an empty creditor problem where banks can overinsure and cause
a higher rate of firm bankruptcies by studying firm exit hazard rates post covenant
violation. Finally, Section 3.3.5 tests whether capital markets anticipate and discount
for the potential agency problems by comparing the stock market returns to the loan
announcement conditional on whether or not CDS trades against a firm’s debt.
3.3.1 CDS and Capital Expenditure After Covenant Violations
Financial covenant violations provide an ideal setting for studying agency problems
that banks face in the presence of CDSs. Covenant violations give creditors contrac-
tual rights similar to those in the event of payment defaults, such as the right to
request immediate repayment of the principal and terminating further lending com-
mitments. Such rights provide creditors with a sudden increase in bargaining position
post-violation. Hence, if agency problems between lenders and borrowers exist, they
should manifest after covenant violation.
Granting waivers for a violation to a borrowing firm requires banks to investigate
the firm’s current condition, and its future prospects, and then handle each waiver
on a case-by-case basis. This requires the lending bank to exert effort at a significant
cost. Hence, if a bank hedges or reduces its exposure to a firm through CDS trading,
and the firm violates a covenant, the bank may not have economic incentives to take
corrective actions. To test for such lender moral hazard in the presence of CDS
trading, we follow the regression discontinuity approach in [35].
The identification is based on comparing firms just around the contractually writ-
ten covenant violation threshold. We compare the average treatment effects (ATE)
of firms that violate a covenant and have a traded CDS, with firms that violate a
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covenant and do not have a traded CDS. [35] have shown that after covenant viola-
tion, creditors intervene and firm investment is reduced significantly. [112] show that
such intervention helps the firm regain financial strength over time, helping equity
holders as well. If banks with CDS protection intervene less in firm policy, then we
should see smaller corrective changes, resulting in smaller drops in investment, for
firms with CDSs traded against their debt than for firms without.
The empirical specification is as follows, where i is the subscript to denote a
specific firm, and subscript t represents time quarter:
Investmentit = α+β1d Bindit−1 × d CDSit−1 + β2d Bindit−1
+ β3d CDSit−1 + β4Xit−1 + ηi + δt + εit,
(23)
where Investmentit is the ratio of the capital expenditures to the capital in the
beginning of the period. Our main variables of interest is the interaction term
d Bindit−1 × d CDSit−1. d Bindit−1 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm
i in quarter t − 1 is in covenant violation and zero otherwise. Similarly, d CDSit−1
is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a traded CDS contract for a firm i
in quarter t − 1. The coefficient β1 captures the average difference in investment
between a firm with a traded CDS and a firm without a traded CDS, after covenant
violation. Coefficient β2 captures the ATE of covenant violation for the firms that do
not have a traded CDS. Xit−1 is a vector of control variables to control for potential
differences in dynamic firm characteristics that affect firm investment. ηi denotes
firm fixed effects and δt estimates year-quarter fixed effects to control for unobserved
heterogeniety across firms and time. Detailed variable definitions of the dependent
variable and all the firm controls included in the regression specifications are provided
in the Appendix.
Table 25, Panel A reports the results. The first three columns utilize the full
dataset and the last three columns conduct the analysis using the regression disconti-
nuity sample. The regression discontinuity sample limits the sample of observations
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to 30% of the relative distance around the covenant violation boundary. Columns
(2), (3), (5), and (6) include firm level characteristics, and Columns (3) and (6) also
include the distance from covenant violation threshold as additional controls.
The negative and statistically significant coefficients that we find on the d Bind
indicator variable confirm the findings of [35], who show that firms face a significant
reduction in investment after a covenant violation due to creditor intervention. The
positive coefficient on the interaction term d Bind×d CDS shows that firms which
violate a covenant and have a CDS traded do not have as large a decrease in invest-
ment. In fact, adding the coefficients on d Bind and d Bind×d CDS, we note that the
net effect of violating a covenant on firm investment is statistically indistinguishable
from zero for firms with traded CDSs. The results hold through all six specifications.
This supports the hypothesis that in the presence of CDS trading, which allows lend-
ing banks to reduce credit exposure to borrowing firms, banks do not intervene in
changing firm investment policy after gaining control post covenant violation.
For a visual representation, Figure 7 plots firm investment with respect to the
distance of the firm from the covenant violation threshold 8. We consider two types of
covenants, net worth and current ratio, and use the tighter of the two covenants when
both are present to calculate the distance to covenant violation. The top panel reports
the relationship between firm investment and the distance to covenant violation for
firms which do not have CDSs traded against them. The bottom panel is for firms
with traded CDSs. In the case of firms without CDSs, we note a significant decline
in investments once a covenant is violated. However, in the bottom panel we do not
see any marked change in firm investment for firms with a traded CDS.
8We also plot the polynomial fit for firm investment versus firm distance to covenant violation in
the appendix section in Figure C.1
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3.3.1.1 CDS and Borrower CapEx After Violations: Lender Heterogeneity
In this section, we delve deeper into the hypothesis that bank moral hazard is causing
the muted reduction in firm investment after covenant violation. We investigate if
lender characteristics that affect bank moral hazard have predictable effects on firm
investment post covenant violation.
We match lenders from Dealscan to their parent bank holding companies (BHCs).
Using the parent BHC’s FR Y-9C reports, we gather data on their activities in the
credit derivatives market, loan sales, and securitization market and the total amount
of non-core banking activities. We are able to find matches for lenders for about 70%
of the packages in our sample. Data for credit derivatives and securitization & loan
sales are available from 1997 Q1 and 2001 Q2 onwards, respectively, while data on
non-interest income is available for the entire sample period from 1994-2012. Detailed
definitions for these lender variables are in the Appendix.
High (Low) lender activity for a specific lender variable is defined as the variable
being above (below) its computed median value using the entire sample period over
which data for it is available. Similar to specifications in Table 25, the dependent vari-
able is Investment and the main independent variables of interest are d Bind×d CDS
and d Bind. As before, along with firm level controls such as Macro q, Cash Flow,
and Assets (log), we also include the initial distance to the covenant violation thresh-
old. The distance to threshold helps control for the probability of covenant violation
(and ensuing conflicts of interest with the borrower) that the lender expects while
setting the initial covenant tightness.
We find that banks that actively reduce their credit exposure – by either buying
protection in the credit derivatives market or removing loans from their balance sheets
by securitizing them and/or selling them in the secondary loan market – intervene less
in borrowing firms’ investment policies after covenant violation. Table 26, Panels A
and B report these results for the full sample and the regression discontinuity sample,
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respectively. By noting the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction vari-
able d Bind×d CDS in Column (2) compared to the statistically and economically
insignificant coefficient in Column (1), we note that banks that have higher amounts
of CDS protection bought, intervene less. This holds true for Columns (3) and (4)
where banks with higher amounts of loans securitized, intervene less post covenant
violation. Finally, Columns (5) and (6) show that banks that have higher amounts
of non-interest income, i.e. banks with more non-core banking activities such as pro-
prietary trading and investment banking activities, intervene less as well. Overall,
banks that are more likely to hedge credit risk exposure intervene less in firms’ invest-
ment policies post-violation. These results are consistent with a bank moral hazard
argument.
3.3.1.2 CDS and Borrower CapEx After Violations: Borrower Heterogeneity
Table 27, Panels A and B conduct a test similar to the one above, where we investigate
whether borrowing firm characteristics that increase intervention costs for the lender
affect moral hazard. We examine two sets of problems that can increase the costs of
monitoring for the lender: (i) agency problems, such as free cash flow problems, are
exacerbated for firms that have a higher fraction of assets held as cash ([88]); and
(ii) information asymmetry and related monitoring costs should be higher when firms
have a shorter relationship history with the lending bank. Banks that are exposed
to such agency and information problems have even higher incentives to intervene
in firm policies after a credit event than in the case of firms in general. However, a
creditor hedged with a CDS has less incentive to intervene after a credit event, even
for firms with higher agency and information problems.
To conduct the test, we first divide our sample based on cash holdings and lending
relationship length. These borrower characteristics, as we argued above, should affect
the level of intervention post covenant violation, based on our hypothesis. Borrowing
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firms’ cash holdings data is from COMPUSTAT and lending relationship length is
obtained from Dealscan. High (Low) Cash is defined as cash being above (below) its
computed median value using the entire sample period over which data is available.
Lending relationship is computed at the firm level when a loan is made by summing up
the lending relationships of all lenders in the syndicate. A High lending relationship
sample corresponds to loans in which 30% or greater of the borrower’s past loans have
been made by the lending syndicate. A Low lending relationship sample corresponds
to loans in which a borrower has no historical relationship with the lenders in the
syndicate. As before, detailed definitions of these variables are in the Appendix.
Our dependent variable remains Investment and the main independent variables
of interest remain the interaction term d Bind×d CDS and also d Bind. Along with
firm-level controls, we again include the initial distance to the covenant threshold
to take into account potential future problems, such as covenant violation, that the
lenders might anticipate.
Comparing Columns (2) and (1) for both panels, we first note that the coefficient
of d Bind is twice as large and negative for firms with higher cash holdings when
compared to firms with low cash holdings. This result suggests that lenders recognize
possible free cash flow problems and reduce investment in firms with more cash. Next,
we note the positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term d Bind ×
d CDS for firms with a greater fraction of cash holdings. Thus, even though possible
free cash flow problems are large, the net effect of the presence of a CDS is that
there is effectively no reduction in firm investment after covenant violation. The
same phenomenon holds true when we compare the coefficient of interaction terms in
Columns (3) and (4) in either panel. Firms with shorter relationship history, which
implies higher information asymmetry and higher costs of due diligence by banks,
face less intervention in the presence of CDS trading.
A potential concern is that CDS traded firms tend to be large and if covenant
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violations are less constraining for larger firms then our results may possibly be driven
by size 9. In order to examine this we analyze the subsample of non-CDS firms by
dividing it into small and large firms. Large firms are defined as firms with an
asset value greater than $1 billion (which is close to the median asset value of CDS
firms). We follow the regression discontinuity setup as in column (4) of Table 25
and substitute d CDS with the large-firm dummy d Large instead. We find that the
d Bind×d Large coefficient is indeed positive but statistically insignificant from zero
with a t-statistic of 1.23 and a coefficient value of 0.006 which is half the magnitude
of the comparable d Bind×d CDS coefficient in column (4) of Table 25.
Overall, these results further bolster the hypothesis that banks suffer from moral
hazard in the presence of CDS trading, which results in muted or no corrective action
after a credit event.
3.3.2 Debt renegotiation after covenant violation
As discussed before, intervention, renegotiation, and monitoring are costly to banks.
If a lending bank has hedged or reduced its credit exposure to a borrowing firm by
purchasing a CDS, then the lender may not have incentives to intervene and help
improve the firm’s future prospects. At the same time, the lending bank still has
control rights over the firm, which allows it to renegotiate loans and grant waivers
after covenant violation. Thus, in the presence of a CDS against the firm, a hedged
lending bank may minimize the costly monitoring efforts post covenant violation.
If lending banks can overinsure themselves, through CDS, then arguably they
will have a higher incentive to accelerate the loan payment by not granting a waiver
and push the borrowing firm into bankruptcy (empty creditor problem). However,
there are many reasons why banks cannot get overinsured against their borrowers:
9We control for firm-size and include firm fixed-effects in our covenant violation regression which
should arguably address this issue to some extent. In unreported specifications, we also control for
non-linear terms of firm-size and find that our results are qualitatively unaltered.
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(a) regulatory reasons,10 (b) adverse selection,11 and (c) reputation concerns.12 In
such cases however, banks could grant waivers to borrowing firms and extract rents
via the renegotiated loan terms due to their increased bargaining power vis-á-vis the
borrower. This can be achieved, for instance, by imposing higher spreads or fees on
renegotiated loans of borrowing firms that have violated a covenant.
Table 28 investigates changes in the major loan contract terms post covenant
violation. We focus on loans initiated and amended by the same borrower-lead lender
pair before and after covenant violation 13 . The loan issuance date post covenant
violation is restricted to before the maturity of the loan facility which was affected by
the violation, or within one year of the covenant violation, whichever is the shorter
period. In addition to new issuances, we also gather data from the Dealscan facility
amendment datafile on the covenant violating loan facilities. Again, we require that
the amendment date be within one year of the covenant violation date.
Loan spread is the main dependent variable in our regression analysis. The
main independent variable of interest is the interaction term d AfterCovViol×d CDS.
d AfterCovViol is an indicator variable set equal to one for loan facilities initiated
10The rules regarding risk-weighting of bank assets, such as those prescribed by Basel Accords,
may also suggest why banks do not overinsure against borrowing firms. A CDS purchased to hedge
credit exposure receives a lower weight in terms of the risk based on the credit rating of the CDS
seller according to the Basel credit risk methodology. However, purchases that lead to overinsurance
are deemed speculative assets and receive higher risk weights as they are evaluated under the Basel
market risk methodology. Thus, overinsurance can be costly for banks.
11One can purchase CDS protection only if there is a counterparty willing to sell it. Given that a
lending bank is in an informationally advantageous position regarding a borrowing firm’s health, it
may be harder to find protection sellers to lay off credit risk at an attractive price, especially during
or after a credit event like a covenant violation.
12The concern of losing future loan origination business or syndicate ties might deter lending banks
from getting overinsured and pushing firms into bankruptcy after a credit event like a covenant
violation. However, given that large banks with diversified businesses are more active in the credit
derivatives market, reputation may be a weak disciplining mechanism for such lending banks (See
[70]).
13When there is a unanimous decision among the lenders to restructure or refinance a given loan
then the loan is entered as a new loan as opposed to an amended loan in Dealscan. Some of these
loans are marked as refinanced loans but many are not. Whereas the facility amendment dataset in
Dealscan mainly consists of amendments which requires a majority (51%) of lenders to agree to the
amendment (See [128])
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or amended after the covenant violation date and is set to zero otherwise. d CDS
is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan facility announcement occurs when
CDS is traded on the underlying firm’s debt, and zero otherwise. d TradedCDS is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm in our sample has CDS traded on the debt
at any point during our sample period, and zero otherwise.
By noting the coefficient of d AfterCovViol in Column (1) of Table 28, we find that
after covenant violation, the spread of the renegotiated loan increases, which is in line
with the results in [113].14 The coefficient in Column (1) of our variable of interest
d AfterCovV iol × d CDS suggests that firms that have CDS traded against them,
experience an increase in spread of approximately 51%, or about 90 bps on average
compared to firms that do not have a traded CDS. The summation of coefficients in
Column (1) shows that post covenant violation, firms with a CDS experience a 65%
increase in loan spread (by approximately 120 bps). The main observed change in
loan terms post-violation is in the loan spread, through which the lending banks can
extract additional rents.15 Thus, renegotiation in the presence of CDS seems to only
benefit the lending bank and not the borrowing firm.
The remaining columns investigate if extraction of rents is higher in cases where
banks have a higher probability of hedging their economic exposure to borrowing
firms. Columns (2)–(9) in Table 28 report the results for changes in loan spreads
by dividing the sample by credit derivative market activity, securitization activity,
proportion of non-interest income, and syndicate size, respectively. A larger syndi-
cate size can imply a greater coordination failure among lenders upon a credit event
incentivizing lenders to hedge themselves in the CDS market ([22]). Therefore us-
ing these subsamples we test the hypothesis that lenders who actively reduce their
14We also find that the maturity decreases and the syndicate size is also significantly reduced.
15In unreported tests, we also check non-price loan terms such as whether the loan is secured, or
has performance pricing terms, sweep provisions. Although we note that CDS firms are significantly
less likely to have secured loans and sweep provisions, we do not see a significant change in the
non-price terms for CDS firms compared with non-CDS firms post covenant violation.
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credit exposure extract more surplus from borrowing firms as a result of the higher
bargaining power vis-á-vis the borrower.
The coefficients of interaction variable d AfterCovV iol×d CDS in Columns (3),
(5), (7), and (9) are all positive and statistically significant. This suggest that banks
that have high credit derivative market activity, high securitization activity, a high
proportion of non-interest income, and banks that have large syndicates, and are
thus more likely to hedge credit risk of their borrowers, extract surplus by charging
a statistically significant higher loan spread in the case that CDS trades on borrower
debt. Overall, this evidence supports the hypothesis that banks attempt to extract
additional surplus from firms where they have higher bargaining resulting from a
lower credit exposure.
3.3.3 Equity return after violation
In this section, we examine the effect of lender intervention on the stock returns of the
borrowing firm after covenant violation where there is a traded CDS on the firm’s debt.
[113] find that after a covenant violation, the actions taken by creditors to change the
firm policy increase the value of the firm. On average, if creditor intervention improves
firm quality, then the equity markets should respond with higher cumulative abnormal
returns in the long run.
However, as discussed above, as a result of moral hazard stemming from the abil-
ity to buy CDS protection, creditors may not take corrective action post covenant
violation. Creditors may not expend costly effort to reign in inefficient firm invest-
ment, and instead may extract higher surplus from firms. In such a case, firms should
experience lower cumulative abnormal returns after a covenant violation. Therefore,
in the long run, firms with a traded CDS should have lower cumulative abnormal
returns after a covenant violation compared with firms that do not have a traded
CDS.
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We compare the stock return post-violation for firms with an outstanding CDS
with firms without an outstanding CDS for the full sample as well as the regression
discontinuity sample. As before, the regression discontinuity sample limits the obser-
vations in the sample to 30% of the relative distance around the covenant violation
boundary. Following the regression framework developed in [146] and [135] and im-
plemented in [113], we compute monthly abnormal returns using a four-factor model
(three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor). We also account for delisting
returns which are calculated from the CRSP delisting file. We then use the estimated
model to calculate cumulative abnormal returns of each firm over various horizons
after covenant violation. For our analysis, as in [113], we define a “new covenant
violation” for a firm as a violation where the firm has not violated another covenant
in the previous four quarters.
Figure 8 plots event-time abnormal returns after a new covenant violation, and
compares the returns of firms with CDSs with those of firms without CDSs. The
figure shows that in the post-violation period, firms without a traded CDS show
substantially higher positive abnormal returns than firms with a traded CDS. The
equity price of violating firms with a traded CDS also increases in the early part of
the post-violation period, but then remains flat after about a year.
Table 29, Panel A reports the results of the monthly CAR regressions post covenant
violation for the full sample of firms. Panel B reports the results for the regression
discontinuity sample. The dependent variable is the monthly cumulative abnormal
return CAR computed at various horizons. For instance, for every firm i and quarter
q, CAR(1,m) is computed by summing up the monthly abnormal returns of firm i
from the first month following quarter q until the mth month. The main indepen-
dent variables of interest remain d Bind and d Bind×d CDS. The control variables
included in the regressions are assets (log), tangible assets, operating cash flow, book
leverage, interest expense, and market-to-book. All control variables are lagged by one
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quarter and their definitions are provided in the Appendix. All columns include firm
level accounting variables as controls along with firm fixed effects and year quarter
fixed effects.
Consistent with Figure 8 and the findings of [113], we note that the coefficient
estimates of the d Bind indicator variable suggest that on average violating firms
experience positive stock returns after covenant violation. This can be attributed to
a reduction in inefficient investment and an improvement of management discipline
in general by lending banks that gain control rights. The coefficient estimates of the
d CDS indicator variable are not significant, suggesting that just the presence of CDS
trading does not lead to a different stock market performance. The variable of interest
is, as before, the estimated coefficient of the interaction between the d Bind and
d CDS indicator variables. We note that over time, the coefficient of the interaction
variable is statistically and economically significant and negative. The net effect
on firms with a CDS traded against them post covenant violation is statistically
indistinguishable from zero, as observed by the sum of the d Bind and d Bind×d CDS
coefficients.
We next carry out similar CAR regressions for our regression discontinuity sample.
In support of our results from the full sample, we again find that violating firms with
a CDS have much lower abnormal stock returns than firms without a CDS. The
coefficient of the interaction variable, over 24 months, i.e., two years post covenant
violation is −17% and is statistically and economically significant. The same remains
true 30 months and three years out.
Overall, these results suggest the absence of lender intervention in the borrowing
firm’s interest when the firm has a traded CDS, which potentially allows creditors to
hedge their credit risk.
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3.3.4 Firm survival after covenant violation
If banks face an empty creditor problem, then firms should default more often in
the presence of CDS trading. This is because in this extreme case of moral hazard,
overinsured banks benefit from firm bankruptcy. As banks gain control rights after
covenant violation, they should use these control rights to push firms into bankruptcy.
To test this hypothesis, we conduct a survival analysis for firms after a covenant
violation.
We first examine the frequency of firm exit from our sample. We identify firm
exits from the CRSP delisting codes16 and Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database
(Moody’s URD) which contains information on all bonds rated by Moody’s.17 Firms
which do not have delisting codes in the CRSP dataset are classified as dropped due
to financial distress, in case we also fail to find firm data on total assets, total sales,
common shares outstanding, and the closing share price in COMPUSTAT.
Overall, we find that the frequency of firm exit within four quarters after covenant
violation is 7.82% in our sample compared to a firm exit rate of 3.30% when there is
no covenant violation. Distress related exits within the four quarters after covenant
violations are 4.5% while non-distress related exits (mergers, going private) over the
same period after covenant violation is 3.32%. We also note that only 5% of all the
exits over fours quarters after covenant violations are CDS firms, whereas this number
is 2% for our entire sample period.
We run a Cox proportional hazards model on loan-quarter observations, where the
hazard rate is the likelihood of a firm exit after a covenant violation. The survival time
16Financial failure is defined as liquidation (400 – 490), bankruptcy (574). Other forms of firm
exit include mergers (200 – 290), or going private (573). Active firms have codes ranging from (100
– 170).
17Moody’s defines default as an event when one or more of the following occurs: (a) there is
a missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, including delayed payments made
within a grace period; (b) the company files for bankruptcy, administration, legal receivership, or
other legal blocks to the timely payment of interest or principal; and (c) a distressed exchange takes
place.
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is measured in quarters from the firm’s covenant violation until its exit. Specifically,
we estimate the hazard rate h(t) which is the conditional probability that a firm will
exit between t and t+ δt conditional on surviving until time t. Formally, let T be the
time when the firm exits. Then h(t) is defined as:
h(t) = lim
δt→0
P(t ≤ T < t+ δt|T ≥ t)
y
.
In our hazard regression model, the hazard function is then represented by:










In the above equation, x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk1)
′ is a time-independent vector of
variables which consists of the initial covenant tightness, industry fixed effects and
year fixed effects. zt−1 = (z1,t−1, z2,t−1, . . . , zk2,t−1)
′ is a time-dependent vector of
lagged firm characteristics affecting the hazard rate of firm exit.
Table 30 reports the results. Specification (1) examines all firm exits, while spec-
ifications (2) and (3) examine distress related exits and non-distress related exits,
respectively. An insignificant coefficient for the d CDS indicator variable, which
is our main variable of interest, suggests that CDS firms are neither more nor less
likely to exit the sample after covenant violation. This result is evidence against the
presence of a severe empty creditor problem where an over-hedged creditor has an
incentive to push the firm into bankruptcy.
Next, we measure firm distress in an alternative manner. We define distress and
outperformance based on [66] and [67], among others, to be the firms in the bottom
and top 5% of the entire universe of firms in the CRSP dataset based on the past
three-year cumulative return. The reason we focus on distress is because distressed
firms are generally more likely to be bankrupt. The insignificant coefficient estimates
on the d CDS indicator variable for the distress regression in specification (4) based
on cumulative equity return confirms our previous result that CDS firms are not more
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likely to be distressed when compared with non-CDS firms. As a comparison, we also
investigate the probability of firms outperforming the universe of CRSP firms in
Column (5). Interestingly, the negative and significant result on the d CDS indicator
variable suggests that firms with a CDS traded against them have a significantly
lower likelihood of outperforming the universe of firms. These results suggest that
creditors do not cause the CDS firm to be distressed or push them into bankruptcy
after covenant violation as suggested by the severe empty creditor problem where
lenders are over-hedged. However, if the creditors are at least partially hedged, they
do not exert effort to improve firm performance either.
A concern may be that firms with a CDS traded against them are inherently
different or distressed to begin with. To address such potential selection concerns
regarding the presence of CDS trading, we employ an instrumental variables approach.
Following [133], we instrument the presence of CDS trading by the average amount of
forex derivatives used for hedging purposes relative to total assets of the lead syndicate
banks and bond underwriters with which the borrowing firm has conducted business
in the past five years. Data on bond underwriters is obtained from Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database (FISD). Following the methodology in [152], we use the
fitted value from a probit model for d CDS as shown in the appendix Table C.2 as
an instrumental variable for d CDS. We estimate the model for the determinants of
CDS trading on firm-quarter observations for the full sample including additional
controls that might affect the propensity of CDS trading on a firm. We then run
a 2SLS regression using a linear probability model with the fitted CDS probability
as an instrument. Table C.1 in the Appendix reports the results. As in Table 30,
the negative coefficient in Column (1) for all exits, and the insignificant coefficients
for the d CDS indicator variable in Columns (2)-(4) suggests that CDS firms are
not more likely to exit the sample after covenant violation. As before, Column (5)
suggests that firms that have CDS traded against them have a lower likelihood of
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outperformance.
While exits and stock performance provide corroboration of our hypothesis of bank
moral hazard in the presence of CDSs (but not the extreme case of an empty creditor
problem), another firm event that can shed light on bank behavior before firm exit
is a debt rating change. Hence, we examine the frequency of a rating downgrade or
upgrade conditional on covenant violation. We gather rating change events from FISD
and construct loan-quarter level observations post covenant violation. If a firm in a
given quarter post covenant violation is downgraded (upgraded) by any of the three
rating agencies – namely S&P, Moody’s or Fitch – then an indicator varible d DNG
(d UPG) is set to one; otherwise it is set to zero. We then run a hazard model
similar to the firm exit regressions. However, in this case, the sample is limited to
loan-quarter observations of rated firms.
Table 31 reports the results for the ratings change using a Cox proportional haz-
ards model. Specifications (1) and (2) show that traded CDS firms are more likely
to get downgraded, and not upgraded after a covenant violation compared with non-
traded CDS firms. Columns (3) and (4) show that these results are robust to using
the instrument variables approach for CDS trading as well.
Overall, the evidence above suggests that the lender moral hazard in the pres-
ence of CDS trading leads to under-performance of firms, but does not increase the
likelihood of distress or default.
3.3.5 Loan announcement results
Do capital markets anticipate lender moral hazard in presence of CDS trading, and the
resulting under-performance of firms due to lax monitoring? To answer this question,
we focus on loan announcement results. The literature has shown that bank loan
announcements lead to positive abnormal returns for stocks (see [109, 86, 101, 20]
among others). The theoretical argument hinges on the special role of banks: bank
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monitoring increases firm value and loan issuance signals positive private information
regarding the firm (see [46]). However, if the purchase of CDS protection by banks
creates moral hazard, then equity holders who anticipate such agency problems should
discount the significance of bank loan announcements. This, in turn, should lead to
lower loan announcement abnormal returns for CDS firms when compared with non-
CDS firms.
To test this, we conduct an event study on the abnormal return of firms’ stocks
around the loan announcement date (using the deal active date of a loan in Dealscan).
We compare the loan announcement effect in a five-day window (-2,+2) for firms with
CDS against their debt with those firms without. The null hypothesis is that there
is no difference in the loan announcement return between firms with CDS and those
without, and hence, the estimate of interest is the average effect of the presence of
CDS trading on loan announcement returns.
We first compare the loan announcement effect for the full sample. The full
sample includes both firms that never had CDS traded against their debt and firms
that have had CDS traded at some point in the sample period. Table 32 reports
the results. Consistent with previous studies, we find a significantly positive stock
price reaction at the time of the loan announcement for the full sample. The average
five-day abnormal return is 0.39%, significant at 1% level. These results are similar
in magnitude to findings in the literature that suggests that bank loans are special
in terms of providing monitoring benefits to the firm. However, we find that for loan
announcements of firms with CDS, the stock abnormal return is close to zero (mean
five-day CAR of 0.10%, which is statistically insignificant).
A potential concern is that the firms with CDS are inherently different from firms
that have never had CDS traded. The right-hand side of the table reports the results
only for firms that had CDS traded against their debt at some point in time, compared
to the same firms when they did not have CDS traded against their debt. Even within
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this set of firms that have traded CDSs, the average five-day loan announcement
abnormal return is 0.31%, significant at the 1% level, before the introduction of
CDS trading, and in the period after the introduction of CDS trading, the five-day
abnormal return drops to 0.08%, which is not statistically significant.
The univariate comparison of loan announcement returns described above suggests
a possible decline in the traditional value that the market places on a bank’s role after
the introduction of CDS trading. We next conduct a multivariate regression analysis
to examine whether this conclusion changes when we control for other determinants
of borrower loan announcement abnormal returns identified in the literature.
The dependent variable for the multivariate analysis is the five-day (-2,+2) stock
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the borrowing firm, where day 0 refers to the
loan announcement day. The main variable of interest is, as before, the CDS indicator
variable d CDS, that takes a value of 1 if a firm has CDS trading on its debt at the
time of the loan announcement and 0 otherwise.18 If CDS trading leads to bank moral
hazard that the market anticipates ex-ante, then we should expect the coefficient on
the CDS indicator variable to be negative and statistically significant.
We employ four sets of controls to capture additional determinants of loan an-
nouncement returns: (i) loan-level characteristics; (ii) pre-announcement stock per-
formance controls; (iii) firm level accounting variables as controls; and (iv) controls
that may determine the presence of CDS trading. Loan-level characteristics include
variables such as the interest rate spread at which the loan was obtained, the size
of the loan, the horizon of the loan, and the number of lenders in the syndicate.
All these characteristics contain potential information about the firm’s future plans
18As discussed before, we do not have access to data regarding which bank obtains protection
using a CDS against which firm. We divide firms based on traded CDSs. We think this approach
is reasonable since stock market participants also may not have access to bank data regarding
which bank loans are protected with a CDS. Hence, stock market participants also respond to loan
announcements based on a similar information set, i.e., expected CDS exposure of the bank with
respect to a firm.
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and how banks perceive them. [95] show that firms tend to sell new equity claims
following a run-up. If the issuance of bank loans are related to similar trends, then
pre-announcement stock performance such as Runup and Beta of the firm’s stock
may be related to the abnormal return around loan announcement. We also include
idiosyncratic volatility as an independent variable since shareholders in a risky firm
might react more positively to the initiation of a loan and accompanied monitoring,
than shareholders of a less risky firm (see [20]). [19] show that large firms are able
to obtain large loans at lower interest rates. Hence, firm level accounting variables
such as size of the firm and leverage may be relevant to firm performance around loan
announcement. A loan announcement event for a profitable company or a firm with
a high current ratio could convey a different signal to the market than an unprof-
itable firm or a firm with a low current ratio, which may require more monitoring.
Consequently, we expect a relationship between variables such as profitability and
current ratio and the abnormal stock return on the day of loan announcement. Firms
with high market-to-book ratios tend to have more growth options, and hence, we
expect alleviation of financial constraints to be especially important for such firms
(see [63]). Since we are interested in the impact of CDS trading on bank behavior,
we also included controls that may determine which firms have CDS traded against
their debt.
Table 33 reports the loan announcement regression results for the full sample of
firms. To address any industry level announcement effects, the specifications include
industry fixed effects. The columns also include an indicator variable d TradedCDS
to control for firms that have ever had a CDS traded against them. This control helps
address concerns about selection bias due to the inherent heterogeneity of firms that
ever had a CDS traded against their debt. We also control for the purpose of the deal
and time fixed effects.
All specifications (1)-(4) show that the coefficient of the CDS indicator variable
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(d CDS ) is indeed negative and statistically significant in each case. As shown in
specification (4), which is the most exhaustive, firms with traded CDS conservatively
have approximately a 0.5% lower abnormal loan announcement return.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that suggests that capital markets
anticipate bank moral hazard ex-ante when firms with CDSs obtain loans.
3.3.6 Evidence against adverse selection
In this section, we further investigate whether selection in terms of the quality of
firms that have traded CDS can explain the muted loan announcement response.
The muted loan announcement returns could be because the quality of firms that
have CDS traded against them is worse at the time of loan announcement. In other
words, the presence of a CDS market allows lower quality firms to obtain loans, and
hence, markets discount the loan announcements since the markets believe banks are
not screening firms with CDSs carefully.
Table C.3 in the Appendix investigates this concern by considering various mea-
sures of firm health such as Altman Z-score, proportion of intangible assets, interest
coverage, and cash flow volatility. Controls include firm level characteristics such as
whether the firm has a rating, which may indicate different access to credit mar-
kets, firm size, leverage, market-to-book, profitability, and current ratio, and other
characteristics that may affect the probability of CDS trading.
In Column (1), we note that the indicator variable CDS loads positively on the
Altman Z-score, suggesting that firms with traded CDS are, in fact, in relatively
better health statistically, and not worse health. A higher proportion of intangible
assets at the firm may suggest higher information asymmetry and riskier loans. The
insignificant coefficient of d CDS in Column (2) shows this not to be the case. Firms
with low interest coverage may be risky as they are closer to potential technical
default. Column (3) shows that firms with traded CDSs do not have statistically
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different interest coverage than firms without. Cash flow volatility can also indicate
firm level risk. Column (4) again shows that firms with traded CDSs are similar
in this dimension as well to firms without traded CDSs. These results suggest that
firms with traded CDSs are not in relatively worse financial health at the time of loan
announcement. This evidence suggests that the quality of firms at the time of loan
announcement cannot explain the muted response of the markets.
Another possible explanation for the muted loan announcement returns could be
that the lenders lending to CDS and non-CDS firms are different. In that case, the
loan announcement result between CDS and non-CDS firms may be driven by some
unobserved heterogeneity among different lender-types. Table C.4 investigates this
concern by including Lender fixed-effects in the loan announcement CAR regressions
in specifications (1) & (2). Specifications (3) & (4) are more exhaustive and include
both Lender and Firm fixed-effects. In all of the columns (1) – (4), the negative and
statistically significant coefficients on d CDS show that the even after controlling for
lender heterogeneity, loan announcement returns for CDS traded firms are muted.
3.4 Conclusion
The growth of CDSs have allowed banks to now originate a loan and continue to
service the loan without being exposed to the borrowing firm’s prospects. This paper
empirically investigates agency problems that banks may suffer in the presence of CDS
trading. By analyzing changes in firm policy in case of covenant violations, we provide
evidence consistent with the presence of bank moral hazard in the presence of CDS
contracts. CDS firms do not decrease their investment after a covenant violation, even
those that are more prone to agency issues. Moreover, consistent with the increased
bargaining power of the lenders, CDS firms pay a significantly higher spread on loans
issued after covenant violations than non-CDS firms that violate covenants. These
results are magnified when lenders have weaker incentives to monitor (higher purchase
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of credit derivatives, higher amount of securitization, and higher non-interest income).
However, we do not find evidence in support of a more severe empty creditor
problem, where banks overinsure themselves and cause firms to go bankrupt more
often. Our loan announcement return results are also more consistent with lender
moral hazard but not the empty creditor problem. The capital markets seem to an-
ticipate this lender moral hazard, leading to insignificant loan announcement return,
for firms with CDSs, as compared to positive returns for non-CDS firms. It seems, in
contrast to public debt investors, the reputation of the lenders or regulatory capital
requirements constrain private lenders to not overinsure themselves with CDSs, and
push firms into inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation.
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Figure 7: Investment vs distance to violation: CDS vs non-CDS firms
This figure plots investment vs distance to covenant violation. Distance to covenant violation
is defined as the negative of the relative covenant distance for every firm-quarter observation
(−Ratio−CovenantThresholdRatioCovenantThresholdRatio ). In case both, net worth and current ratio covenants are present,
the tighter of the two is chosen to compute the distance to covenant violation. The plot displays
the mean investment for 60 bins defined along the distance to covenant violation on each side with
95% confidence bands.
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Figure 8: Financial covenant violations and stock price performance
This figure plots event-time abnormal returns post covenant violation for firms in the presence and
absence of CDS on its underlying debt. Following the regression framework developed in [146] and
[135] and implemented in [113], monthly abnormal returns are computed using a four-factor model
(three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor) over the entire sample period by including
dummy variables for the covenant violation event month and for months prior and post the event
month for which we need to compute the monthly abnormal returns. We also account for delisting
returns computed from the CRSP delisting file. The estimated model is then used to compute the
monthly abnormal return for each firm and the cumulative abnormal returns. Data for the three
monthly Fama-French factors and the momentum factor are gathered from Kenneth French’s web
data library.
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Table 23: Loan sample summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, and the 10th and 90th
percentile) for the loan characteristics for all loans made to non-financial firms found in the Dealscan
database during the period of 1990–2012. The sample consists of 5,951 firms and 27,450 packages
and the following loan characteristics are at the package level. A package is a collection of loans
made under a common agreement or a deal. Variable definitions for the loan and firm cahracteristics
are provided in the Appendix section.
Panel A : Summary statistics of loan sample
Mean Median 10th 90th Std. Dev N
Loan Size (Mil) 352.030 127.000 10.500 1000.000 580.861 27449
Relative Loan Size 0.308 0.192 0.036 0.658 0.620 27449
Maturity (Months) 48.582 48.700 12.133 85.233 28.264 25946
Assets (log) 6.529 6.449 4.021 9.274 1.922 27450
Book Leverage 0.297 0.286 0.026 0.564 0.199 27120
Market-To-Book 1.658 1.352 0.898 2.815 0.933 26400
Panel B : Summary statistics by year
Year CDS=0 CDS=1
Count Loan Size Count Loan Size












2001 1261 100.00 197 650.00
2002 1103 85.40 263 600.00
2003 971 100.00 308 500.00
2004 948 133.50 383 680.00
2005 847 165.00 399 750.00
2006 796 175.00 334 950.00
2007 711 225.00 338 1000.00
2008 485 150.00 136 750.00
2009 345 100.00 130 600.00
2010 484 200.00 178 917.50
2011 666 300.00 303 1000.00
2012 239 300.00 105 1250.00
Total 24375 100.00 3074 750.00
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Table 24: Summary statistics of the covenant violation sample
This table provides the summary statistics for the covenant violation sample which was constructed
based on [35]. The covenant sample begins in 1994 as the information on covenants is limited before
that period. There are two main covenant samples included in the analysis - the current ratio
covenant sample and the net worth covenant sample. The median and standard error are provided
in square brackets and round brackets respectively.
Panel A provides summary statistics for the current ratio and net worth covenant samples from
1994 to 2012. The current ratio and net worth sample consists of all firm-quarter observations of
non-financial firms in the COMPUSTAT database. The current ratio (net worth) sample consists
of firms whose private loans have a current ratio (net worth and/or tangible net worth) covenant as
per the Dealscan database between 1994 to 2012. These two samples are further divided based on
whether a firm-quarter observation is determined to be in covenant violation (denoted by “Bind”)
or not in covenant violation (denoted by “Slack”) for the corresponding covenant.
Panel B displays the same firm-quarter observations for CDS and non-CDS firms. The data on
the timing of CDS introduction is obtained from three separate sources: Markit, CMA Datavision
(CMA), and Bloomberg. Firm-quarter observations are classified as “CDS” observations if there are
CDS contracts trading on the firm’s debt in that quarter. The sample is further divided on whether
the observation is determined to be in covenant violation for either the current ratio, net worth
covenant, or both. Variable definitions of all the firm characteristics in the table are provided in the
Appendix section.
Panel A: Current ratio vs net worth. Mean, Median, and Standard error
Current Ratio Net Worth
Bind Slack Bind Slack
Assets(log) 5.335 (0.034) 5.191 (0.013) 5.277 (0.034) 5.882 (0.011)
[5.243] [5.190] [4.945] [5.803]
Market-to-Book 1.453 (0.022) 1.745 (0.014) 1.439 (0.022) 1.753 (0.014)
[1.215] [1.339] [1.138] [1.292]
Macro q 4.991 (0.221) 9.733 (0.161) 6.847 (0.237) 10.370 (0.121)
[1.974] [3.713] [2.375] [3.739]
ROA 0.016 (0.002) 0.034 (0.000) 0.005 (0.001) 0.035 (0.003)
[0.026] [0.034] [0.018] [0.033]
Tangible Capital 0.506 (0.007) 0.334 (0.002) 0.298 (0.004) 0.316 (0.002)
[0.477] [0.259] [0.231] [0.241]
Investment 0.066 (0.005) 0.099 (0.007) 0.050 (0.004) 0.086 (0.002)
[0.043] [0.055] [0.025] [0.048]
Cash Flow -0.051 (0.008) 0.100 (0.003) -0.099 (0.008) 0.099 (0.002)
[0.028] [0.076] [0.020] [0.076]
Book Leverage 0.433 (0.006) 0.258 (0.002) 0.401 (0.006) 0.244 (0.001)
[0.384] [0.232] [0.358] [0.235]
Firm-Qtr Obs. 2353 11104 3388 23797
Firms 395 901 541 1817
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Table 24 (continued)
Panel B: CDS vs non-CDS firms. Mean, Median, and Standard error
CDS Non-CDS
Bind Slack Bind Slack
Assets(log) 9.291 (0.040) 8.769 (0.022) 5.106 (0.023) 5.600 (0.010)
[9.887] [8.738] [5.010] [5.585]
Market-to-Book 1.187 (0.016) 1.443 (0.018) 1.460 (0.017) 1.773 (0.012)
[1.159] [1.276] [1.161] [1.313]
Macro q 6.468 (0.748) 7.568 (0.344) 6.055 (0.178) 10.419 (0.109)
[2.478] [3.512] [2.119] [3.801]
ROA 0.027 (0.001) 0.032 (0.001) 0.009 (0.001) 0.035 (0.002)
[0.025] [0.032] [0.020] [0.033]
Tangible Capital 0.368 (0.015) 0.340 (0.006) 0.389 (0.004) 0.320 (0.001)
[0.347] [0.270] [0.300] [0.244]
Investment 0.041 (0.003) 0.047 (0.002) 0.059 (0.003) 0.093 (0.003)
[0.024] [0.038] [0.032] [0.051]
Cash Flow 0.066 (0.016) 0.122 (0.009) -0.085 (0.006) 0.100 (0.002)
[0.051] [0.075] [0.022] [0.077]
Book Leverage 0.316 (0.008) 0.291 (0.003) 0.412 (0.004) 0.248 (0.001)
[0.298] [0.285] [0.372] [0.232]
Firm-Qtr Obs. 330 1601 5172 28360
Firms 42 110 814 2228
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Table 25: Investment response to covenant violations: Regression discontinuity
This table follows the regression discontinuity (RD) approach for investment in [35]. The sample
consists of firm-quarter observations for non-financial firms merged with COMPUSTAT. Panels A
and B present results for the full sample and the RD sample, respectively. The RD sample in Panel
B is defined as those firm-quarter observations that have a relative distance (absolute value) of less
than 0.3 around the covenant violation boundary. The dependent variable is Investment and the
main independent variables of interest are d Bind and d Bind×d CDS, where d Bind is an indicator
variable equal to one if a firm-quarter observation is determined to be in covenant violation and zero
otherwise; and d CDS is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a traded CDS contract for that
firm-quarter observation. All control variables are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions of all
the firm characteristics in the table are provided in the Appendix section. All t-statistics displayed
in parantheses are robust to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% , respectively.
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: RD sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d Bind -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.005*
(-8.13) (-8.29) (-5.68) (-4.91) (-4.06) (-1.87)
d Bind×d CDS 0.010*** 0.010** 0.008* 0.014*** 0.013** 0.012**
(2.77) (2.56) (1.88) (3.08) (2.32) (2.06)
d CDS 0.007** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.000 0.008 0.008
(2.09) (3.35) (3.43) (0.03) (1.39) (1.46)
Macro q 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(16.81) (16.76) (6.90) (6.91)
Cash Flow 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(4.71) (4.65) (3.73) (3.63)
Assets(log) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(-5.51) (-5.37) (-3.21) (-3.14)
NW Distance 0.000*** 0.015
(15.14) (1.60)
CR Distance 0.028*** 0.037**
(3.54) (2.44)
ΣCoeff -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007
T-stat (-1.38) (-0.92) (-0.72) (1.02) (0.94) (1.31)
N 33439 28584 28584 11054 9532 9532
Adj. R2 0.385 0.434 0.434 0.418 0.455 0.456
Firm FE X X X X X X
Year-Quarter FE X X X X X X
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Table 26: Investment response to covenant violations : Lender characteristics
Panels A and B divide our main sample based on lender characteristics that may affect the level
of intervention post covenant violation. The observations in the sample are at lender-firm-quarter
level. High (Low) lender activity in a given lender variable is defined as the variable being above
(below) its computed median value using the entire sample period over which data for it is available.
Panels A and B present results for the full sample and the RD sample respectively. The RD sample in
Panels B1 and B2 is defined as those firm-quarter observations that have a relative distance (absolute
value) of less than 0.3 around the covenant violation boundary. The dependent variable is Investment
and the main independent variables of interest are d Bind and d Bind×d CDS, where d Bind is
an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-quarter observation is determined to be in covenant
violation and zero otherwise; and d CDS is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a traded
CDS contract for that firm-quarter observation. All control variables are lagged by one quarter.
Firm-level controls included in the regressions are Macro q, Cash Flow, Assets (log), and the initial
distance to the covenant threshold. Variable definitions of all the firm and lender characteristics in
the table are provided in the Appendix section. All t-statistics displayed in parentheses are robust
to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Lender characteristics – Full sample
CD bought Loans securitized Non-interest income
Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d Bind -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.010***
(-6.19) (-4.12) (-4.18) (-3.59) (-6.96) (-4.53)
d Bind×d CDS 0.004 0.010** 0.009 0.010* 0.006 0.010*
(0.51) (2.01) (0.99) (1.82) (1.09) (1.89)
d CDS 0.015** 0.007** 0.012* 0.002 0.017*** 0.007**
(2.51) (2.37) (1.82) (0.49) (3.12) (2.26)
ΣCoeff -0.011 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.011** -0.001
(-1.57) (-0.11) (-0.45) (-0.31) (-2.22) (-0.14)
N 15185 14674 8834 8889 15770 16379
Adj. R2 0.447 0.462 0.450 0.458 0.449 0.448
Firm Controls X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Year-Quarter FE X X X X X X
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Table 26 (continued)
Panel B: Lender characteristics – RD sample
CD Bought Loans Securitized Non-Interest Income
Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d Bind -0.011*** -0.006* -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.006**
(-3.70) (-1.90) (-3.06) (-2.65) (-3.71) (-2.14)
d Bind×d CDS 0.002 0.014** 0.010 0.020** 0.008 0.014**
(0.27) (2.12) (1.52) (2.49) (1.33) (2.06)
d CDS 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.011
(0.84) (1.31) (1.49) (0.56) (0.93) (1.48)
ΣCoeff -0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.009 -0.003 0.008
(-1.11) (1.33) (-0.16) (1.37) (-0.56) (1.27)
N 5201 4945 2839 2826 5460 5619
Adj. R2 0.480 0.480 0.499 0.484 0.481 0.484
Firm Controls X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Year-Quarter FE X X X X X X
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Table 27: Investment response to covenant violations: Borrower characteristics
Panels A and B divide our main sample based on borrower characteristics that may affect the level
of intervention post covenant violation. The observations in the sample are at the firm-quarter level.
We compute the cash from COMPUSTAT and lending relationship using Dealscan. High (Low) cash
is defined as cash being above (below) its computed median value using the entire sample period
over which data for it is available. Lending relationship is computed at the firm level when a loan
is made by summing up the lending relationships of all lenders in the syndicate. A High lending
relationship sample corresponds to loans in which 30% or greater of the borrower’s past loans have
been made by the lending syndicate. A Low lending relationship sample corresponds to loans in
which the borrower has no historical relationship with the lenders in the syndicate.
Panel A and B present results for the full sample and the RD sample, respectively. The RD sample
in Panel B1 and B2 is defined as those firm-quarter observations that have a relative distance
(absolute value) of less than 0.3 around the covenant violation boundary. The dependent variable is
Investment and the main independent variables of interest are d Bind and d Bind×d CDS, where
d Bind is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-quarter observation is determined to be in
covenant violation and zero otherwise; and d CDS is an indicator variable equal to one if there is
a traded CDS contract for that firm-quarter observation. All control variables are lagged by one
quarter. Firm-level controls included in the regressions are Macro q, Cash Flow, Assets (log), and
the initial distance to the covenant threshold. Variable definitions of all the firm characteristics in
the table are provided in the Appendix section. All t-statistics displayed in parentheses are robust
to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics – Full Sample
Cash Lending Relationship
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d Bind -0.009*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.011***
(-4.09) (-6.15) (-7.01) (-3.56)
d Bind×d CDS 0.004 0.017*** 0.013 0.011
(0.58) (3.12) (1.53) (1.57)
d CDS 0.006* 0.014** 0.013** 0.008**
(1.72) (2.45) (2.37) (2.04)
ΣCoeff -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.000
(-0.64) (-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.03)
N 13335 14275 17995 8705
Adj. R2 0.400 0.437 0.428 0.448
Firm Controls X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Year-Quarter FE X X X X
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Table 27 (continued)
Panel B: Firm Characteristics – RD Sample
Cash Lending Relationship
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d Bind -0.008*** -0.007* -0.008*** -0.010***
(-2.95) (-1.68) (-3.13) (-2.79)
d Bind×d CDS 0.005 0.020** 0.022* 0.017*
(0.57) (2.17) (1.71) (1.81)
d CDS 0.007 0.002 -0.006 0.018*
(0.78) (0.16) (-0.59) (1.93)
ΣCoeff -0.003 0.013 0.014 0.007
(-0.32) (1.55) (1.11) (0.78)
N 5352 4009 5922 3097
Adj. R2 0.426 0.491 0.467 0.436
Firm Controls X X X X
Firm FE X X X X



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 31: Ratings change Cox proportional hazard rate model
This table conducts rating change hazard regression using Cox hazard regressions and a
2SLS IV regression using a linear probability model for firms after a covenant violation in
the presence and absence of traded CDS on its underlying debt. Downgrade and upgrade
rating change event data are gathered from FISD. The instrument used for CDS trading is
the average amount of forex derivatives used for hedging purposes relative to total assets
of the lead syndicate banks and bond underwriters with which the firms have conducted
business in the past five years.
The data is constructed at the firm-quarter level. The main independent variable of interest
is d CDS, which is an indicator variable equal to one if a CDS is traded on the underlying
firm’s debt for that firm-quarter observation, and zero otherwise. t-statistics displayed in
parentheses are robust to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and ***
indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Cox hazard 2SLS IV
DNG UPG DNG UPG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d CDS 1.43*** 1.56
(3.07) (1.61)
CDS IV 0.18** 0.05
(2.00) (1.33)
Assets(log) 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.33) (0.17) (-0.59) (-0.85)
Profitability -5.67*** 3.65** -0.56*** 0.03
(-5.08) (2.16) (-3.13) (0.65)
Book Leverage -0.05 0.72 0.10 0.04
(-0.04) (0.26) (0.95) (0.68)
Interest Expense/Assets 13.04 -25.97 -0.03 -0.72
(1.11) (-0.91) (-0.03) (-1.11)
Market-to-Book 0.05 1.16** -0.01 0.03
(0.14) (2.32) (-0.20) (1.58)
Initial Covenant Tightness 0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.01
(1.20) (-0.69) (0.10) (-0.87)
Observations 11228 11228 7805 7805
Nob. events 652 208
Pseudo. R2 0.07 0.15
Adj. R2 0.15 0.03
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
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Table 32: Loan announcement univariate results
This table reports stock price reactions to firm loan announcements. The sample consists of loan
announcements from 1990 to 2012. The full sample consists of all the loan announcements in the
period 1990-2012. The traded-CDS sample consists only of firms that have a CDS traded on their
underlying debt at any point in our sample period, i.e., from 1990 to 2012. In each panel, we report
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) calculated over the 5-day event window (-2,+2), where day zero
represents the loan announcement event day. CAR is calculated using the market model. Count
reports the number of loan announcements used in each CAR calculation. We report averaged
CAR values separately for the “CDS=0” period and the “CDS=1” period. Loan announcements
that occur in the presence of CDS trading are considered to be in the “CDS=1” period, while loan
announcements that occur in the absence of CDS trading are considered to be in the “CDS=0”
period. Difference reports the difference in averaged CAR values between the “CDS=1” period and
the “CDS=0” period. t-statistics displayed in parentheses are robust to within-firm correlation and
heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
Full Sample Traded-CDS Sample
Mean CAR (%) Count Mean CAR (%) Count
CDS=0 0.39*** 24376 0.31*** 3713
(9.61) (4.08)




Total 0.36*** 27450 0.21*** 6672
(9.36) (3.67)
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Table 33: Loan announcement CAR regression
The specifications in Panel A report regression results of stock price reactions to firm loan
announcements. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) calcu-
lated over the five-day event window (-2,+2), where day zero represents the loan announce-
ment event day. CAR is calculated using the market model. Our main variable of interest
is d CDS, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan announcement occurs when
CDS is traded on the underlying firm’s debt, and zero otherwise. d TradedCDS is an idica-
tor variable equal to one if the firm in our sample has CDS traded on the debt at any point
during our sample period, and zero otherwise. We control for loan-level characteristics, pre-
announcement characteristics, firm-level characteristics, and CDS-trading characteristics
which are defined in detail in the Appendix.
Loan announcement CAR (-2,+2) regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d CDS -0.51*** -0.59*** -0.71*** -0.55***
(-3.10) (-3.42) (-2.84) (-3.14)
d TradedCDS 0.28** 0.26* 0.25*
(2.07) (1.83) (1.75)
Loan-level controls
Loan Spread 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.09) (0.15) (0.20)
Loan Size (log) 0.13** 0.07 0.05 0.08
(2.07) (1.09) (0.57) (1.20)
Maturity (Months) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.81) (-1.28) (-0.12) (-1.04)
Syndicate Size -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-1.01) (-0.39) (-0.21) (-0.56)
Pre-announcement controls
Beta -0.25** -0.11 0.07 -0.15
(-2.18) (-0.81) (0.31) (-0.99)
Idiosyncratic Volatility 20.70*** 7.20 3.51 6.37
(3.76) (0.86) (0.27) (0.76)
Runup -2.03*** -1.97*** -2.08*** -1.98***




d Rated -0.20 -0.24* -0.34 -0.24*
(-1.54) (-1.72) (-1.23) (-1.70)
Assets (log) -0.07 0.04 -0.39** 0.03
(-1.15) (0.49) (-2.10) (0.41)
Book Leverage 0.71** 0.48 1.23 0.47
(2.26) (1.35) (1.60) (1.30)
Market-to-Book -0.15** -0.11 -0.24 -0.11
(-2.39) (-1.46) (-1.56) (-1.51)
Profitability 1.10** 0.44 -0.19 0.66
(1.97) (0.66) (-0.16) (0.97)
Current Ratio -0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01
(-0.69) (-0.22) (-1.01) (-0.11)
CDS-trading controls
Analyst Coverage (log) -0.06 -0.03 -0.06
(-0.76) (-0.24) (-0.77)
Institutional Ownership 0.15 0.01 0.15
(1.58) (0.04) (1.64)
Stock Illiquidity 0.50 1.68** 0.46
(1.24) (2.34) (1.14)
Analyst Dispersion -0.08 -0.17* -0.08
(-1.40) (-1.93) (-1.31)
N 20683 15436 15436 15436
Adj. R2 0.024 0.024 0.123 0.026
Deal Purpose FE X X X X
Year FE X X X 7
Industry FE X X 7 7
Firm FE 7 7 X 7
Industry×Year FE 7 7 7 X
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CHAPTER IV
DO BOND INVESTORS PRICE TAIL RISK EXPOSURES
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS?
4.1 Introduction
The experience of the recent financial crisis highlights two aspects of risk-taking by
financial institutions that reinforced each other in the run-up to the crisis and con-
tributed to an increase in systemic risk.1 First, executives at financial institutions
have incentives to take on tail risks, that is, risks that generate severe adverse con-
sequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous returns the rest of the
time ([126], [92], [82] and [143]). Second, institutions have incentives to herd with
other institutions in investment choices, thus increasing their exposure to systemically
important sectors, such as housing, because they expect to be bailed out in the event
of a systemic crisis ([58]).
Given the importance of the financial sector and the negative externality on the
real economy from a widespread failure of financial institutions, there is an increased
focus on how to contain tail risk exposures of financial institutions. One recurring
idea in financial-sector regulation is that regulators increase their reliance on “market
discipline” in controlling institutions’ risk exposures. The idea is that a financial
institution will be more restrained in its risk-taking behavior if its cost of capital
increases with its risk exposure. However, market discipline can only be effective if
investors price the risk exposure of financial institutions. In this paper, we examine
whether bond market investors price the tail risk exposure of financial institutions in
1Systemic risk is the risk of widespread failure of financial institutions or the freezing up of capital
markets (see [5] and [79] for a more detailed discussion).
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which they invest.
We focus on tail risk because financial institutions are highly-levered entities,
whose equity capital may not be adequate to absorb the large losses that materialize
when a tail event occurs. Given that bondholders hold uninsured liabilities that do
not share in the upside from tail risk but may have to absorb losses when the tail risk
materializes, it is rational to expect that they will demand higher yield spreads from
institutions with higher tail risk exposures. This should be particularly true for in-
vestors in subordinated bonds, whose claims are junior to those of senior bondholders.
In fact, Pillar III of the New Basel Capital Accord places special emphasis on mar-
ket discipline through subordinated bonds, which are meant to act as loss-absorbing
instruments.
On the other hand, there are two reasons why bondholders may not price tail
risk exposures. First, implicit bailout guarantees may engender moral hazard prob-
lems among bond market investors. Bondholders of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs) may rationally anticipate a taxpayer-funded bailout of their in-
stitution in the event of a systemic crisis, and thus, may not price the institution’s
exposure to tail risk, especially systematic tail risk. Even bondholders of smaller
institutions may be subject to moral hazard, because they may rationally anticipate
indirect benefits from bailouts of SIFIs with which their institution has counterparty
links in the derivatives and wholesale funding markets. The experience of the recent
financial crisis, during which bondholders of many distressed institutions were able
to avoid losses thanks to government bailouts, lends credence to the moral hazard
argument.2 Second, it may be that, investors did not really expect a large tail event
2For instance, the government-assisted buyout of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan lifted the rat-
ing on Bear Stearn’s bonds from junk status to investment-grade status, and ensured that senior
bondholders of Bear Stearns did not have to suffer any losses. Similarly, the government bailout of
A.I.G. ensured that none of its counterparties had to take any haircuts on their claims. In the 2010
bailout of Irish banks, unsecured senior bondholders were paid in full even though the bonds did not
carry any explicit government guarantees. The only two U.S. institutions where senior bondholders
had to take significant haircuts were Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual. The benefits to
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like the financial crisis to materialize, and hence, ignored tail risk as a low-probability
nonsalient risk before the crisis ([24] and [64]).3
We test these hypotheses using a large sample of primary bond issuances by U.S.
financial institutions during the 1990 to 2010 period. We focus on the primary bond
market because it directly affects the cost of institutions’ debt capital. As is standard
in the literature, we proxy for institutions’ expected tail risk using realized measures
of tail risk computed using the recent history of stock returns.4 We measure an
institution’s own tail risk using expected shortfall (ES ), which measures its expected
loss conditional on returns being less than some α-quintile. Specifically, ES is defined
as the negative of the average return on the institution’s stock over the 5% worst
return days for the institution over the year; i.e., ES measures the institution’s loss
in its own left tail. We capture the tail dependence between the institution and
the stock market using the marginal expected shortfall (MES ), which measures the
institution’s expected loss when the stock market is in its left tail (see [5], [27]).
Specifically, MES is defined as the negative of the average return on the institution’s
stock over the 5% worst return days for the S&P 500 index over the year. Clearly,
both ES and MES are realized measures of risk. [5] show that MES is an important
determinant of a financial institution’s overall contribution to systemic risk, and that
institutions with high MES before the onset of the financial crisis had worse stock
returns during the crisis years, all else equal. Henceforth, we will refer to MES as the
institution’s systematic tail risk, to distinguish it from ES, which may also be driven
by risk factors that are idiosyncratic to the institution.
bondholders from bailouts can be gauged from the fact that senior bondholders in Lehman were only
able to recover 21 cents on the dollar, whereas holders of Lehman’s commercial paper were only to
recover around 48–56 cents on the dollar.
3This view is supported by [87] and [39] who show that, before the financial crisis, the sensitivities
of structured products like CDOs to home prices were not taken into account by rating agencies and
investors alike.
4It is possible to obtain forward-looking measures of tail risk derived from equity options, but
that would significantly reduce the size of our sample, because only 30% of the institutions have
options traded.
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We first examine whether the yield spreads on new bond offerings at issuance
(Yield Spread) vary with the tail risk exposure of the financial institution issuing the
bonds. To test this, we estimate regressions similar to that in [30], where we include
the tail risk measures one at a time as the main independent variable of interest.5 As
expected, we find a robust positive relationship between Yield Spread and ES, which
indicates that the cost of debt capital is higher for institutions with a higher total
tail risk. Interestingly, however, we fail to detect any significant relationship between
Yield Spread and MES ; that is, bond market investors seem to ignore an institution’s
systematic tail risk. To alleviate the concern that the effect of systematic tail risk
may be subsumed by a bond’s credit rating or an institution’s size and leverage, we
estimate our regression after omitting these important controls, and obtain qualita-
tively similar results. To test the robustness of this result that systematic risk is not
priced whereas total risk is priced, we regress Yield Spread against equity volatility
(e.g., standard deviation of the institution’s stock return) and Beta, and arrive at a
similar conclusion: Yield Spread increases with equity volatility but does not respond
to systematic risk (Beta).
We next explore how the relationship between yield spreads and tail risk varies
with different bond characteristics that can affect an institution’s default risk and
the loss given default. When we distinguish between senior and subordinate bonds,
we find that, as expected, the positive relationship between yield spreads and ES
is significantly stronger for subordinated bonds. However, the pricing of systematic
tail risk MES does not vary between senior and subordinated bonds. In fact, a
more striking result is that the institutions’ MES is not priced even in the case of
subordinated bonds. We also find that, as expected, the positive relationship between
5As expected, ES and MES are highly correlated with each other, and with other risk measures,
such as equity volatility and Beta. Hence, we cannot include all risk measures simultaneously. We
focus on the pricing of tail risk because, given the high leverage of financial institutions, tail risk
should be a first-order concern for bondholders.
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yield spreads and tail risk is stronger for bonds with poorer credit ratings.
Next, we examine how the pricing of tail risk varies with firm characteristics that
may affect bailout expectations. As [143] highlights, if investors place a positive
probability that creditors would be protected in the event of failure, the prices of
financial instruments would be distorted - the greater the probability, the greater
the distortion. Consistent with the existence of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidies for
large financial institutions (e.g., see [3]), we find that the relationship between yield
spreads and total tail risk ES is weaker for large financial institutions, although ES is
priced even in case of large financial institutions. However, there is no such variation
in terms of the pricing of MES, which is not priced regardless of the institution’s
size. An interesting class of institutions in our sample are the government-sponsored
entities (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Although bonds issued by GSEs
carry no explicit government guarantee of creditworthiness, there is a perception of
an implicit guarantee because it is widely believed that the government will not allow
such important institutions to fail or default on their debt ([143]). Consistent with
the existence of such an implicit guarantee, we find that the relationship between
yield spreads and tail risk measures is significantly weaker for GSEs.
We conduct several additional tests to further distinguish between the moral haz-
ard hypothesis and the nonsalient-risks hypothesis. First, we estimate our regressions
separately for the following four categories of institutions: depository institutions,
broker-dealers, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. Institutions
across these categories vary not only in terms of their risk exposures and balance-
sheet composition, but also in terms of implicit bailout guarantees from the govern-
ment. For instance, ever since the bailout of the Continental Illinois National Bank
in 1984, the FDIC and other regulatory agencies have repeatedly indicated that they
consider large banks too-big-to-fail (TBTF) because their closure might destabilize
the financial system and impose a negative externality on the real economy. On the
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other hand, there are no implicit guarantees for debt issued by insurance companies
as these are less likely to be considered systemically important. Thus, as per the
moral hazard hypothesis, the relationship between bond yield spreads and tail risk
should be weaker for depository institutions compared with other types of financial
institutions.
Consistent with this argument, we uncover striking differences in the pricing of
tail risk between depository institutions and other types of financial institutions. We
find that neither the total tail risk ES nor the systematic tail risk MES is priced in
the case of bonds issued by depository institutions, whereas both ES and MES are
priced in the case of bonds issued by broker-dealers and insurance companies. More
strikingly, we find that ES and MES are not priced even in the case of subordinated
bonds issued by depository institutions. These results cast serious doubt on the idea
that market discipline can be used to control the tail risk exposure of depository
institutions.
Second, we examine how the relationship between yield spreads and tail risk varies
based on the political connectedness of financial institutions. The idea is to exploit
political connectedness as a source of cross-sectional variation in bailout expecta-
tions, because politically connected institutions are more likely to receive government
bailouts ([57]). To test this idea, we hand-collect information on corporate lobbying
expenditures by financial institutions from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).
Consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, we find that the relationship between
yield spreads and tail risk is significantly weaker for politically-connected institutions
compared with non-connected institutions, suggesting the existence of a bailout sub-
sidy for the debt of politically-connected institutions. If such a subsidy exists, a
natural question that arises is whether politically-connected institutions exploit the
subsidy to issue more debt. To investigate this question, we examine how the debt
issuance of institutions varies with their political connectedness. Although we do not
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find evidence that politically-connected institutions issue more debt on average, our
analysis shows that large and politically-connected institutions undertake more bond
issues and issue larger amounts, all else equal.
Third, we examine how the relationship between yield spreads and tail risk varies
in the immediate aftermath of crisis events, such as the Long Term Capital Manage-
ment (LTCM) crisis and the recent financial crisis. The idea underlying this test is
to exploit the time-series variation in bailout expectations following the large-scale
bailouts of troubled institutions during these crises. Not surprisingly, we find an
across-the-board increase in the cost of debt for all financial institutions following a
crisis event. However, consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, the relationship
between yield spreads and tail risk is significantly weaker in the immediate aftermath
of the LTCM crisis and the recent financial crisis. In sharp contrast, we do not find
any such patterns surrounding the dotcom crisis of 2001. This is interesting because
the dotcom crisis was confined to the technology sector and did not lead to bailouts of
financial institutions. This differential impact of the dotcom crash compared with the
other two crisis events suggests that our results are more likely driven by expectations
of future bailouts rather than a general neglect of nonsalient risks.
Our paper is closely related to and complements the results in a contemporaneous
paper by [3] that finds that secondary bond yield spreads of large financial insti-
tutions are lower compared with other financial institutions even after controlling
for their risk exposures. They attribute this phenomenon to investor expectations
of implicit state guarantees for large institutions. Our paper differs from theirs in
the following respects: First, we focus on primary bond yield spreads that directly
reflect the institutions’ cost of debt capital. Second, our analysis is focused on the
pricing of tail risk measures that are of particular concern to bondholders, especially
investors in subordinated bonds. Finally, we provide further support for the moral
hazard hypothesis by showing that the pricing of tail risk is significantly weaker for
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politically-connected institutions compared with non-connected institutions. Over-
all, our evidence points to moral hazard in the primary debt markets for financial
institutions and complements the secondary debt market evidence in [3].
Our paper is related to prior studies of bank market discipline that focus on
whether uninsured bank liabilities such as certificates of deposit (CDs) and subordi-
nated notes and debentures (SNDs) contain appropriate risk premia. The literature
generally concludes that CD rates paid by large money-center banks include signif-
icant default risk premia (e.g., see [54], [78], and [31]). On the other hand, the
literature is divided with respect to the pricing of SNDs. Using a sample from 1983
and 1984, [14] and [72] fail to detect any relationship between SND pricing and bal-
ance sheet measures of bank risk. However, examining a longer sample period, [61]
conclude that SND prices become more sensitive to risk measurements as expectations
of government-sponsored bailouts decrease. The main difference between our study
and this literature is that we focus exclusively on the pricing of tail risk exposures
of financial institutions. Similar to [14] and [72], we fail to find any evidence that
subordinated bondholders of depository institutions care more about tail risk than
senior bondholders. Also, similar to [61], we find that the pricing of tail risk changes
with expectations of government bailouts.
Past research has highlighted the perverse impact of implicit bailout guarantees on
risk-taking behavior of financial institutions. This literature argues that expectations
of future systemic bailouts causes banks to correlate their risk exposure and take on
high leverage ([58]), incentivizes small banks to herd together with large banks and
increases the risk that many banks fail together ([2]), and generally exacerbates the
moral hazard of banks and bank managers ([16] and [127]). We contribute to this
literature by highlighting how implicit bailout guarantees also exacerbate the moral
hazard of bond investors, thus undermining bank market discipline. Our finding is
also in line with a recent study by [93] that shows that a large amount of aggregate
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tail risk is missing from the price of financial sector crash insurance (i.e., price of puts
on the financial sector index) during the recent financial crisis, which suggests that
investors in the options market are pricing in a collective government guarantee for
the financial sector.
Our study has potential regulatory implications in favor of internal restructuring/bail-
in provisions, which lower the expectations of future government bailouts. In par-
ticular, it is important that bondholders are made to share in any loss arising from
the institution’s failure. This is essential in restoring market discipline and ensuring
that prices of uninsured liabilities of financial institutions are in line with their risk
exposures. 6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our data sources
and construction of variables in Section 4.2, and provide descriptive statistics and
preliminary results in Section 4.3. We present our main empirical results in Section
4.4. We do additional tests in Section 4.5 to distinguish between our competing
hypotheses. Section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Data, Sample Construction, and Key Variables
Given the focus of our paper, our sample comprises only bonds issued by U.S. finan-
cial institutions over the 1990 to 2010 period. Following Acharya et al. (2010), we
classify U.S. financial institutions into the following four groups based on SIC codes:
depositories, which have a 2-digit SIC code of 60 (e.g., Bank of America, JP Morgan,
Citigroup, etc.); broker-dealers, which have a 4-digit SIC code of 6211 (e.g., Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, etc.); insurance companies, which have a 2-digit SIC code of
either 63 or 64 (e.g., AIG, Metlife, Prudential, etc.); and other financial institutions,
6Possibly recognizing these issues, Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (ECB),
recently advocated that even senior bondholders must share in the losses at the worst-hit savings
banks in Spain. This was in sharp contrast to the bailout of Irish banks in late 2010 in which
unsecured senior bondholders were paid in full using taxpayer money even though they had absolutely
no form of government guarantee.
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which have a 2-digit SIC code of 61, 62, 65 or 67, and consist of nonbank finance
companies (e.g., American Express), real estate companies (e.g., CIT Group), and
GSEs (e.g., FNMA and FHLM), etc. We include all financial institutions in our sam-
ple regardless of their size. We have verified that our results are qualitatively similar
even if we confine our analysis to large institutions, defined as those with market
capitalization in excess of $5 billion dollars over the entire sample period. The names
of these large U.S. financial institutions are listed in Table D.1.
We obtain primary bond market data from Mergent’s Fixed Investment Securities
Database (FISD). FISD is a comprehensive database that provides issue details for
over 140,000 corporations, U.S. agencies, and U.S. Treasury debt securities.7 We
restrict our sample to U.S. domestic bonds and exclude yankee bonds, bonds issued
via private placements, and issues that are asset-backed or have credit-enhancement
features. We also exclude preferred stocks, mortgage-backed securities, trust-preferred
capital, and convertible bonds.8 We include only ratings issued by the top three
NRSROs – Standard and Poor (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch. Our sample consists of
both senior and subordinated bonds.9 We obtain firm-level control variables from
COMPUSTAT’s quarterly firm fundamentals file and merge this information with
the primary market data.
Our main dependent variable of interest is Yield Spread, which is the yield to
maturity (YTM) on the bond at issuance minus the YTM on a Treasury security
with comparable maturity. Another variable of interest is Rating, which measures
7FISD contains detailed information for each issue such as the issuer name, bond yields, bond
yield spreads over the closest benchmark treasury, maturity date, offering amount, bond types,
optionality features, rating date, rating level, and the agency that rated the issue, etc. See [33] for
more details of the FISD database.
8Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley issued large number of equity-linked bonds in 2007 and
2008. Such issues were dropped after a search based on the issue description field.
9FISD usually provides information regarding the seniority of the bond issue. In cases where the
information is not provided, we obtain the missing seniority information by matching the issue in
FISD using its complete CUSIP with the corresponding issue in Moody’s Default Risk Database
(DRS) and S&P’s CUSIP master file. Additionally, we also classify issues as senior or subordinated
based on the issue description for bonds.
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the bond’s credit rating at issuance. To obtain Rating, we first convert the credit
ratings provided by S&P (Moody’s) into an ordinal scale starting with 1 as AAA
(Aaa), 2 as AA+ (Aa1), 3 as AA (Aa2), and so on until 22, which denotes the default
category. As Fitch provides three ratings for default, we follow the existing literature
and chose 23 instead of 22 for the default category, which is the average of the three
default ratings; i.e., DD. Because each bond issue may be rated by multiple agencies,
we compute Rating as the simple average of the ordinal rating assigned by each rating
agency. Note that by construction, a lower value for Rating denotes a better credit
quality at issuance.
We obtain stock price data from CRSP and use it to compute our risk measures.
We measure tail risk using expected shortfall (ES ), which is widely used within fi-
nancial firms to measure expected loss conditional on returns being less than some
α-quintile. Its computation involves identifying the 5% worst return days during
the year for the firm’s stock (i.e., days on which the return was lower than its fifth-
percentile cutoff), and then computing the negative of the average of the firm’s daily
returns on these days. We measure systematic tail risk using marginal expected short-
fall (MES ), which measures the firm’s expected loss when the market is in its left
tail (see Acharya et al. (2010)). Specifically, MES is defined as the negative of the
average return on the firm’s stock over the 5% worst return days for the S&P500
index over the year. As we show below, there is a high correlation between ES and
MES in our sample, which is not surprising: given the systemic importance of the
financial sector, financial institutions are more likely to experience a tail event when
the market as a whole experiences a tail event.
Apart from the tail risk measures, we also compute two commonly used measures
of risk: Volatility, which is a measure of the total firm-specific risk and defined as
the standard deviation of the firm’s daily return over the year; and Beta, which
is a measure of systematic risk, and is obtained by estimating the market model
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Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit using daily returns over the year. We use a rolling yearly
window to compute the risk measures, so that for each quarter, risk measures are
computed using the information from the preceding four quarters. For example, the
risk measures pertaining to quarter from April 2007 to June 2007 are computed using
the stock and S&P returns over the one-year period from April 2006 to March 2007.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Results
4.3.1 Summary Statistics
We provide a year-wise summary of bond offerings by financial institutions during the
1990 to 2010 period in Table 34. As can be seen, there is a great deal of variation in
total annual bond issuances by number over our sample period, with the 1992–1995
period being the most active in terms of number of bonds issued. However, although
there were fewer issues in the latter half of the sample period, the median offering
amount in the second half of the sample period is significantly higher than in the
first half. Therefore, examining the total dollar amount issued each year, we find
that the later half of the sample period has a larger dollar amount of bonds issued
even though there are a fewer number of total issues in this period. The majority of
the sample consists of senior bonds, with subordinated bonds making up only 18% of
total issuances by number. A little more than half of the bonds in our sample have a
maturity of less than 10 years and about half have a redeemable feature.
We provide the mean and median values (in parentheses) of the key variables by
institution type in Panel B of Table I. Examining firm characteristics, we see that
broker-dealers have the highest leverage, whereas insurance companies have the lowest
leverage. On average, depository and broker-dealer institutions are also larger (higher
log(assets)) and better rated (lower Rating) than insurance firms. Consistent with
Acharya et al. (2010), depository institutions have lower aggregate risk and lower tail
risk (both ES and MES ), whereas broker-dealers have the highest level of systematic
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risk (Beta), tail risk (ES ), and systematic tail risk (MES ) mainly due to the nature of
their business. Other financial institutions account for half of the total bond issuances
in our sample; out of these, GSEs account for about 40%. Depository institutions
account for about a quarter of the total bond issuances by number, whereas broker-
dealers and insurance firms together account for another quarter. However, as can be
seen from the mean and median offering sizes, the bond offerings by broker-dealers
and depository institutions are much larger in size compared with those of insurance
companies and other financial institutions. Depository institutions are the main is-
suers of subordinated debt, which accounts for around 40% of their bond offerings.
This is mainly due to regulatory reasons. As per the Basel Capital Accord, subordi-
nated debt is among the three types of eligible loss-absorbing instruments that banks
are required to issue at regular intervals in order to facilitate market discipline.
4.3.2 Correlations
We provide univariate correlations between our key variables in Table 35. Not sur-
prisingly, total tail risk (ES ) and systematic tail risk (MES ) are highly correlated.
This suggests that, given the systemic importance of the financial sector, financial
institutions are more likely to experience a tail event when the market as a whole
experiences a tail event. Therefore, in our subsequent multivariate analysis, we are
careful to only include either ES or MES as an independent variable. We also note
the high correlation between ES and Aggregate Risk, which suggests that riskier in-
stitutions also have higher tail risk. Similarly, the high correlation between Beta and
MES suggests that institutions with high overall systematic risk also have higher
systematic tail risk.
We find that Yield Spread is positively correlated with the tail risk measures (ES,
MES ) and Aggregate Risk. We must, however, interpret this with caution because
these are univariate correlations that do not control for other important institutional
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characteristics. In particular, Yield Spread is negatively correlated with Size and
Leverage, which are two important characteristics that are positively correlated with
tail risk. In the case of rating assignments, we find that Rating is positively corre-
lated with ES and Aggregate Risk, suggesting that institutions with higher tail risk
and higher total risk are assigned worse ratings. On the other hand, Rating is uncor-
related with MES. As with the yield spreads, we find that Rating is highly negatively
correlated with Size and Leverage, suggesting that large and highly levered financial
institutions are assigned better ratings.
We now proceed to multivariate analysis in which we examine the relationship
between Yield Spread and tail risk after controlling for differences in size, leverage,
and other risk characteristics across institutions.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Bond Yield Spreads and Tail Risk
We begin our empirical analysis by examining whether investors in the primary bond
markets price the tail risk exposures of the financial institution issuing the bonds. To
test this, we estimate the following OLS regression model:
Yield Spreadift = α+β ∗Tail Riskf,t + γ ∗Xf,t−1 + ρ ∗Xi +Y earFE+ InstTypeFE.
In the above equation, we use subscript ‘i’ to denote the bond, subscript ‘f’ to denote
the issuer firm, and subscript ‘t’ to denote the quarter of issuance. Each observation
in the regression sample corresponds to a primary bond issue. The main dependent
variable of interest is the bond’s Yield Spread at issuance. The main independent
variable of interest is Tail Risk, which we measure using either ES or MES. We control
the regression for important firm characteristics (Xf ), issue characteristics (Xi), and
macroeconomic variables that may affect Yield Spread. All the variables are defined
in the Appendix. The firm characteristics that we control for are Size, Profitability,
market leverage (Leverage), and book leverage (LongTermDebt Assets). The issue
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characteristics that we control for are the bond’s Rating, issue size, maturity, and
indicator variables to identify subordinated debt, callable bonds, and agency debt.
We also include year fixed effects in all specifications, and control for Term Spread,
which is defined as the yield spread between 10-year and 1-year Treasury bonds.
We begin by estimating regression (4.4.1) on all financial institutions in our sam-
ple pooled together, but include institution-type fixed effects to control for differences
between depository institutions, broker-dealers, insurance companies, and other fi-
nancial institutions. The results of our estimation are presented in Table 36. The
standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity, and are clus-
tered at the level of the institution.
The main independent variable of interest is ES in column (1) and MES in column
(2). As we mentioned previously, we do not include ES and MES simultaneously to
avoid multicollinearity. The positive and significant coefficient on ES in column (1)
indicates that yield spreads at issuance are higher for bonds issued by institutions
with high tail risk. A one standard deviation increase in ES increases the primary
bond issuance yield by 18 basis points. However, the coefficient on MES in column (2)
is statistically insignificant, and is also much smaller in magnitude than the coefficient
on ES in column (1). Thus, it appears from the results in column (1) and (2) that
primary bond market investors care about the institution’s total tail risk, but not its
systematic component of tail risk.
The coefficients on the control variables in columns (1) and (2) are broadly as
expected. The positive coefficients on Rating and Maturity indicate that yield spreads
are higher for lower rated bonds and longer maturity bonds, whereas the negative
coefficient on Log(Issue Size) indicates that yield spreads are lower for larger issues.
Examining firm characteristics, we find that yield spreads are higher for institutions
with higher leverage. However, controlling for issue size, the size of the institution
has no effect on yield spreads.
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One possible reason for the lack of a significant association between Yield Spread
and MES is that we may be over-controlling our regressions. That is, it is possible that
the impact of the tail risk measures is being subsumed by Size, Leverage, Rating, and
other firm-level factors, which we showed to be significantly correlated with the risk
measures. To alleviate this concern, we repeat our tests from (1) and (2) after omitting
all firm-level controls and the bond’s credit rating. The results are reported in columns
(3) and (4). As can be seen by comparing columns (1) and (3), the coefficient on ES
does become stronger after we omit firm-level controls and rating from the regression
specification, suggesting that the omitted controls are somewhat subsuming the effect
of ES. However, the coefficient on MES continues to be insignificant and actually
decreases in magnitude after omission of the controls.
To summarize, the results in Table III suggest that primary bond market investors
care about the institution’s total tail risk, but not its systematic component of tail
risk.
4.4.2 Bond Yield Spreads and Other Risk Measures
We did not control the regressions in Table 36 for well-known risk measures, such
as Volatility and Beta, because these are highly correlated with ES and MES, re-
spectively. Thus, including Volatility along with ES, or Beta along with MES, may
give rise to multicollinearity. For the same reason, we did not include ES and MES
together in the same regression. In this section, for robustness, we examine how pri-
mary bond yield spreads vary with Volatility and Beta. The results of our estimation
are presented in Table IV. Apart from the fact that we employ different risk mea-
sures, the empirical specification and control variables in columns (1) through (3) are
exactly the same as that of column (1) of Table 36; i.e., we control for the full set of
firm-level and issue characteristics, and include year fixed effects and institution-type
fixed effects. However, to conserve space, we do not report the coefficients on the
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control variables.
The risk measures of interest in columns (1) and (2) are Volatility and Beta,
respectively. Recall that Volatility is a measure of the institution’s aggregate risk,
whereas Beta is widely used as a measure of systematic risk. Consistent with our
results in Table III, we find that primary bond market investors price the institution’s
aggregate risk (positive and significant coefficient on Volatility) but do not price its
systematic risk (insignificant coefficient on Beta).
As we noted in Table II, ES and MES are highly correlated. To isolate the
idiosyncratic component of tail risk, we construct a new risk measure, ES idio, by
orthogonalizing ES with respect to MES.10 We then estimate regression (4.4.1) after
including both ES idio and MES as independent variables. As can be seen from column
(3), the coefficient on ES idio is positive and significant whereas the coefficient on
MES is insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient on ES idio appears to be larger than
the coefficient on ES in column (1) of Table III. Thus, it appears that primary bond
market investors only price the idiosyncratic component of the institution’s tail risk.
As in Table III, we repeat the estimations in columns (1) through (3) after omitting
firm-level characteristics and credit rating as control variables, just to make sure that
these control variables are not subsuming the effect of the risk variables. As can
be seen from columns (4) through (6), our qualitative results hold even after we
omit these control variables. Moreover, consistent with our findings in Table III, the
coefficients on Volatility and ES idio become stronger after the omission of the control
variables, whereas the coefficient on Beta becomes significantly weaker.
Note that the results in Tables III and IV are more consistent with the moral
hazard hypothesis than the nonsalient-risks hypothesis. As per the nonsalient-risks
10Formally, we obtain ES idio by adding the constant and the residual from the regression of ES on
MES. We conduct the orthogonalization separately for each institution type because the sensitivity
of ES to MES can vary across depositories, broker-dealers, insurance companies, and other financial
institutions.
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hypothesis, yield spreads should not respond to either the idiosyncratic or the sys-
tematic component of tail risk. However, we find that although bond yield spreads do
not respond to the systematic component of tail risk (MES ), they do increase with
the total tail risk (ES ) and the idiosyncratic component of tail risk (ES idio). On the
other hand, given that bailouts are more likely in the event of a systemic failure, the
fact that investors only ignore MES is consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis.
4.4.3 Variation of Results with Bond Characteristics
In this section, we examine how our baseline results on the association between Yield
Spread and risk measures vary with key bond characteristics, such as seniority, ma-
turity, and rating. The results of our analysis are in Table 38.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 38, we examine how the pricing of tail risk varies
between senior and subordinated bonds. Absent government bailout, the loss given
default should be significantly higher for subordinated bonds. Hence, it is logical
to expect that the positive association between Yield Spread and tail risk measures
should be stronger for subordinated bonds. To test this, we define the dummy variable
d Sub to identify subordinated bonds, and estimate regression (4.4.1) after including
d Sub and its interaction with the tail risk measures as additional regressors. The
empirical specification and control variables are exactly the same as in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 36, although we suppress the coefficients on the control variables
in order to conserve space. The positive and significant coefficient on d Sub×ES in
column (1) indicates that the association between tail risk and yield spreads is indeed
stronger for subordinated bonds. However, the insignificant coefficient on d Sub×MES
indicates that there is no incremental effect of MES on yield spreads for subordinated
bonds over senior bonds. A more striking finding is that the sum of the coefficients
on MES and d Sub×MES is also statistically insignificant, which suggests that MES
is not priced even in the case of subordinated bonds issued by financial institutions.
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In columns (3) and (4), we examine how our baseline results vary with the bond’s
credit quality at issuance. Intuitively, we expect our results to be stronger for bonds
with lower credit ratings. To test this, we define the dummy variable d LowGrade to
identify bonds with an S&P credit rating of “A” or worse at issuance (i.e., Rating≥
5), and interact this with the tail risk measures.11 The positive coefficients on the
interaction terms d LowGrade×ES and d LowGrade×MES indicate that the effect of
tail risk on yield spreads is indeed stronger for low grade bonds. These results are
inconsistent with the nonsalient-risks hypothesis as yield spreads respond to both the
idiosyncratic and systematic component of tail risk.
In columns (5) and (6), we examine whether the effect of tail risk on yield spreads
is stronger for longer maturity bonds. There are two reasons to expect that the effect
should be stronger for longer maturity bonds. First, there is more uncertainty in
the long run than in the short run. Second, given that financial institutions rely
heavily on short-term debt, long-term bondholders are also exposed to the risk that
the institution may not be able to rollover or refinance its short-term debt (“rollover
risk”). To test this, we define the dummy variable d LongMat to identify bonds with
stated maturity of 10 years or more. We then estimate our baseline regressions after
including d LongMat and its interaction with the tail risk measures as additional
regressors. As can be seen from the insignificant coefficients on d LongMat×ES and
d LongMat×MES, we fail to detect any incremental effect of tail risk on primary yield
spreads for longer maturity bonds. Moreover, the sum of the coefficients on MES and
d LongMat×MES in column (4) is also statistically insignificant, which suggests that
MES is not priced for long maturity bonds.
11High-grade bonds (defined as those with credit rating of AAA or AA) constitute roughly 33% of
our sample, medium-grade bonds (defined as those with credit rating between A and BBB) constitute
63% of our sample, and speculative-grade bonds (i.e., credit rating worse than BBB) constitute the
remaining 4%.
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4.4.4 Variation of Results with Firm Characteristics
Next, we examine how our baseline results on the association between Yield Spread
and tail risk measures vary with important firm characteristics, such as size, leverage,
and implicit bailout expectations. The results of our analysis are in Table 39.
We begin with the effect of firm size. As per the moral hazard hypothesis, the
relationship between Yield Spread and tail risk should be weaker for large institutions,
which are more likely to be considered systemically important and qualify for implicit
too-big-to-fail guarantees. To test this, we define the dummy variable d Large to
identify firms that are larger than the median size by the book value of assets in the
universe of all the financial firms in COMPUSTAT.12 We then estimate our baseline
regressions after including d Large and its interactions with tail risk measures as
additional regressors. The negative and significant coefficient on d Large×ES in
column (1) indicates that the incremental effect of ES on Yield Spread is significantly
weaker for large institutions. However, the sum of coefficients on ES and d Large×ES
is still positive and significant, which suggests that yield spreads increase with total
tail risk even for large financial institutions. On the other hand, the coefficients on
MES and d Large×MES in column (2), as well as the sum of these coefficients are
all statistically insignificant. This indicates that yield spreads do not vary with MES
regardless of the institution’s size.
In columns (3) and (4), we examine if our results vary with the level of the
institution’s leverage. As with size, we define the dummy variable d HighLeverage
to identify institutions whose market leverage exceeds the median leverage in the
universe of all the financial firms in COMPUSTAT. As expected, the positive and
significant coefficient on d Leverage signifies that firms with higher leverage have
higher bond yield spreads, all else equal. However, we fail to find any incremental
12This classification yields 144 small firms and 160 large firms. However, the large firms contribute
to more than three-quarters of the issuance sample while the remainder comes from the smaller firms.
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effect of tail risk on yield spreads for institutions with high leverage.
An interesting class of institutions in our sample are the GSEs such as Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. Although bonds issued by GSEs carry no explicit government
guarantee of creditworthiness, there is a perception of an implicit guarantee because
it is widely believed that the government will not allow such important institutions
to fail or default on their debt.13 Hence, as per the moral hazard hypothesis, we
should also expect the relationship between Yield Spread and tail risk measures to
be weaker for GSEs. We examine this in columns (5) and (6) where we interact the
tail risk measures with d Agency, a dummy variable that identifies GSEs. The strong
negative and significant coefficients on d Agency×ES and d Agency×MES indicate
that the effect of tail risk exposure on yield spreads is indeed much weaker for bonds
issued by GSEs.
As a further robustness check, in unreported results, we also compare financial
firms and industrial firms by employing the nearest-neighborhood (NN) matching
technique (see [1]) to match debt issued by financial firms to debt issued by non-
financials (industrial firms). We conduct an exact matching on the subordination
status, callability feature, and year of origination, and then use the NN matching on
the remaining controls in the bond yield spread regression model, namely, Rating, Lo-
gAssets, Profitability, LongTermDebt Assets, Leverage, LogIssueSize, and Maturity.14
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the sample of matched counterfactuals,
we match each bond offering by a financial institution (treated sample) with three
bond offerings by non-financial firms (control sample). We then estimate OLS regres-
sions to examine how the yield spread on bonds issued by financial institutions varies
with their tail risk exposure, after controlling for the yield spread on the matched
13According to estimates by the Congressional Budget Office and the Treasury Department in
1997, GSEs saved about $2 billion per year in funding costs because of this implicit guarantee.
14Optimal matching resulted in 100% matching on the subordinated and callable dummy, and
91% on offering year of the bond. As the optimal matching on offering year is not exact, we include
year fixed effects in our regressions.
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counterfactuals. Consistent with earlier results and the moral hazard hypothesis, we
find that investors do not price the systematic tail risk exposure (MES) for either
senior or subordinated debt issuances of financial institutions, and do not price tail
risk (ES) for bonds issued by GSEs.
4.5 Why Don’t Primary Bond Market Investors Price Tail
Risk Exposures of Financial Institutions ?
As we noted in the introduction, there are two potential reasons why primary bond
market investors may not price an institution’s tail risk. It may be that bond market
investors are subject to moral hazard because, given the systemic importance of the
financial sector, they rationally anticipate taxpayer-funded bailouts in the event of
large losses. Alternatively, it may be that investors neglect low-probability nonsalient
risks, in general, and are caught unaware when the debt that they had considered
safe turns out to be risky ([64]). In this section, we conduct additional tests aimed
at distinguishing between these competing hypotheses.
4.5.1 Variation of Results Across Institution Types
One way to distinguish between the moral hazard hypothesis and the nonsalient-risk
hypothesis is to examine how the pricing of tail risk varies across different types of
financial institutions. Certain types of financial institutions, such as depositories and
GSEs, are more likely to be considered systemically important because the failure
of such institutions imposes a large negative externality on the real economy. Such
institutions are also more likely to receive government bailouts if a negative event
materializes. Thus, as per the moral hazard hypothesis, the relationship between
bond yield spreads and tail risk should be weaker for depository institutions compared
with other types of financial institutions.
To test this idea, we now estimate regression (4.4.1) separately for bonds issued
by each institution type. The results of our estimation are presented in Panel A
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of Table VII. We estimate the regressions separately on the subsamples of bonds
issued by depository institutions (columns (1) and (2)), broker-dealers (columns (3)
and (4)), insurance companies (columns (5) and (6)), and other financial institutions
(columns (7) and (8)). We control these regressions for the full set of firm and bond
characteristics as in Table III, and also include year fixed effects. However, to conserve
space, we do not report the coefficients on the control variables.
As can be seen, the results in Panel A highlight a striking difference in the pricing
of tail risk between bonds issued by depository institutions and bonds issued by all
other types of financial institutions. The insignificant coefficients on ES and MES
in columns (1) and (2) indicate that the cost of debt for depository institutions does
not vary with their exposure to tail risk. On the other hand, we find a positive
and significant association between Yield Spread and tail risk measures for all other
institution types, except for the category of other financial institutions for which the
coefficient on MES is positive but statistically insignificant. The lack of significance
on MES in column (8) may be driven by bonds issued by GSEs, which are included
in the category of other financial institutions. As we showed in Panel B of Table VI,
the relationship between bond yield spreads and tail risk is significantly weaker in
case of bonds issued by GSEs.
Our results in Panel A cast doubt on the idea that primary bond markets can
provide effective market discipline to depository institutions. One particular category
of bonds that bank regulators and supervisors rely on to enhance market discipline
are subordinated bonds, which are meant to act as loss-bearing instruments and are
thus treated as part of regulatory capital. As we noted in the discussion following
Table I, depository institutions are by far the largest issuers of subordinated bonds.
In Panel B of Table VII, we separately examine whether the pricing of tail risk varies
between subordinated and senior bonds for depository institutions (in columns (1)
and (2)) and for all other types of financial institutions (in columns (3) and (4)).
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The positive and significant coefficient on d Sub×ES in column (1) indicates that
in the case of bonds issued by depository institutions, the relationship between Yield
Spread and ES is indeed stronger for subordinated bonds. However, the coefficient
on ES is itself negative, although not statistically significant. Moreover, the sum of
coefficients on ES and d Sub×ES is insignificant, which indicates that tail risk is not
priced even in the case of subordinated bonds issued by depository institutions. In
column (2), we find that the coefficients on MES and d Sub×MES, as well as the
sum of these coefficients, are all statistically insignificant. That is, systematic tail
risk MES is not priced either for senior or subordinated bonds issued by depository
institutions.
Turning to the non-depository institutions, we can see that the coefficients on
d Sub×ES in column (3) and d Sub×MES in column (4) are both positive but are
not statistically significant at the conventional 10% level (the t−statistics of 1.61 and
1.49, respectively, are lower than the cutoff value of 1.652). However, the coefficient
on ES as well as the sum of coefficients on ES and d Sub×ES in column (3) are both
statistically significant, which indicates that total tail risk is priced for both senior
and subordinated bonds issued by non-depository institutions. The same is true for
systematic tail risk MES in column (4).
Overall, the results in Table VII indicate that the pricing of tail risk in the primary
bond market varies between depository institutions and non-depository institutions.
The result that neither ES nor MES is priced for bonds issued by depository institu-
tions is consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, because depository institutions
are more likely to be considered systemically important and benefit from implicit
government guarantees. In unreported tests, we verify that the qualitative results in
Table VII are robust to the exclusion of firm-level characteristics and credit rating as
control variables; that is, we verify that the effect of tail risk is not being subsumed
by Size, Leverage, and Rating of depository institutions.
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4.5.2 Political Connectedness and the Pricing of Tail Risk
In this section, we focus on cross-sectional variation in bailout expectations across
financial institutions. One such source of cross-sectional variation is the political
connectedness of financial institutions. If politically connected institutions are more
likely to receive government bailouts, then we expect the relationship between bond
yield spreads and tail risk measures to be weaker for better connected institutions.
We measure political connectedness using information on lobbying expenditures by
financial institutions obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), which
compiles data from lobbying disclosure reports filed with the Secretary of the Senate’s
Office of Public Records (SOPR).15 This data is available from 1998 through the most
recent quarter. We hand-match lobbying records with our data set by firm name and
broad industry classification. We measure political connectedness using two variables:
a dummy variable d PoliticalConnection, which identifies financial institutions that
have ever lobbied the government; and Log(Lobby Expenditure), which is the natural
logarithm of the amount of total lobbying expenditure by the institution since the
data became available in 1998.
As per our definition of d PoliticalConnection, 53% of the institutions in our sam-
ple are politically connected, and include large institutions that were bailed out during
the recent financial crisis; e.g., Bear Stearns, AIG, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Bank
of America, JP Morgan, CIT Group, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae among others.
The average lobbying amount per year for our sample of firms is close to $1.8 mil-
lion. Depositories on average have the highest lobbying amount per year, as well
as the highest percentage of politically connected firms, followed by broker-dealers.
15This data is also publicly available for download on SOPR’s website. As per the lobbying
disclosure act of 1995, firms that hire lobbyists are required to provide a good-faith estimate rounded
to the nearest $20,000 of all lobbying-related expenditures in each six-month period. An organization
that spends less than $10,000 in any six-month period does not have to state its expenditures. In
those cases, the Center treats the figure as zero.
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In general, there seems to be a positive correlation between our measures of political
connectedness and bailout probability ([57]). A simple correlation analysis shows that
our measures of political connectedness are positively correlated with firm assets and
leverage, which implies that larger institutions lobby the government more. Similarly,
the correlation between Yield Spread and our political connections measures are neg-
atively correlated, which indicates that politically connected firms seem to enjoy a
lower cost of capital.
To test whether the pricing of tail risk varies with the institutions’ political con-
nectedness, we estimate regression (4.4.1) after including our measures of political
connectedness and their interactions with the tail risk measures as additional regres-
sors. We can estimate this regression only for the 1998 to 2010 period as the data
on lobbying expenditures is available only after 1998. The results of our analysis are
presented in Table 41. The empirical specification and control variables are exactly
the same as in Table III although we suppress the coefficients on control variables in
order to conserve space.
The negative and significant coefficients on d PoliticalConnection×ES and Log(Lobby
Expenditure)×ES in columns (1) and (3), respectively, indicate that the relationship
between Yield Spread and tail risk is indeed weaker for politically connected institu-
tions. On the other hand, although the coefficients on d PoliticalConnection×MES
and Log(Lobby Expenditure)×MES in columns (2) and (4), respectively, are negative,
they are not statistically significant. Hence, we cannot conclude that the pricing of
systematic tail risk varies between politically-connected and non-connected financial
institutions. However, the sum of coefficients on MES and d PoliticalConnection×MES
in column (3) is statistically insignificant, which indicates that the yield spreads of
bonds issued by politically-connected institutions does not vary with their MES.
Note that the regression sample in columns (1) through (4) includes both crisis
periods and noncrisis periods. It is possible that political connections matter less in
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the midst of a systemic crises, when the government is focussed on bailing out the
entire financial sector. For example, the massive liquidity infusions into the interbank
market in the immediate aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy were not aimed at any
specific institution, but were rather meant to prevent a complete breakdown of money
markets. Hence, a better test of the impact of political connectedness is to examine
bond issuances during noncrisis periods. We do this in columns (5) through (8),
where we estimate the regressions on a subsample spanning the crisis-free period
from 2001:Q2 to 2008:Q2 (i.e., the period from immediately after the LTCM and
dotcom crises to immediately before the recent financial crisis). As can be seen, all
the interaction terms between measures of political-connectedness and tail risk in
columns (5) through (8) are negative and statistically significant: that is, consistent
with the moral hazard hypothesis, we find that the relationship between yield spreads
and tail risk is significantly weaker for politically-connected institutions compared
with non-connected institutions, suggesting the existence of a bailout subsidy for the
debt of politically-connected institutions.
If indeed politically-connected financial institutions benefit from an implicit bailout
subsidy in bond markets, then a natural question that arises is whether politically-
connected institutions exploit the implicit subsidy to undertake more and larger bond
issuances. To investigate this question, we aggregate all bond issuances for each fi-
nancial institution in each calendar quarter during our sample period, and create
an institution-quarter bond issuance panel dataset. We then examine how bond is-
suances vary with the institutions’ political connectedness, after controlling for all
possible institution- and market-level characteristics that may affect bond issuances.
The main dependent variables of interest are: (a) d Issue, which is a dummy variable
that identifies whether the institution issued any bonds during that calendar quarter;
(b) Total Issue Amount, which is the total issuance amount across all the bond is-
suances by the institution during the quarter; and (c) Number of issues which is the
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total number of issues undertaken by the institution during the quarter. We control
for both lagged institution-level determinants (assets, book leverage, market lever-
age, market-to-book, asset growth) and include year-quarter fixed effects to control
for market-level conditions of bond issuance activity. The results of our estimation
are in Table 42.
In column (1), we report the results of a Probit regression with d Issue as the de-
pendent variable. The insignificant coefficient on d PoliticalConnection indicates that
politically-connected institutions are no more likely to issue bonds in any given quar-
ter than non-connected institutions. However, the positive coefficient on d Political-
Connection×Lag1Q-Assets(log) in column (1) indicates that among large institutions,
politically-connected institutions are more likely to undertake bond issuances than
non-connected institutions. We arrive at very similar conclusions when we examine
total issuance amounts (in column (3)) and the number of bond issuances (in column
(5)). In columns (2), (4), and (6), we verify that these results are also robust to using
Total Lobby Amount as the measure of political connectedness.
Overall, the results in Table 41 and Table 42 provide more evidence in support
of the moral hazard hypothesis by highlighting that primary bond market investors
are less likely to price the tail risk exposures of politically-connected institutions, and
that large, politically-connected institutions exploit this implicit bailout subsidy by
issuing more debt in the bond markets.
4.5.3 Pricing of Tail Risk Around Crisis Periods
In the previous section, we used political connectedness to identify the cross-sectional
variation in bailout expectations across firms. Another way to distinguish between
the moral hazard hypothesis and the nonsalient-risks hypothesis is to examine how
the association between Yield Spread and the tail risk measures varies around crisis
periods. In general, a crisis can affect the pricing of tail risk in two ways. In the
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absence of bailout expectations, a crisis may serve as a reminder of the existence of
tail risks, and thus strengthen the relationship between Yield Spread and the tail risk.
However, if the crisis triggers large-scale bailouts of troubled institutions, that may
weaken the relationship between Yield Spread and the tail risk.
To better understand these effects, we focus on three crisis events that occurred
during our sample period: the failure and bailout of LTCM in August 1998, the dot-
com crash of March 2000, and the recent financial crisis in March 2008. Note that
unlike the dotcom crash, which was largely confined to the technology sector, the
LTCM crisis and the recent financial crisis adversely affected the financial sector and
triggered government bailouts of troubled institutions. We exploit this key difference
to understand the extent to which our results are being driven by changes in expecta-
tions of future bailouts. For each of these crisis events, we construct a sample of bond
issuances by all financial institutions that occurred in a two-year (i.e., eight calendar
quarters) window around the crisis event, and divide this into pre-crisis and post-
crisis windows of four calendars quarters each.16 We then compare how the pricing
of tail risk varies between the pre-crisis and post-crisis samples.
The results of our analysis are summarized in Table 43. In columns (1) and
(2), we examine the effect of the LTCM crisis that occurred during August and
September of 1998. The LTCM bailout was announced on September 23, 1998 when
14 financial institutions agreed to a $3.6 billion recapitalization under the supervision
of the Federal Reserve. Accordingly, we use the sample of bonds issued during the
two-year period from 1997:Q4 to 1999:Q3 surrounding this crisis event; the sample
consists of 154 bond offerings. In this sample, we define the dummy variable d LTCM
16Choosing a two-year window around the crisis provides a reasonable sample size for our analysis
without introducing other confounding events, thus allowing for cleaner interpretation of results.
We must note that it is not feasible to conduct these tests separately for each institution type as
the sample size for each institution type would be very small. Hence, we conduct these tests for
all financial institutions pooled together, but include institution-type fixed effects in the regression
specification.
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to identify bonds issued between 1998:Q4 and 1999:Q3, that is, after the LTCM
bailout was announced. We then estimate regression (4.4.1) after including d LTCM
and its interactions with the tail risk variables as additional regressors. The empirical
specification and control variables are otherwise the same as in Table III, but with
one important difference: we exclude the year dummies, and instead use the specific
crisis dummy to understand how the pricing of tail risk changed pre- and post-crisis.
We suppress the coefficients on the control variables in order to conserve space.
The positive and significant coefficients on d LTCM in columns (1) and (2) indi-
cate that primary bond yield spreads of financial firms increased significantly in the
immediate aftermath of the LTCM crisis. However, the negative and significant co-
efficients on d LTCM×ES and d LTCM×MES in columns (1) and (2), respectively,
indicate that the relationship between Yield Spread and tail risk was significantly
weaker in the immediate aftermath of the LTCM crisis. Moreover, the sum of the
coefficients on ES and d LTCM×ES in column (1) is insignificant, and so is the sum
of the coefficients on MES and d LTCM×MES in column (2). These indicate that
tail risk was not priced at all in the immediate aftermath of the LTCM crisis.
We examine the effect of the recent financial crisis in columns (3) and (4). The
main events of the financial crisis occurred during mid-September to early October
of 2008.17 Accordingly, to understand the impact of the financial crisis, we use the
sample of bonds issued during the two-year period from 2007:Q4 to 2009:Q3. In this
sample, we use the dummy variable d FinCrisis to identify bonds issued between
2008:4Q and 2009:Q3, which denotes the post-crisis period. As can be seen from
columns (3) and (4), the impact of the financial crisis was very similar to that of
the LTCM crisis: although there was an across-the-board increase in primary bond
17The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the collapse and bailout of AIG occurred on September
15 and 16, 2008, triggering widespread panic and a liquidity crisis that required the intervention of
the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve. In the next few weeks, other financial institutions
including Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and Citigroup
were either acquired under duress, or were subject to government takeover.
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yield spreads for all financial institutions following the crisis (positive coefficient on
d FinCrisis), the relationship between yield spreads and tail risk was also significantly
weaker after the crisis as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficients on
d FinCrisis×ES and d FinCrisis×MES.
Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we study the effect of the dotcom crisis, which was
triggered by the collapse of the NASDAQ-100 Index on March 10, 2000. Accordingly,
we use the sample of bonds issued in the two-year period from 1999:Q2 to 2001:Q1. In
this sample, the dummy variable d Dotcom identifies bonds issued between the period
2000:Q2 and 2001:Q1, the period right after the dotcom bubble burst on March 10,
2000. As with the LTCM crisis and the financial crisis of 2008, we find that there was
an across-the-board increase in primary bond yield spreads of financial institutions
in the immediate aftermath of the dotcom crisis (positive and significant coefficient
on d DotCom). However, in stark contrast to the other two crises, the coefficients on
d DotCom×ES and d DotCom×MES are statistically insignificant, which suggests
that there was no difference in the pricing of tail risk in the primary bond markets in
the immediate aftermath of the dotcom crisis. This could be due to the fact that the
dotcom crash did not change bond market investors’ expectations of future bailouts
of financial institutions.
Overall, the evidence in Table 43 lends more support to the moral hazard hypoth-
esis over the nonsalient-risks hypothesis.
4.5.4 Do Rating Agencies Account for Tail Risk Exposures?
Investors may rely on rating agencies to price tail risk, as rating agencies specialize
in determining creditworthiness of firms. For example, a rating agency may be better
positioned to judge the quality of loans and other non-traded assets on a bank’s
balance sheet. Rating agencies also have access to a firm’s private information as
they were exempt from the Fair Disclosure Regulation (Reg FD) during our sample
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period. If rating agencies are also subject to the aforementioned bailout moral hazard
problem then they may not price tail risk. Bond investors, who may rely on rating
agencies to price tail risks, will consequently not price it too. On the other hand
rating agencies may price tail risk and investors might rationally choose to ignore
them. To investigate this issue we run an ordered probit model with Rating as the
dependent variable, and ES and MES as the key independent variables of interest.
We include all the control variables in equation (4.4.1) except of course Rating itself.
The results of our estimation are presented in Panel A of Table 44.
In columns (1) and (2), we estimate the regression separately on the subsample
of bonds issued by depository institutions. Although we find a positive association
between Rating and total tail risk (ES ), we fail to find any association between Rating
and systematic tail risk (MES ). Interestingly, while rating agencies appear to price ES,
investors seem to ignore it as shown in Table 40. In columns (3) and (4), we estimate
the regression separately on the subsample of bonds issued by broker-dealers. In this
subsample, we fail to find any significant association between Rating and either tail
risk or systematic tail risk. In contrast, even though rating agencies seem to ignore
the tail risk exposures of broker-dealers, primary bond market investors as shown in
Table 40 seem well aware of these risks and do price them. When we estimate the
regression on bonds issued by insurance companies (columns (5) and (6)) and other
financial institutions (columns (7) and (8)), we find a positive association between
Rating and both tail risk measures, which is particularly strong for bonds issued by
insurance companies.
Next, we examine how the association between Rating and the tail risk measures
varies with bonds’ seniority status. As in the previous section, we repeat our regres-
sion in Panel A after including the interaction terms d Sub×ES and d Sub×MES,
where d Sub is an indicator variable that identifies subordinated bonds. The results
of the estimation are presented in Panel B. The positive and significant coefficient
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on d Sub indicates that subordinated bonds are assigned lower ratings, all else equal,
which is to be expected because the loss given default should be higher for these
bonds. However, surprisingly, there is no adverse incremental effect of tail risk on the
credit ratings of subordinated bonds. As can be seen, the coefficients on d Sub×ES
and d Sub×MES are mostly insignificant; in fact, we find a negative and significant
coefficient on d Sub×ES in column (1). In a separate row, we also report the statisti-
cal significance on the sum of coefficients on the tail risk measure and its interaction
term with the d Sub dummy. Overall, these coefficients are positive and significant for
depositories whereas they are insignificant for the rest of the financial firms suggesting
that rating agencies account for tail risk for subordinated debt issued by depositories
although not incrementally over senior bonds.
To summarize, the results in Table 44 highlight interesting differences in how credit
rating agencies rate new bond issuances by different types of financial institutions
compared with investors. In particular, rating agencies do not seem to account for
tail risk exposures of broker-dealers and the systematic tail risk exposure of depository
institutions. More strikingly, although subordinated bonds are assigned lower credit
ratings, there is no additional adverse impact of the institution’s tail risk on the credit
ratings assigned to subordinated bonds. Again, to ensure we are not over-controlling
our regressions, we repeat all of our tests from Panels A and B after omitting these
firm-level factors as controls. The results of these robustness tests are however not
reported and our qualitative results from Panels A and B are unchanged when we
omit these additional controls. The only noticeable difference is that the coefficient
on MES is significantly lower for these repeat tests of Panels A and B and all of the
sum of coefficients on the tail risk measure and its interaction term with the d Sub
dummy are small and statistically insignificant. Overall, the ordered probit rating
regression results indicate that it is not the investors’ reliance on rating agencies that
leads to the mispricing of tail risk.
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4.6 Conclusion
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, there is an increased focus on contain-
ing tail risk and systematic risk exposure of financial institutions. One recurring idea
in financial sector regulation is for regulators to increase their reliance on “market
discipline” in controlling institutions’ risk exposure. However, market discipline is
effective only if investors price the risk exposure of financial institutions. In the re-
cent U.S. subprime financial crisis, large-scale government interventions were enacted,
which included bailouts designed to prevent the financial industry from a potential
system-wide breakdown. However, a consequence of implied government guarantees
and bailouts for financial institutions is a weakening of market discipline. Investors
can be subject to moral hazard and may not rationally price an institution’s exposure
to tail risks.
In this paper, we use a large sample of bond issuances by U.S. financial institutions
during the 1990 to 2010 period to examine whether bond market investors price the
tail risk exposure of financial institutions. We find that primary bond yield spreads
increase with institutions’ own tail risk (expected shortfall) but do not respond to their
systematic tail risk (marginal expected shortfall), even in the case of subordinated
bonds. When we distinguish between different types of financial institutions, we find
a striking result that primary bond yield spreads of depository institutions do not
respond to tail risk for either senior bonds or subordinated bonds. On the other
hand, primary bond yield spreads of broker-dealers and insurance companies respond
to both total tail risk and systematic tail risk.
There are two potential explanations for why bond market investors may neglect
tail risk exposure of financial institutions. It may be that bond market investors are
subject to moral hazard because they rationally expect to be bailed out by the gov-
ernment if a negative tail event materializes. Alternatively, it may be that investors
neglect low-probability non-salient risks are are caught unaware when the assets that
191
they had considered to be safe turn out to be risky. Consistent with the moral hazard
hypothesis, we find that systematic tail risk is not priced in situations where ex-ante
bailout expectations are higher: that is, for depositories and government-sponsored
entities (GSEs), large institutions, and politically connected firms. Moreover, bond
investors’ concern for tail risk seems to have weakened in the immediate aftermath
of financial crises (such as LTCM and the recent financial crisis) that involved gov-
ernment bailouts of financial institutions.
Overall, our results point to moral hazard in the primary bond markets due to
implicit bailout guarantees and cast doubt on the idea that market discipline can be
sufficient in controlling the tail risk exposures of depository institutions.
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Table 34: Summary statistics of bond sample.
The table displays the summary statistics of the sample of senior and subordinated corporate
bonds issued by U.S. financial firms (1-digit SIC code=6) during the period from 1990 to
2010. We restrict our sample to U.S. domestic bonds and exclude yankee bonds, bonds
issued via private placements, issues which are asset-backed or have credit-enhancement
features. In addition we exclude preferred stocks, mortgage backed securities, trust preferred
capital and convertible bonds. Panel A displays the summary statistics year-wise. The
numbers for Subordinated, Maturity, and Callable feature are expressed as a percentage
of the total sample. In addition, Panel B displays the summary statistics by firm-type for
our risk measures, bond-level variables and firm-level variables. Our tail risk measures are
defined as: ES: the negative of the average of the firm’s daily returns on 5% worst return
days during the calendar year for the firm; MES: the negative of the average firm’s daily
return on 5% worst return days of the market (S&P 500 instead of for the firm) during the
calendar year; ESidio: is the residual plus constant upon regressing ES on MES separately
for each firm-type. Other risk measures are Volatility: is the standard deviation of daily
firm equity return over the calendar year; Beta: is the estimate of the coefficient upon
regressing the firm’s daily return on market’s daily return (S&P 500); Volatility, ES, MES,
ESidio are expressed in percentage terms. Other variables are defined as: Yield Spread is
the bond yield minus closest benchmark treasury yield expressed in basis points. Rating is
generated by converting the bond ratings to a cardinal scale measured on a 23 point scale
for ratings issued by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch and then taking their average for a given
firm, Leverage is the ratio of market value of assets and market value of equity; Assets (log)
is the log of total assets. The firms are categorized into 4 groups (firm-types): Depositories
(2-digit SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers (4-digit SIC code=6211); Insurance (2-digit SIC





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B : Summary Statistics by Firm Type
BrokerDeal Depository Insurance Other Total
Bond Vars
Number of Issues 228 470 269 906 1873
Subordinated 6.1% 39.6% 9.7% 12.4% 18.0%
Offering Amount ($mil) 711.85 694.40 397.32 241.19 434.63
(400.00) (386.79) (300.00) (150.00) (250.00)
Rating Scale 5.57 5.55 7.26 5.04 5.55
(5.00) (6.00) (7.00) (5.00) (6.00)
Yield Spread (bps) 140 127 189 110 129
(101) (92) (160) (83) (95)
Tail Risk Vars
ES 4.54 3.84 4.47 3.82 4.01
(3.97) (3.41) (4.12) (3.31) (3.45)
MES 3.01 2.22 2.35 1.91 2.19
(2.70) (1.89) (1.69) (1.79) (1.88)
ESidio 1.44 1.88 2.41 2.18 2.05
(1.34) (1.54) (2.08) (1.81) (1.75)
Other Risk Vars
Volatility 2.28 1.89 2.20 1.86 1.97
(2.00) (1.62) (1.92) (1.63) (1.67)
Beta 1.53 1.10 1.00 1.10 1.14
(1.56) (1.09) (0.89) (1.19) (1.14)
Firm Vars
Assets (log) 11.98 12.14 10.44 9.94 10.81
(12.13) (12.28) (10.57) (10.69) (11.18)
Market Leverage 17.66 9.24 8.62 10.20 10.64
(16.52) (7.42) (5.06) (7.84) (7.87)
Book Debt/Equity 24.80 12.18 8.06 12.92 13.48


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 36: Bond Yield Spreads and Tail Risk
The following table displays the primary bond yield regressions with dependent vari-
able as bond yield minus the closest benchmark treasury yield expressed in basis
points on firm tail-risk measures and other firm and bond characteristics during the
period from 1990 to 2010. Our tail risk measures are defined as: ES: the negative of
the average of the firm’s daily returns on 5% worst return days during the calendar
year for the firm; MES: the negative of the average firm’s daily return on 5% worst
return days of the market (S&P 500 instead of for the firm) during the calendar year;
ES, MES are expressed in percentage terms. Rating is generated by converting the
bond ratings to a cardinal scale measured on a 23 point scale for ratings issued by
S&P, Moody’s and Fitch and then taking their average for a given firm. The firms
are categorized into 4 firm-types: Depositories (2-digit SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers
(4-digit SIC code=6211); Insurance (2-digit SIC code=60 & 64); Other (2-digit SIC
code=61, 62(except 6211), 65, 67). Standard bond yield regression controls which are
defined in Appendix D.1 and included in the regression specification are: log assets,
profitability, long-term debt to assets, leverage, term spread, log issue size, years to
maturity. Firm-type fixed effects (FE) are included by defining a dummy variable
d Firm-Type for each firm-type that is set to 1 if a firm belongs to that firm-type
or else it is set to 0. Bond-type fixed effects are controlled by including d Agency,
d Sub and d Callable which are dummy variables set to 1 if the type of bond is an
agency debt, subordinated or callable respectively or else they are set to 0. Year
fixed effects are included in the regressions. All standard errors are clustered at firm
level to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. All t-statistics are




All Controls No Firm Controls







Market Leverage 0.63** 0.79***
(2.42) (2.64)
LongTermDebt Assets 50.35*** 51.26***
(2.68) (2.63)





d Agency -5.85 -3.99 -65.06*** -69.98***
(-0.34) (-0.22) (-7.59) (-7.52)
Rating Scale 12.81*** 14.22***
(5.10) (5.60)
Maturity (yrs) 1.11*** 1.01*** 0.76*** 0.55*
(4.56) (4.04) (2.70) (1.84)
IssueSize (log) -16.31*** -16.98*** -22.32*** -22.96***
(-3.39) (-3.56) (-4.99) (-4.93)
Macro Vars
10yr-1yr Treasury Spread -8.48* -5.15 -14.39** -9.08
(-1.68) (-1.06) (-2.46) (-1.62)
N 1873 1873 1873 1873
Adj. R2 0.577 0.569 0.536 0.518
Year FE X X X X
FirmType FE X X X X
BondType FE X X X X
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Table 37: Bond Yield Spreads and Other Risk Measures
The following table displays the pricing effect of other risk measures, which are closely related to tail
risk, on bond yield issuance in the primary market controlling for bond and firm characteristics during
the period from 1990 to 2010. Our risk measures are defined as the following: ESidio: is the residual
plus constant upon regressing ES on MES separately for each firm-type; Volatility: is the standard
deviation of daily firm equity return over the calendar year; Beta: is the estimate of the coefficient
upon regressing the firm’s daily return on market’s daily return (S&P 500). Volatility, MES, ESidio
are expressed in percentage terms. Other variables are defined as: Yield Spread is the bond yield
minus closest benchmark treasury yield expressed in basis points. The firms are categorized into 4
firm-types: Depositories (2-digit SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers (4-digit SIC code=6211); Insurance
(2-digit SIC code=60 & 64); Other (2-digit SIC code=61, 62(except 6211), 65, 67). d firm − type
is defined as a dummy variable that is set to 1 if a firm belongs to that firm-type or else it is set to
0. d Agency, d Sub and d Callable are dummy variables set to 1 if the type of bond is an agency
debt, subordinated or callable respectively or else they are set to 0. Standard bond yield regression
controls which are defined in Appendix D.1 and included in the regression specification are: log
assets, profitability, long-term debt to assets, leverage, term spread, log issue size, years to maturity
and rating scale Year fixed effects are included in the regressions. All standard errors are clustered at
firm level to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. All t-statistics are displayed
in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
All Controls No Firm Controls









N 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873
adj. R2 0.579 0.568 0.578 0.547 0.517 0.542
Year FE X X X X X X
FirmType FE X X X X X X
BondType FE X X X X X X
Firm-level Vars X X X 7 7 7
OtherControls X X X X X X
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Table 38: Bond Characteristics and Pricing of Tail Risk
The following table displays the primary bond yield regressions with dependent variable as
bond yield minus closest benchmark treasury yield expressed in basis points on firm tail-risk
measures and other bond characteristics during the period from 1990 to 2010. The analysis
consists of the interaction results of tail-risk measures with bond features which are defined
in the following manner: Dummy variable d Sub is set to 1 if the bond is subordinated
else it is set to 0. Dummy variables d LowGrade is set to 1 if it’s rating scale ≥ 5 (A
or lower for S&P, Fitch and Moodys’) implying they are medium-grade bonds else it is
set 0 implying they are high-grade bonds (AAA or AA - High-grade AAA and AA bonds
constitute about 33% of the sample; Medium grade A to BBB constitute 63% and the rest
4% are speculative grade bonds). Similarly d LongMat is set to 1 if the years to maturity
of the bond is ≥ 10 (the mean and median maturity in the sample is close to 10 years) else
it is set to 0. Our tail risk measures are defined as: ES: the negative of the average of the
firm’s daily returns on 5% worst return days during the calendar year for the firm; MES:
the negative of the average firm’s daily return on 5% worst return days of the market (S&P
500 instead of for the firm) during the calendar year; ES, MES are expressed in percentage
terms. Rating is generated by converting the bond ratings to a cardinal scale measured
on a 23 point scale for ratings issued by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch and then taking their
average for a given firm. The firms are categorized into 4 firm-types: Depositories (2-digit
SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers (4-digit SIC code=6211); Insurance (2-digit SIC code=60 &
64); Other (2-digit SIC code=61, 62(except 6211), 65, 67). Standard bond yield regression
controls which are defined in Appendix D.1 and included in the regression specification
are: log assets, profitability, long-term debt to assets, leverage, term spread, log issue size,
years to maturity. Firm-type fixed effects (FE) are included by defining a dummy variable
d Firm-Type for each firm-type that is set to 1 if a firm belongs to that firm-type or else it
is set to 0. Bond-type fixed effects are controlled by including dummy variables d Agency,
d Sub and d Callable. Year fixed effects are included in the regressions. All standard errors
are clustered at firm level to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. All
t-statistics are displayed in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance greater than 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 38 (continued)
Subordinated Low Grade Bond Maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ES 7.50** -0.38 11.36***
(2.18) (-0.09) (2.98)














d Sub 2.42 1.61 13.85* 13.38 4.32 4.66
(0.29) (0.18) (1.74) (1.61) (0.48) (0.51)
d LowGrade 5.64 2.61
(0.74) (0.34)
d LongMat 8.41* 6.32
(1.86) (1.27)
ΣCoeff 19.22*** 5.42 17.98*** 10.31*** 7.73** 2.80
(3.37) (0.74) (5.05) (2.81) (2.34) (0.79)
N 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873
adj. R2 0.580 0.569 0.563 0.542 0.574 0.565
Year FE X X X X X X
FirmType FE X X X X X X
BondType FE X X X X X X
Rating X X 7 7 X X
Maturity X X X X 7 7
OtherControls X X X X X X
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Table 39: Firm Characteristics and Pricing of Tail Risk
The following table displays the primary bond yield regressions with dependent variable as
bond yield minus closest benchmark treasury yield expressed in basis points on firm tail-risk
measures and other firm characteristics during the period from 1990 to 2010. The analysis
consists of the interaction results of tail-risk measures with firm features which are defined
in the following manner: d Large is a dummy variable set to 1 if the log of firm assets is
greater than the median in the universe of financial firms in COMPUSTAT, else it is set
to 0. d HighLeverage is a dummy variable set to 1 if the firm leverage is greater than the
median in the universe of financial firms in COMPUSTAT, else it is set to 0. d Agency is set
to 1 if the bond is an agency bond else it is set to 0. Our tail risk measures are defined as:
ES: the negative of the average of the firm’s daily returns on 5% worst return days during
the calendar year for the firm; MES: the negative of the average firm’s daily return on 5%
worst return days of the market (S&P 500 instead of for the firm) during the calendar year;
ES, MES are expressed in percentage terms. Rating is generated by converting the bond
ratings to a cardinal scale measured on a 23 point scale for ratings issued by S&P, Moody’s
and Fitch and then taking their average for a given firm. The firms are categorized into
4 firm-types: Depositories (2-digit SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers (4-digit SIC code=6211);
Insurance (2-digit SIC code=60 & 64); Other (2-digit SIC code=61, 62(except 6211), 65, 67).
Standard bond yield regression controls which are defined in Appendix D.1 and included in
the regression specification are: log assets, profitability, long-term debt to assets, leverage,
term spread, log issue size, years to maturity. Firm-type fixed effects (FE) are included by
defining a dummy variable d Firm-Type for each firm-type that is set to 1 if a firm belongs
to that firm-type or else it is set to 0. Bond-type fixed effects are controlled by including
dummy variables d Agency, d Sub and d Callable. Year fixed effects are included in the
regressions. All standard errors are clustered at firm level to correct for correlation across
observations of a given firm. All t-statistics are displayed in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate
significance greater than 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 39 (continued)
Assets Leverage Agency Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ES 17.97*** 10.82** 11.62***
(3.33) (2.44) (3.43)














d Large -16.45 -18.26
(-1.58) (-1.49)
d Leverage 13.43 19.31*
(1.33) (1.90)
d Agency -3.03 -1.15 12.35 14.57 -12.98 -5.67
(-0.18) (-0.07) (0.78) (0.90) (-0.74) (-0.31)
ΣCoeff 7.83** 4.32 10.05*** 2.92 -18.36*** -27.85***
(2.31) (1.32) (2.74) (0.79) (-3.37) (-3.95)
N 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873
adj. R2 0.581 0.570 0.573 0.565 0.581 0.571
Year FE X X X X X X
FirmType FE X X X X X X
BondType FE X X X X X X
LogAssets 7 7 X X X X
Leverage X X 7 7 X X
RatingScale X X X X X X
OtherControls X X X X X X
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Table 40: Pricing of Tail Risk for Different Institution Types
The following table displays the primary bond yield regressions with dependent variable
as bond yield minus closest benchmark treasury yield expressed in basis points on firm
tail-risk measures and other firm and bond characteristics during the period from 1990 to
2010 separately for each firm type. Our tail risk measures are defined as: ES: the negative
of the average of the firm’s daily returns on 5% worst return days during the calendar year
for the firm; MES: the negative of the average firm’s daily return on 5% worst return days
of the market (S&P 500 instead of for the firm) during the calendar year; ES, MES are
expressed in percentage terms. Rating is generated by converting the bond ratings to a
cardinal scale measured on a 23 point scale for ratings issued by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch
and then taking their average for a given firm. The firms are categorized into 4 firm-types:
Depositories (2-digit SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers (4-digit SIC code=6211); Insurance
(2-digit SIC code=60 & 64); Other (2-digit SIC code=61, 62(except 6211), 65, 67).
Standard bond yield regression controls which are defined in Appendix D.1 and included in
the regression specification are: log assets, profitability, long-term debt to assets, leverage,
term spread, log issue size, years to maturity. Firm-type fixed effects (FE) are included by
defining a dummy variable d Firm-Type for each firm-type that is set to 1 if a firm belongs
to that firm-type or else it is set to 0. Bond-type fixed effects are controlled by including
d Agency, d Sub and d Callable which are dummy variables set to 1 if the type of bond is
an agency debt, subordinated or callable respectively or else they are set to 0. Year fixed
effects are included in the regressions. All standard errors are clustered at firm level to
correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. All t-statistics are displayed in
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Panel A analyzes the effect of tail-risk on bond issuance yields controlling for all
our bond-level, firm-level and macroeconomic variables. Panel B analyzes the incremental
effect of tail-risk on subordinated bond issuance yields controlling for all our bond-level,
firm-level and macroeconomic variables.
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Table 40 (continued)
Panel A: Only Tail Risk
Depository Broker-Dealer Insurance Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ES -1.45 37.92*** 11.85* 15.56***
(-0.22) (3.34) (1.68) (3.57)
MES -8.57 35.68*** 16.28** 5.23
(-0.98) (3.59) (2.44) (1.10)
N 470 470 228 228 269 269 906 906
adj. R2 0.476 0.478 0.494 0.483 0.552 0.558 0.656 0.635
Year FE X X X X X X X X
BondType FE X X X X X X X X
OtherControls X X X X X X X X
Panel B: Tail Risk×Subordinated
Depository Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ES -7.23 10.85***
(-0.89) (2.88)




d Sub×MES 0.61 14.69
(0.06) (1.49)
d Sub 4.08 5.00 11.85 21.73
(0.42) (0.43) (0.92) (1.51)
ΣCoeff 7.68 -8.19 24.41*** 22.47**
(1.20) (-1.00) (3.10) (2.22)
N 470 470 1403 1403
adj. R2 0.484 0.477 0.616 0.604
Year FE X X X X
FirmType FE 7 7 X X
BondType FE X X X X
OtherControls X X X X
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Table 41: Political Connectedness and Pricing of Tail Risk
The following table displays the primary bond yield regressions with dependent variable
as bond yield minus closest benchmark treasury yield expressed in basis points on firm
tail-risk measures and other firm and bond characteristics during the period from 1998 to
2010. Our tail risk measures are defined as: ES: the negative of the average of the firm’s
daily returns on 5% worst return days during the calendar year for the firm; MES: the
negative of the average firm’s daily return on 5% worst return days of the market (S&P
500 instead of for the firm) during the calendar year; ES, MES are expressed in percentage
terms. Rating is generated by converting the bond ratings to a cardinal scale measured
on a 23 point scale for ratings issued by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch and then taking their
average for a given firm. The firms are categorized into 4 firm-types: Depositories (2-digit
SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers (4-digit SIC code=6211); Insurance (2-digit SIC code=60 &
64); Other (2-digit SIC code=61, 62(except 6211), 65, 67). Standard bond yield regression
controls which are defined in Appendix D.1 and included in the regression specification
are: log assets, profitability, long-term debt to assets, leverage, term spread, log issue size,
years to maturity. Firm-type fixed effects (FE) are included by defining a dummy variable
d Firm-Type for each firm-type that is set to 1 if a firm belongs to that firm-type or else
it is set to 0. Bond-type fixed effects are controlled by including d Agency, d Sub and
d Callable which are dummy variables set to 1 if the type of bond is an agency debt,
subordinated or callable respectively or else they are set to 0. All standard errors are
clustered at firm level to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. All
t-statistics are displayed in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance greater than 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
To study the impact of political connectedness, we use lobbing expenditure data
from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) which compiles data from lobbying
disclosure reports filed with Secretary of the Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR).
The data covers lobbying activity that took place from 1998 to 2010. Lobbying records are
matched with our dataset on the name and the broad industry classification of the firm.
Political connectedness is defined in two ways - a dummy variable d PoliticalConnection
equal to 1 if the financial firm has ever lobbied the government and 0 otherwise; and Total
Lobby Amount(log) as the natural logarithm of the amount of total lobbying expenditure




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 42: Political Connectedness and Debt Issuance
The following table displays the regression results of measures of bond issuance on political con-
nectedness and other firm characteristics during the period from 1998 to 2010 on a firm-quarter
panel dataset. The dependent variables are d Issue: a dummy variable set to 1 for a firm-quarter
observation if the firm issues a bond in the given quarter, and 0 otherwise; Total Issue Amount: is
the total bond issue amount for a given firm in a given quarter in log terms; Number Of Issues: is
the total number of bond issues for a given firm in a given quarter. Control variables, defined in
Appendix D.1 and included in the regression specification are 1 quarter lagged values of: log assets,
profitability, long-term debt to assets, market leverage, market-to-book, asset growth. Firm-type fixed
effects (FE) are included by defining a dummy variable d Firm-Type for each firm-type that is set
to 1 if a firm belongs to that firm-type or else it is set to 0. All standard errors are clustered at firm
level to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. All t-statistics are displayed in
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
To study the impact of political connectedness, we use lobbing expenditure data from the Center
for Responsive Politics (CRP) which compiles data from lobbying disclosure reports filed with Sec-
retary of the Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR). The data covers lobbying activity that took
place from 1998 to 2010. Lobbying records are matched with our dataset on the name and the
broad industry classification of the firm. Political connectedness is defined in two ways - a dummy
variable d PoliticalConnection equal to 1 if the financial firm has ever lobbied the government and
0 otherwise; and Total Lobby Amount(log) as the natural logarithm of the amount of total lobbying
expenditure since the year of data availability in 1998.
Pr(Issue) Tot. Issue Amount Num. Of Issues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d PoliticalConnection -0.10 -0.16 -0.02
(-1.36) (-0.76) (-0.25)
d PoliticalConnection×Lag1Q-Assets(log) 0.12** 0.70*** 0.33***
(2.51) (4.11) (3.53)
Total Lobby Amount(log) -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.52) (-0.74) (-0.18)
Total Lobby Amount(log)×Lag1Q-Assets(log) 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.03***
(2.58) (4.27) (3.41)
Lag Assets(log) 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.54*** 0.79*** 0.06** 0.17***
(7.45) (11.11) (6.23) (9.47) (2.18) (5.21)
ΣCoeff 0.37*** 1.24*** 0.38***
(9.95) (7.72) (4.40)
N 8366 8366 8366 8366 8366 8366
pseudo. R2 0.164 0.164
adj. R2 0.152 0.156 0.103 0.108
Year-Quarter FE X X X X X X
FirmType FE X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
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Table 43: Pricing of Tail Risk Around Crisis Periods
The following table displays the primary bond yield regressions with dependent variable
as bond yield minus closest benchmark treasury yield expressed in basis points on firm
tail-risk measures and other firm and bond characteristics during the crisis periods from
1990 to 2010. Our tail risk measures are defined as: ES: the negative of the average of the
firm’s daily returns on 5% worst return days during the calendar year for the firm; MES:
the negative of the average firm’s daily return on 5% worst return days of the market (S&P
500 instead of for the firm) during the calendar year; ES, MES are expressed in percentage
terms. Rating is generated by converting the bond ratings to a cardinal scale measured
on a 23 point scale for ratings issued by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch and then taking their
average for a given firm. The firms are categorized into 4 firm-types: Depositories (2-digit
SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers (4-digit SIC code=6211); Insurance (2-digit SIC code=60 &
64); Other (2-digit SIC code=61, 62(except 6211), 65, 67). Standard bond yield regression
controls which are defined in Appendix D.1 and included in the regression specification
are: log assets, profitability, long-term debt to assets, leverage, term spread, log issue size,
years to maturity. Firm-type fixed effects (FE) are included by defining a dummy variable
d Firm-Type for each firm-type that is set to 1 if a firm belongs to that firm-type or else
it is set to 0. Bond-type fixed effects are controlled by including d Agency, d Sub and
d Callable which are dummy variables set to 1 if the type of bond is an agency debt,
subordinated or callable respectively or else they are set to 0. All standard errors are
clustered at firm level to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. All
t-statistics are displayed in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance greater than 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
To study the impact of crisis periods, we construct bond issuance samples of all the
financial firms in a 2-year window around the crisis-period and divide the period into equal
pre- and post- crisis periods of four quarters each. Post-crisis dummies are defined in the
following manner: For bonds issued between the period 1997:Q4 and 1999:Q3, d LTCM
takes the value 1 for all bonds issued between the 1998:Q4 and 1999:Q3, and 0 otherwise.
For bonds issued between the period 1999:Q2 and 2001:Q1 , d Dotcom takes the value
1 for all bonds issued between 2000:Q2 and 2001:Q1, and 0 otherwise. For bonds issued
between the period 2007:Q4 and 2009:Q3, d F inCrisis takes the value 1 for all bonds
issued between 2008:4Q and 2009:Q3, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 43 (continued)
LTCM Dotcom Financial Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ES 27.57** 2.24 43.41***
(2.09) (0.31) (3.53)














d LTCM 70.28*** 86.66***
(2.77) (4.08)
d DotCom 47.77*** 40.31***
(3.81) (2.80)
d FinCrisis 175.59*** 230.37***
(2.80) (5.11)
ΣCoeff -5.59 -6.98 11.89 -24.13* -17.82 -55.95***
(-0.88) (-1.25) (1.17) (-1.69) (-0.71) (-2.86)
N 154 154 126 126 100 100
adj. R2 0.656 0.602 0.364 0.374 0.605 0.626
Year FE 7 7 7 7 7 7
FirmType FE X X X X X X
BondType FE X X X X X X
OtherControls X X X X X X
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Table 44: Credit Ratings and Tail Risk
The following table displays the ordered probit regressions with dependent variable as
rating scale on tail risk and other firm characteristics during the period from 1990 to 2010
separately for each firm-type. Credit ratings are converted into a cardinal scale starting
with 1 as AAA(Aaa), 2 as AA+(Aa1), 3 as AA(Aa2), and so on. Our tail risk measures are
defined as: ES: the negative of the average of the firm’s daily returns on 5% worst return
days during the calendar year for the firm; MES: the negative of the average firm’s daily
return on 5% worst return days of the market (S&P 500 instead of for the firm) during the
calendar year; ES, MES are expressed in percentage terms. The firms are categorized into
4 firm-types: Depositories (2-digit SIC code=60); Broker-Dealers (4-digit SIC code=6211);
Insurance (2-digit SIC code=60 & 64); Other (2-digit SIC code=61, 62(except 6211),
65, 67). Standard bond yield regression controls which are defined in Appendix D.1 and
included in the regression specification are: log assets, profitability, long-term debt to
assets, leverage, term spread, log issue size, years to maturity. Firm-type fixed effects
(FE) are included by defining a dummy variable d Firm-Type for each firm-type that is
set to 1 if a firm belongs to that firm-type or else it is set to 0. Bond-type fixed effects
are controlled by including d Agency, d Sub and d Callable which are dummy variables
set to 1 if the type of bond is an agency debt, subordinated or callable respectively or else
they are set to 0. Year fixed effects are included in the regressions. All standard errors are
clustered at firm level to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm. All
t-statistics are displayed in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance greater than 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
Panel A analyzes the effect of tail-risk on bond rating assignment by credit rating
agencies controlling for all our bond-level, firm-level and macroeconomic variables. Panel
B analyzes the incremental effect of tail-risk on subordinated bond rating assignment
controlling for all our bond-level, firm-level and macroeconomic variables.
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Table 44 (continued)
Panel A: Only Tail Risk
Depository Broker-Dealer Insurance Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ES 0.27*** 0.08 0.43*** 0.15***
(3.68) (0.37) (4.19) (2.93)
MES 0.21 -0.30 0.38*** 0.16**
(1.46) (-1.17) (3.31) (2.34)
N 470 470 228 228 269 269 906 906
Pseudo-R2 0.298 0.290 0.368 0.375 0.189 0.175 0.436 0.433
Year FE X X X X X X X X
BondType FE X X X X X X X X
OtherControls X X X X X X X X
Panel B: Tail Risk×Subordinated
Depository Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ES 0.33*** 0.18***
(3.77) (3.92)




d Sub×MES 0.09 0.09
(0.78) (0.78)
d Sub 1.10*** 1.05*** 0.30 0.39**
(7.89) (8.18) (1.49) (1.98)
ΣCoeff 0.16* 0.26* 0.04 0.20
(1.94) (1.82) (0.37) (1.54)
N 470 470 1403 1403
Pseudo-R2 0.301 0.290 0.376 0.371
Year FE X X X X
FirmType FE 7 7 X X
BondType FE X X X X
FirmControls X X X X
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APPENDIX A
MISCELLANEOUS SECTION FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Variable Definitions
This section provides the definitions of variables used in the paper’s analysis. The
mortgage loans used in this paper are all owner occupied, first lien, single family
homes from HMDA and BBx databases. County-level income and population data is
from the publicly available U.S. Census Bureau data. House prices are gathered from
Zillow.com.
The Loans in BBx and HMDA are matched exactly on four loan characteristics,
namely loan amount, loan purpose, occupancy type and lien type. Additionally loans
are matched on the geographic location of the property as shown in Figure A.1 .
• Number of Loans is computed as
∑N
i pi where pi is the probability of a matched
loan-pair from BBx and HMDA. N is the number of matched loan pairs in the
aggregation set (ex: firm-county-quarter level set). The definition of N and p
remain the same when defining the rest of the variables below.
• Volume of Loans is computed as
∑N
i pi × Ai where. Ai is the mortgage loan
amount of the matched pair (matching is exact on this dimension).
• Average Loan Amount is computed as the
(∑N





• Average Loan-to-Income Ratio is computed as the
(∑N





where LTIi is the loan-to-income ratio of the matched loan pair i available in
the HMDA dataset.
• Average Loan-to-Value Ratio is computed as the
(∑N






where LTVi is the loan-to-value ratio of the matched loan pair i available in the
BBx dataset.
• Average Borrower Income is computed as the
(∑N





where Incomei is the mortgage borrower’s Income corresponding to the matched
loan pair i available in the HMDA dataset.
• Average FICO Score is computed as the
(∑N





FICOi is the mortgage borrower’s FICO credit score corresponding to the
matched loan pair i available in the BBx dataset.







Ratei is the is the initial interest rate in percentage terms of the matched loan
pair i available in the BBx dataset.
• ARM Loans are adjustable rate mortgages.
• Complex Loans are defined as either Interest Only (IO), Hybrid ARM (HARM),
Pay-option ARM, or Negative Amortizing mortgages.
• Jumbo Loans are mortgages with loan amount greater than a particular loan
limit. The loan limits for 2004, 2005 and 2006 were $333,700, $359,650 and
$417,000 respectively.
• Loan-type are low-documentation loans, Alt-A loans, Subprime loans, ARM
loans, loans with pre-payment penalty, complex loans and jumbo loans. Loans
are classified based on BBx data.
• Loan-type (%) is computed as
(∑N




i=1 pi in percentage
terms where Iloan−type is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the loan is
of type=loan-type and 0 otherwise. For instance, the fraction of Alt-A loans is
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(∑N




i=1 pi where IAlt−A is an indicator function taking the
value of 1 if the loan is an Alt-A mortgage and 0 otherwise.
• Loan default is defined if any of the following conditions are true: (a) payments
on the loan are 60+ days late as defined by the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS); (b) the loan is in foreclosure; or (c) the loan is real estate owned (REO),
that is, the lending bank has retaken possession of the home.
• Default PercentageT is computed as
(∑N




i=1 pi in percentage
terms where IDef,T is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the loan has
defaulted within T periods after origination and 0 otherwise.
A.2 Supplemental Notes on Repo Financing and Bankruptcy
Code
1. “The Amended Repurchase Agreements increased the capacity of the Mortgage
Repurchase Facility from $500 million to $750 million, expanded the eligibility
of underlying mortgage loan collateral and modified certain other covenants
and terms. In addition, the Mortgage Repurchase Facility has been modified to
conform to the revised bankruptcy remoteness rules with regard to repurchase




2. “Our use of repurchase agreements to borrow money may give our lenders





3. “Our borrowings under repurchase agreements may qualify for special treat-
ment under the bankruptcy code, giving our lenders the ability to avoid the
automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code and to take possession of
and liquidate our collateral under the repurchase agreements without delay in




4. “Our repurchase facilities are dependent on our counterparties ability to resell
our obligations to third-party purchasers. There have been in the past, and in
the future there may be, disruptions in the repurchase market. If there is a
disruption of the repurchase market generally, or if one of our counterparties
is itself unable to access the repurchase market, our access to this source of




5. “Repurchase agreements are used instead of warehouse loans in part to qualify
for an exemption from the automatic stay provisions under Section 362(a)
of the federal Bankruptcy Code” – Wells Fargo responding as a Warehouse
Lender to a HUD solicitation of “Information on Changes in Warehouse
Lending and Other Loan Funding Mechanisms”.
Source: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HUD-2010-
0121-0008
6. “Since the adoption of the 2005-06 Bankruptcy Amendments, the Financing
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Documentation has significantly shifted towards the use of Repurchase Agree-
ments” – American Securitization Forum responding to a HUD solicitation




A.3 BBx and HMDA Matching Algorithm
The HMDA dataset contains information on whether a loan was sold to a secondary
market entity within the same calendar year as the origination year. This field allows
for breaking down the mortgages sold to GSE and non-GSE financial institutions.
The mortgages sold to non-GSE financial institutions are classified as (i) mortgages
sold for private securitization, (ii) mortgages sold to non-bank institutions such as
insurance companies, credit unions, mortgage banks or other finance companies, (iii)
mortgages sold to banking institutions which include commercial and savings banks
and (iv) mortgages sold to originating institution affiliates 1. Following [105]’s classi-
fication and [13] who show that ten of the largest issuers of MBS from securitization
belong to category (ii), categories (i) and (ii) are classified as mortgages most likely
sold for the purpose of securitization. Summary statistics for the filtered HMDA
dataset are shown in Table A.2 Panel A. Using the zip-code and census-tract cross-
walk file, this dataset is then matched to the BBx data based on four loan character-
istics: loan amount, loan purpose, occupancy type and lien type and the geography
of the property2. While the matching can be carried out exactly on the four loan
characteristics, matching on geography yields a probability related to the overlap of
1The HMDA reporting format and thereby the classification codes for mortgages sold changes in
2004. Different codes are used for pre- and post-2004 periods.
2The HMDA loan amount is rounded to the nearest thousand, but BBx contains the exact loan
amount. This leads to a coarse match on the loan amount. Moreover, while the data on the identity
of the loan originator is complete in the HMDA dataset, it is missing for about 90% of the BBx
data. This does not allow for matching on the loan originator.
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a HMDA census-tract region with the BBx zip-code region. Specifically, within the
subset of HMDA and BBx loans that have matched on the four loan characteristics,
let there be N census-tracts which overlap with the zip-code z of a matched BBx loan.
Let Kc,z be the number of matched loans in census-tract c which overlaps with the
zip-code z of a matched BBx loan, where c ∈ {1, 2, 3 . . . N}. The conditional proba-
bility3 of any one loan Li,c,z in census-tract c to be a match for the given HMDA loan





where P(Ac,z) is the proportion
of a census-tract region c that overlaps with a given zip-code region z based on the
number of housing units. Refer to Figure A.1 for a simple pictorial depiction of the
above matching algorithm. Summary statistics for the matched BBx-HMDA data is
shown in Table A.2 Panel B. The matching quality of both databases is compared
by plotting the Epanechnikov kernel densities in Figure A.2 and Figure A.3 across
various loan characteristics.
3I.e. conditional on matching exactly on the four loan-characteristics.
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Figure A.1: Databases Matching Exercise




P(L1,C2,Z) = P(L2,C2,Z) =
P(AC2,Z)/2
P(AC1,Z) + P(AC2,Z)
Where P(AC,Z) is the proportion of a census-tract region C that overlaps with a



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A of this table presents the summary statistics of the HMDA sample used for matching with
the BBx database. The HMDA dataset is first filtered to consist of mortgages (i) sold for private
securitization, (ii) sold to non-bank institutions such as insurance companies, credit unions, mortgage
banks or other finance companies. This subsample of loans sold to non-GSEs is further filtered to
contain only owner occupied, first lien, single family homes. Similarly, the BBx database is also
filtered to consist of owner occupied, first lien, single family homes. Panel B of this table presents
the matched BBx-HMDA dataset. The matching is carried exactly on four loan characteristics,
namely loan amount, loan purpose, occupancy type and lien type. Additionally, loans are matched
on the geographic location of the property as shown in Figure A.1. LTI stands for loan-to-income
ratio. LTV stands for loan-to-value ratio.
Panel A:Unmatched HMDA sample
CommBanks Thrifts CreditUnions AMC IMC
Tot Loan Number (1000s) 553.10 536.29 29.34 714.85 2597.68
Tot Loan Volume ($Bil) 116.40 127.33 4.55 184.59 584.74
Avg Loan Amount (1000s) 210.45 237.42 155.23 258.23 225.10
Avg Borrower Inc. (1000s) 86.56 94.49 70.72 102.33 89.68
Avg LTI Ratio (%) 2.65 2.68 2.40 2.70 2.68
Panel B:Matched BBx-HMDA sample
CommBanks Thrifts CreditUnions AMC IMC
Tot Loan Number (1000s) 339.04 396.19 8.97 716.09 1666.18
Tot Loan Volume ($Bil) 81.55 105.20 1.70 192.44 393.42
Avg Loan Amount (1000s) 240.54 265.53 189.19 268.74 236.12
Avg FICO 674.86 675.30 673.23 678.96 670.85
Avg LTV Ratio (%) 83.78 81.99 83.14 82.46 82.52
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics
Panel A of this table presents the summary statistics of the matched BBx-HMDA sample. The
headers of the columns indicate the number of HMDA matches for a given BBx loan. The matching
is carried exactly on four loan characteristics, namely loan amount, loan purpose, occupancy type
and lien type. Additionally, loans are matched on the geographic location of the property as shown
in Figure A.1.
Panel A: BBx Logic matching across years
Number of Matches (%)
Year BBx Unmatched (#) BBx Matched (%) One Two Three Four ≥ Five (%)
2004 879,377 74.70 36.72 21.38 13.02 8.24 20.64
2005 1,237,355 79.87 32.09 19.48 12.75 8.62 27.06
2006 989,129 78.63 35.49 20.41 12.66 8.35 23.09
Panel B: HMDA matching across years
Year IMCs (%) AMCs (%) Others (%)
2004 60.14 59.84 60.10
2005 63.97 73.20 66.27

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws
This table provides the data for anti-predatory lending laws for U.S. states gathered from [25]. The
numbers reported in this table are from the combined index based on the pre- and post-mini-HOEPA
laws that were in effect in 2004–2005. The table has been sorted based on the Enforcement measure.
StateName Enforcement Coverage Restriction
Arizona 0.00 0.00 0.00
Delaware 0.00 0.00 0.00
Louisiana 0.00 1.81 0.67
Minnesota 0.00 6.46 0.55
Montana 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Hampshire 0.00 0.00 0.00
North Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00
Oregon 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rhode Island 0.00 1.93 2.01
South Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tennessee 0.00 0.00 0.00
Washington 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wisconsin 0.00 0.00 0.00
Alaska 0.64 1.69 2.68
Iowa 0.64 1.93 2.68
Nebraska 0.64 1.93 0.00
Michigan 0.96 6.74 2.16
New York 1.76 2.15 1.91
West Virginia 1.76 5.60 1.64
Hawaii 1.92 0.85 0.67
Mississippi 1.92 1.93 0.67
Missouri 1.92 1.81 0.67
Vermont 1.92 1.57 2.68
Florida 2.10 0.00 1.64
Arkansas 2.11 3.66 4.07
Connecticut 2.11 2.67 3.25
Georgia 2.11 1.72 3.00
Pennsylvania 2.11 0.00 1.36
Texas 2.11 0.86 1.36
Illinois 2.46 3.74 1.91
Massachusetts 2.46 2.15 3.82
New Jersey 2.46 2.15 2.73
Alabama 2.57 1.57 2.68
Idaho 2.57 1.81 1.34
Kansas 2.57 1.93 2.68
Utah 2.57 3.54 4.87
Virginia 2.57 1.81 0.00
Wyoming 2.57 0.85 2.68
Nevada 2.81 0.00 0.00
California 3.33 4.09 2.03
North Carolina 3.33 3.42 4.61
District Of Columbia 3.39 5.67 3.25
Maryland 3.97 3.01 3.23
Colorado 4.03 1.88 4.32
Ohio 4.03 1.93 2.03
South Carolina 4.32 2.80 4.87
Indiana 4.39 3.23 4.34
Maine 4.39 1.57 3.23
Oklahoma 4.68 0.97 4.87
Kentucky 4.74 2.43 2.85
New Mexico 5.03 6.10 5.96
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Table A.6: Mortgage Credit Growth: Unique BBx-HMDA Matches
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the
2005 BAPCPA between IMCs and AMCs. The dataset is at the mortgage originating firm-county-
quarter level. The dataset is restricted to only unique matches where one BBx loan is matched to
one HMDa loan. The dependent and independent variables are the same as in the baseline regression
specifications in Table 2. All regressions include Firm FE and County×Quarter FE. T -statistics
displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.09*** 0.11*** -0.14*** 0.03**
(7.81) (11.57) (-8.04) (2.54)




ARM Loans(%) -0.23*** 0.13***
(-8.37) (10.85)
Alt-A Loans(%) 0.40*** -0.04***
(17.46) (-3.15)
Subprime Loans(%) 1.02*** -0.06***
(36.09) (-3.70)
LowDoc Loans(%) 0.19*** -0.10***
(13.16) (-12.26)
Firm FE X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X
N 96483 96483 79724 78787
Adj. R2 0.040 0.039 0.547 0.356
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Table A.7: Mortgage Credit Growth: Highest Probability Match
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the
2005 BAPCPA between IMCs and AMCs. The dataset is at the mortgage originating firm-county-
quarter level. The dataset is restricted only to the highest probability matched HMDA loan for a
given BBx loan. The dependent and independent variables are the same as in the baseline regression
specifications in Table 2. All regressions include Firm FE and County×Quarter FE. T -statistics
displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.10*** 0.11*** -0.09*** 0.05***
(12.65) (15.91) (-8.05) (6.07)




ARM Loans(%) 0.00 0.07***
(0.05) (9.05)
Alt-A Loans(%) 0.33*** -0.01
(19.42) (-1.55)
Subprime Loans(%) 0.86*** -0.03**
(42.73) (-2.46)
LowDoc Loans(%) 0.23*** -0.08***
(23.20) (-12.09)
Firm FE X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X
N 187227 187227 163798 161762
Adj. R2 0.068 0.074 0.593 0.379
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Table A.8: Mortgage Credit Growth: County-Quarter Level
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the 2005
BAPCPA between IMCs and AMCs. The dataset is at the mortgage originating county-quarter level.
The dependent and independent variables are the same as in the baseline regression specifications
in Table 2. Additionally, county-level population growth and per-capita income growth rates are
included as county-level controls. All regressions include County FE and Quarter FE. T -statistics
displayed in parentheses are robust and clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.08*** 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.05***
(7.92) (8.38) (-8.85) (5.65)
dIMC -0.13*** -0.13*** 0.16*** 0.00
(-17.83) (-20.91) (18.26) (0.69)
County-level Controls:
Population growth 1.41** 0.66 -0.00 0.73
(2.20) (1.21) (-0.00) (1.45)
PCI growth -0.24 -0.20 0.07 -0.44***
(-1.15) (-1.08) (0.29) (-2.75)
Competition growth -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.01
(-2.97) (-3.46) (0.20) (0.40)
Loan-mix Controls:




ARM Loans(%) 0.23*** 0.09***
(8.97) (5.82)
Alt-A Loans(%) 0.31*** -0.02
(8.91) (-1.08)
Subprime Loans(%) 0.74*** 0.01
(19.03) (0.44)
LowDoc Loans(%) 0.20*** -0.12***
(9.12) (-8.73)
County FE X X X X
Quarter FE X X X X
N 38356 38356 36508 36505
Adj. R2 0.112 0.145 0.726 0.463
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Table A.9: Mortgage Credit Growth Robustness: Alternate Specifications
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of loan origination before and after the
2005 BAPCPA using alternate specifications for the dependent variable and the event window.
The dataset is at the mortgage originating firm-county-quarter level. The dependent variables in
Panel A are the log of total volume of loans (Log LoanVol) and the log of total number of loans
(Log LoanNum) made by a mortgage originating firm in a given county and quarter. In Panel B
columns (1)–(2), dPostBAPCPA takes the value 1 for four quarters from 2005Q4 to 2006Q3 and
0 for four quarters from 2004Q4 to 2005Q3. In Panel B columns (3)–(4), dPostBAPCPA takes
the value 1 for eight quarters from 2005Q4 to 2007Q3 and 0 for eight quarters from 2003Q4 to
2005Q3. In Panel B columns (5)–(6), the placebo event window is a non-overlapping window with
the baseline regression event window in Table 2. For these specifications, dPostBAPCPA takes the
value 1 for six quarters from 2002Q4 to 2004Q1 and 0 for six quarters from 2001Q2 to 2002Q3. All
regressions include Firm FE, County×Quarter FE. T -statistics displayed in parentheses are robust
and clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and
1% respectively.
Panel A: Change in Levels (log)
Levels




Lagged Depvar 0.56*** 0.58***
(66.17) (67.41)
Firm FE X X
County×Quarter FE X X
N 295932 295932
Adj. R2 0.607 0.561
Panel B: Alternate Time Periods
4Q Before/After 8Q Before/After Placebo Test
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoansNum g LoanVol g LoansNum g LoanVol g LoansNum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dPostBAPCPA×dIMC 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.06*** -0.00 -0.01
(7.02) (8.26) (5.51) (7.01) (-0.19) (-0.96)
Firm FE X X X X X X
County×Quarter FE X X X X X X
N 217025 217025 334839 334839 104177 104177
Adj. R2 0.041 0.042 0.054 0.058 0.032 0.029
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Table A.10: Mortgage Credit Growth Robustness: Discontinuity in Growth of Number
and Volume of Loans
Panel A and B fit a non-parametric local linear polynomial using a triangular kernel within half
and twice the optimal bandwidth (OB) proposed by [28] respectively. The dependent variable in
both panels is either the growth in the number or volume of mortgage originations at each FICO
score from the pre- to post-BAPCPA period covering 2004Q2 to 2007Q1. The Indicator variable
dThreshold is equal to 1 if the FICO score is greater than 620 (580) for low (full) documentation
loans, and 0 otherwise. T -statistics displayed in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
greater than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Local linear polynomial fit within half the optimal bandwidth (0.5×OB)
Low-Doc Loans (FICO Threshold=620) Full-Doc Loans (FICO Threshold=580)
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum g LoanVol g LoanNum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d Threshold 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.07
(4.75) (6.25) (2.67) (1.29)
N 29 29 21 21
Panel B: Local linear polynomial fit within twice the optimal bandwidth (2×OB)
Low Doc Loans (FICO Threshold=620) Full Doc Loans (FICO Threshold=580)
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum g LoanVol g LoanNum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d Threshold 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.13***
(4.79) (6.52) (5.91) (4.31)
N 115 115 83 83
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Table A.11: Mortgage Credit Growth Robustness: Variation Across Counties with
APL laws
This table examines the changes in the broad measures of IMC loan origination before and after
the 2005 BAPCPA between counties bordering states with weak and strong anti-predatory lending
(APL) laws. The dataset is at the mortgage originating firm-county-quarter level. States are sorted
in ascending order based on the strength of the enforcement of APL laws presented in Table A.5.
States in the top and bottom half are classified as weak-APL states and strong-APL states respec-
tively. In panels A and B, neighboring counties are defined as counties within 30 miles and 50 miles
respectively across borders of states with weak and strong APL laws. In panel C all counties in
weak- and strong-APL states are included and no distance cut-off is used. The dummy variable
dWeakAPLCounty is equal to 1 if a county belongs to a weak-APL state and is 0 otherwise. The
dependent variable and rest of the control variables are the same as in Table 2. All regressions
include Firm FE, County, and Quarter FE. T -statistics displayed in parentheses are robust and
clustered at the County level. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
Panel A: Neighboring counties classified as within 50 miles
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dWeakAPLCounty 0.07*** 0.07*** -0.03 0.04**
(3.85) (3.95) (-1.03) (2.43)
Loan-mix Controls X X
Firm FE X X X X
County FE X X X X
Quarter FE X X X X
N 58004 58004 51810 51178
Adj. R2 0.035 0.037 0.569 0.341
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Table A.11 (continued)
Panel B: Neighboring counties classified as within 100 miles
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dWeakAPLCounty 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.00 0.00
(3.04) (3.31) (-0.21) (0.18)
Loan-mix Controls X X
Firm FE X X X X
County FE X X X X
Quarter FE X X X X
N 107849 107849 96397 95253
Adj. R2 0.031 0.033 0.560 0.309
Panel C: Variation across states
Depvar: g LoanVol g LoanNum AvgIntRate AvgLTI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dPostBAPCPA×dWeakAPLCounty 0.02* 0.02** 0.00 0.06***
(1.70) (2.20) (0.17) (4.93)
Loan-mix Controls X X
Firm FE X X X X
County FE X X X X
Quarter FE X X X X
N 241040 241040 217659 214742
Adj. R2 0.032 0.034 0.580 0.353
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APPENDIX B
MISCELLANEOUS SECTION FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Variable Definitions
B.1.1 Rating-level variables
• dCDS is an indicator variable equal to one if the rating change takes place when
the CDS trades on the underlying firm, and 0 otherwise.
• Previous Rating is the credit rating level prior to the rating change. It is
expressed as the natural logarithm of the cardinal rating scale; see Table B.1
for the mapping
• Abs Rating Change is the absolute value of the difference in rating scale change
between after and before rating change events.
• Days Since Last Rating is the natural logarithm of the number of days between
the previous rating change in the same direction for the same bond issue, but
by another rating agency. Following Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005), the number
of days is set to 60 (a) if both rating agencies rate on the same day, (b) if the
rating by the second rating agency is in the opposite direction,or (c) if the rating
change by the other rating agency is more than 60 days.
• Earnings Ann Related is an indicator variable equal to one if there is an earn-
ings announcement within (-1,+1) days of the rating change event day, and 0
otherwise.
• dDowngrade is an indicator variable equal to one if the bond experiences a
rating downgrade event, and 0 otherwise.
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B.1.2 Firm-level variables: Firm fundamentals
• Sales is the firm’s quarterly sales (saleq) reported in COMPUSTAT.
• Assets is the firms’ quarterly total assets (atq) reported in COMPUSTAT.
• Operating income is the quarterly operating income (oiadpq) reported in COM-
PUSTAT.
• Profitability is the firm’s quarterly ratio of Operating income to Sales.
• Total debt is the firm’s total debts (dlcq + dlttq) reported in the quarterly
COMPUSTAT.
• Leverage is the firm’s Total debt divided by its Assets.
• Market value of equity is the market value of equity calculated using the monthly
CRSP database, i.e. share price × total shares outstanding.
• Book value of equity is the book value of equity. It is the total assets minus
total liability plus tax credit (atq−ltq + txditcq) calculated using quarterly
COMPUSTAT.
• Mkt-to-Book is the monthly ratio of Market value of equity divided by the Book
value of equity.
• Avg Volatility is the monthly standard deviation of daily stock returns caculated
using data from CRSP.
• Avg Trading Volume is the monthly trading volume on the stock reported in
CRSP.
• Avg Return is the monthly stock return obtained from CRSP.
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B.1.3 Firm-level variables: CDS trading variables
• Analyst Coverage is the number of analyst EPS forecasts in the 90 days prior
to the earnings announcement date. (source: I/B/E/S)
• Analyst Dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst EPS estimates made
in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement date scaled by the actual
reported EPS. (source: I/B/E/S)
• Institutional Ownership is the ratio of total shares held by institutional investors
to the total shares outstanding for a given stock. (source: Thomson-Reuters
Institutional Holdings (13F) Database)
• Stock Illiquidity is the monthly average stock illiquidity defined as the squared
root of the [9] measure. It is the monthly average of the following daily values
where Rett and Pricet are daily return and price of the stock:√
1000000 ∗ |Rett|/ (Volume× Pricet).
• Bond Illiquidity is the number of outstanding bond issues in a given month (see
[115]).
• Debt Outstanding is a proxy for hedging demand. It is the residual from regress-
ing total amount of bond debt outstanding on the number of bond issues.This
variable measures the amount of bond debt outstanding for a firm that is lin-
early unrelated to the number of its bond issues.
• Forex Derivative Hedging is the average amount of foreign exchange derivatives
used for hedging purposes (i.e. non-trading purposes) relative to total assets of
the lead syndicate banks and bond underwriters that the firm has done business
with in the past five years. Banks’ derivatives usage data is obtained from Bank
Holding Company (BHC) Y9-C filings. Data on the firm’s lead bank syndicate is
obtained from LPC Dealscan, and the firm’s underwriter information is obtained
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from Mergent FISD.
B.1.4 CDS & Bond variables
• CDS Spread is the average monthly 5-year CDS spread from CMA and MARKIT
databases.
• Bond Yield is the trade-weighted average monthly bond yield calculated from
the TRACE database.
• CDS Spread Change is the logarithmic difference in average monthly 5-year
CDS spreads between the current and previous months.
• Bond Yield Change is the logarithmic difference in trade-weighted average bond
yields between the current month and previous months.
• CDS Slope is the difference between the monthly average 10-year CDS spreads
and the monthly average 1-year CDS spreads.
• CDS-implied Rating Class is the firm’s credit rating class, on the scale of 1 to
6, that is backed out non-parametrically using CDS spreads. See Section 2.5.1
for more details.
• Credit Rating Class is the credit rating level mapped to the rating class scale.
See Table C.2 for the mapping.
• Credit watch dummy indicates whether the firm (or bond issue) is put on credit
watch prior to a credit rating change. This monthly indicator variable takes
the value 1 from the month of the watch announcement to the month of the
rating change event or until “Off Watch” or “Not On Watch” is announced.
Only negative watches are considered for downgrades and only positive watches
were considered for upgrades. A credit watch announced 180 days or more prior
to when a firm is re-rated is not considered to be related to the rating change
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event. Credit watch data is obtained from Mergent FISD and Moody’s Default
Risk Database (MDRS).
• Market Cap is the monthly market value of equity.
• Market Leverage is defined as (Total debt + Market value of equity)/(Market
value of equity) calculated at a quarterly frequency.
• Long Term Debt-to-Asset is the ratio of long term debt to total assets (dlttq/atq)
calculated using quarterly COMPUSTAT.
• ERP is the firm’s annualized equity risk premium implied by the dynamic of
CDS term structure.
• Subordinate is an indicator variable equal to one if the bond is subordinated.
We obtain bond characteristics from Mergent FISD, CUSIP Master file, and
Moody’s Default Risk Database (MDRS).
• Callable is an indicator variable equal to one if the bond is callable or re-
deemable, and zero otherwise.
• Issue Size is the offering amount of the bond at primary issue.
• Maturity is the maturity of the bond in years.
• Treasury Slope (10yr-1yr) is the difference between the 10-year and 1-year Trea-
sury rates.
• Bond return is the raw bond return around the rating change event (t = 0)
calculated over the [−k,+k] event days as:
BondReturnt=0 =
BondPricet+k −BondPricet−k + AccruedInterest
BondPricet−k
.
We use the shortest event window possible depending on the availability of bond
trading history. The maximum window of k = 7 days is used, otherwise bond
event-period return is not computed.
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• Daily bond index is the weighted (equal or value) index of bond returns grouped
according to Moody’s six major rating categories.
B.1.5 Bankruptcy & Distress regression variables
• Bankruptcy is defined as when the firm experiences a credit default event as
defined in Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database (Moody’s URD).
• Net Income-to-Assets is the ratio of net income to total assets (niq/atq) ob-
tained from quarterly COMPUSTAT.
• Total Liabilities-to-Assets is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (ltq/atq)
obtained from quarterly COMPUSTAT.
• Relative Size is the logarithmic of the firm’s market value of equity divided by
the total NYSE/AMEX market equity value. It is calculated monthly using
data from CRSP.
• Excess Return is the monthly return on the firm minus the value-weighted
NYSE/AMEX index return.
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Table B.1: Classification of credit rating codes
The table presents the mapping of rating codes issued by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s to the cardinal
scale, as well as to the rating class. The rating codes used by S&P and Fitch are similar but are
different from those used by Moody’s. Moody’s uses code from Aaa down to C to rate bonds whereas
S&P and Fitch rate bonds from AAA down to D. Within the 6 classes from AA to CCC for S&P and
Fitch, the rating agencies have three additional gradations with modifiers (+,none,-). For examples,
S&P’s AA rating class is subdivided into AA+, AA, AA-. Similarly, Moody’s has three additional
gradations with modifiers 1,2,3 from Aaa to Caa. We transformed the credit ratings of the three
rating agencies into a cardinal scale starting with 1 as AAA(Aaa), 2 as AA+(Aa1), 3 as AA(Aa2),
and so on until 23 as the default category. The rating class mapping is from [91]. Fitch differs
from the other two agencies in that it provides three ratings for default. We follow [90] by using 23
instead of 22 as the cardinal scale for Fitch’s default category, which is the average of three default
ratings – i.e., DD.
Description S&P Moody’s Fitch Cardinal scale Rating class
Investment grade
Highest grade AAA Aaa AAA 1 1
High grade AA (+,none,-) Aa (1,2,3) AA (+,none,-) 2, 3, 4 1
Upper-medium grade A (+,none,-) A (1,2,3) A (+,none,-) 5, 6, 7 2
Medium grade BBB (+,none,-) Baa (1,2,3) BBB (+,none,-) 8, 9, 10 3
Speculative grade
Lower medium grade BB (+,none,-) Ba (1,2,3) BB (+,none,-) 11, 12, 13 4
Speculative B (+,none,-) B (1,2,3) B (+,none,-) 14, 15, 16 5
Poor standing CCC (+,none,-) Caa (1,2,3) CCC (+,none,-) 17, 18, 19 6
Highly speculative CC Ca CC 20 6
Lowest quality C C C 21 6
In default D DDD/DD/D 23 6
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Table B.2: Probit model for CDS trading: First-stage IV model
We report probit regression results for the probability of CDS trading. The dependent variable is
the firm-quarter indicator variable that is equal one if CDS contract trades on the underlying firm’s
debt in this quarter, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables include firm-level characteristics,
CDS-trading controls, and the instrument variable proxying for the probability of CDS trading. The
instrumental variable (IV) that we use is Forex Derivative Hedging (see also [132]). It is defined as
the average amount of foreign exchange derivatives used for hedging purposes relative to total assets
of the lead syndicate banks and bond underwriters that firms have done business with in the past
five years. We obtain data on firm’s lead syndicate bank and underwriters from Dealscan and FISD,
respectively. See Appendix B for description of other variables. Industry and year fixed-effects are
included. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
Probability of CDS trading
Instrumental variable











Rating Scale (log) -0.30***
(-6.01)
Avg Volatility (log) -0.05
(-1.58)















Debt Outstanding (log) 0.40***
(20.15)
Observations 17850
Incremental Pseudo R2 1.1%
Pseudo R2 0.4854
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Table B.3: The propensity score matched sample
This table presents matched sample diagnostics. Panel A shows the probit model used in the
propensity score matching. We estimate firms’ probability of having CDS trading in each month. The
dependent variable in the probit model is the firm-month indicator that is equal one if CDS contract
trades on the underlying firm’s debt this month, and zero otherwise. All independent variables are
lagged by one month. The first column in Panel A (Before matching) reports results estimated using
the full sample for which data are available. The second column in Panel A (After matching) reports
results estimated using the CDS-traded and propensity-score matched firms. Firms for which CDS
contracts trade at any point in our sample period (1996-2010) are identified as the treatment group,
i.e. traded-CDS firms. Firms in the control group used in the matching are those in the full sample
that never have CDS contracts traded at any point in our sample period , i.e. non-traded-CDS firms.
Each traded-CDS firm (treatment firm) is matched with up to five non-traded-CDS firms (control
firms) based on their propensity scores of having CDS trading. Industry and year fixed effects are
included in the regressions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical confidence greater than 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively. Panel B reports pairwise comparisons of the variables used for matching for
the CDS treatment firms, and the matched control firms. Panel C reports industry distributions
(Fama-French 12 classification) for the CDS treatment firms, and the matched control firms.
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Table B.3 (continued)
Panel A: Propensity score matched sample
Before matching After matching








Rating Scale(log) -0.33*** -0.36**
(-11.20) (-2.47)
Avg Return 0.05 1.07**
(0.74) (2.41)
Avg Volatility (log) -0.05** 0.05
(-2.52) (0.42)
Avg Trading Volume (log) 0.08*** 0.00
(7.71) (0.05)
Analyst Coverage (log) -0.03** -0.05**
(-2.37) (-1.96)
Analyst Dispersion 0.00*** 0.00
(4.49) (0.88)
Institutional Ownership 0.38*** 0.13
(13.87) (0.82)
Stock Illiquidity -3.14*** -1.42
(-7.99) (-0.43)
Bond Illiquidity 0.64*** 0.21***
(60.12) (3.07)
Debt Outstanding (log) 0.38*** 0.29***
(37.11) (3.36)
Observations 59539 1025
Pseudo R2 0.49 0.09
244
Table B.3 (continued)
Panel B: Sample means of firm variables used in the propensity-score matching
Before matching After matching
Mean (Diff) Mean (Diff)
Treated Control T-stats Treated Control T-stats
Sales (log) 7.75 6.70 151.98 7.22 6.79 6.15
Profitability 0.14 0.15 -8.70 0.16 0.15 0.48
Leverage 0.68 0.69 -8.04 0.68 0.70 -1.77
Mkt-to-Book 2.80 2.47 15.31 2.65 2.62 0.12
Rating Scale 8.41 9.63 -59.39 8.44 9.60 -2.28
Avg Return 0.01 0.01 -1.76 0.02 0.00 1.79
Avg Volatility (log) -4.00 -3.95 -14.74 -4.02 -4.00 -0.61
Avg Trading Volume (log) -0.83 -1.70 107.21 -1.32 -1.46 1.19
Analyst Coverage (log) 2.11 1.86 54.82 1.94 1.81 2.67
Analyst Dispersion 5.59 5.31 1.36 7.09 5.41 0.73
Institutional Ownership 4.27 4.25 10.41 4.25 4.27 -0.98
Stock Illiquidity 0.02 0.03 -64.73 0.02 0.03 -1.92
Bond Illiquidity 2.02 1.46 103.92 1.74 1.59 2.56
Debt Outstanding (log) 0.38 -0.21 96.95 0.20 -0.11 2.99
Panel C: Industry distribution of firms in the matched sample
FamaFrench 12 Industry Classifications Treatment Sample (%) Control Sample (%)
(1) Consumer Non-durables 7.34 5.44
(2) Consumer Durables 2.10 2.51
(3) Manufacturing 13.29 13.81
(4) Energy, Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction 6.64 5.86
(5) Chemicals and Allied Products 4.55 5.44
(6) Business Equipment 6.99 6.69
(7) Telecommunciations 5.59 5.02
(8) Utilities 9.44 8.37
(9) Wholesale, Retail, and Services 10.14 7.11
(10) Healthcare 4.55 5.86
(11) Finance 19.58 22.18
(12) Others 9.79 11.72
245
B.1.6 Descriptives of the credit rating change sample
Panel A of Table B.4 summarizes the number of upgrades and downgrades along with
the size of their rating changes over each year. There are about 2.1 downgrades for
every upgrade, which is more or less consistent with previous studies.1 We observe
clustering of upgrades and downgrades in certain years over the 15-year period, and
we find that 42% of all downgrades occurred in 2001-2002 and 2007-2009, which corre-
spond to the post-Internet bubble and the recent financial crisis periods, respectively.
On the other hand, 39% of all upgrades occurred in pre-Internet bubble period, i.e.
1997-1998, and when the market volatility level is historically low, i.e. 2006-2007, as
measured by the VIX index. The size of the rating change is the absolute value of
the change in the rating scale. The average size of the rating change does not vary
significantly over the years. There are 1416 downgrades and 689 upgrades during the
period when the underlying firms have CDS contracts traded. On the other hand,
there are 3249 downgrades and 1482 upgrades during the period when the underlying
firms do not have CDS contracts traded. For downgrades (upgrades), the mean size
of the absolute rating change for an issue without CDS trading is 1.69 (1.38), and
for an issue with CDS trading, it is 1.55 (1.27). Table B.4 shows that the start dates
of CDS trading in our sample begin in 2001, when we observe only 12 downgrades
on firms that have CDS contracts traded. Nevertheless, the number of firms that
have CDS contracts traded increases significantly in subsequent years. In fact, Panel
A shows that the numbers of downgrades on firms with and without CDS contracts
traded are roughly comparable after 2005.
In order to control for the differences between these two types of firms, we consider
a subsample of firms for which CDS starts trading at some point during our sample
1Our number is closer to that of [47], who report twice as many downgrades as upgrades over
their sample period of 1970 to 1987. In contrast, [90] report 4 downgrades for every upgrade from
1998 to 2002.
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period. We refer to this sample as the “Traded-CDS”. Panel B of Table B.4 reports
the sample size of traded-CDS sample. The average size of rating change for the
sample is 1.45 before CDS trading starts and 1.49 after CDS trading starts.
Table B.5 presents the distribution of the absolute magnitude of rating changes
for the pre- and post-CDS trading periods. Panel A reports the distribution year by
year, while Panel B reports absolute rating changes for “within-letter-grade”, “across-
letter-grade”, and “across-investment” rating changes. A rating change is defined as
“within-letter-grade” if it is within the same alphabet letter (e.g., A+, A, A-). All
other rating changes are classified as “across-letter-grade”. Among the across-letter-
grade changes, those that change between investment grade to speculative grade,
and vice versa, are considered “ across-investment” grade changes. Table B.1 in the
appendix summarizes rating categories that belong to the investment and speculative
grades.
B.1.7 Other robustness tests for stock price reactions to rating changes
The abnormal returns of firms around credit rating events could be affected due to
factors which are unrelated to the rating event. In this case, the CARs would not
average out to zero in the cross-section. This problem can be alleviated by using





, where σ(ARi) is the standard deviation of the one-period mean abnormal
return, and the factor of
√
3 accounts for the length of the event window (-1,+1), which
is equal to 3 days. We carry out all the univariate analysis, the regression analysis,
and the matched sample analysis using SCAR instead of CAR as a measurement of
abnormal returns and obtain the same conclusions.
In order to rule out the possibility that our results are due to outliers, we winsorize
each of the CAR and SCAR specifications at the 1% level. We also test for the
difference in the mean of stock price reactions between the pre- and post-CDS groups
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using bootstrapped standard errors. In both cases, we find that the results do not
change qualitatively. In addition, we conduct various other subsample analyses based
on credit rating agencies, industry type, across-investment-grade rating change, and
we find that our results are robust.
We verify that our main conclusion holds for rating changes that are within-
investment-grade, as well as those that are across investment grade. Using only
traded-CDS firms, we find that stock price reactions to rating downgrades in the pre-
CDS-trading period is -1.72% for “within investment grade” rating changes, while it
is -9.13% for “across investment grade” rating changes. However, in the post-CDS-
trading period, we find that stock price reactions to rating downgrades is -0.84% and
-2.86% for “within investment grade” and “across investment grade” rating changes,
respectively. In both cases we find the difference in CAR(-1,1) to be positive and
statistically different from zero. The difference in CARs between the pre-CDS-trading
and post-CDS-trading periods for “within investment grade” rating change is 0.88%
with a t-statistic of 1.82, while the for “across investment grade” rating change is
6.28% with a t-statistic of 3.60.
Apart from the instrumental variable analysis and the matched sample analysis
described in Sections 2.4.4–2.4.5, we apply a “placebo test” test to further rule out
a concern that our results are related to changes in certain market conditions over
time — e.g., changes in volatility. To do this, we first generate random pseudo
CDS introduction dates. Then we apply the standard event study methodology to
these randomly generated pre- and post-CDS periods. We find that the difference
in the stock price reactions between these pseudo pre- and post-CDS periods is not
significantly different from 0. Overall, using a host of robustness tests, we confirm
that the abnormal stock return around credit rating downgrades is muted after CDS
contracts trade on the underlying firm’s debt.
248
B.1.8 Bond price reactions to rating changes
We examine the impact of the CDS market on corporate bond pricing as a channel
through which CDS trading attenuates firms’ equity price reactions to credit rating
downgrades. The basic idea in the cost of capital calculation is that the market
value of the firm’s assets must equal the market value of the firm’s debt plus the
market value of the firm’s equity. Any impacts on the firm’s debt value can affect its
equity return through changes in the firm’s total assets. We examine whether bond
prices also react less to credit rating downgrade announcements when firms have CDS
trading on their debt.
Similar to our analyses for stock returns, we consider a rating change event on a
debt’s issuer as one observation. We calculate the daily bond price using the trade-
weighted average of all the prices reported during that day (see also [17]). In a
number of cases, there are multiple bond issues per issuer. These multiple issues
usually experience rating changes on the same day. In order to avoid double counting
events, we study the return of a weighted bond portfolio (equal or value weighted) for
each firm. We construct both the equal- and value-weighted portfolios using all the
issues written on a firm, and we find that the results are not qualitatively affected by
the weighting methods. To save space, we present only the results that are based on
the value-weighted portfolios.
Unlike the stock sample analysis, bond trading is relatively thin. For instance,
based on the filtered sample in 2006–2007, we find that each bond issue, on average,
trades on only 30 days per year. Conditional on the day that we observe trades, there
are approximately 3.48 trades per day. To compute abnormal bond returns, we follow
the method advocated in [17] by differencing the raw returns with the benchmark of
indices. We match returns to six benchmark indices based on Moody’s six major
rating categories (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, and B), and the equivalent S&P and Fitch
rating categories (See the mapping in Appendix Table B.1). Matching further on
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additional dimensions yields an inadequately small sample because the majority of
bonds do not trade daily. We construct daily bond return indices based on the above
six rating categories. For each rating category, we calculate the daily index return
using all of the bonds rated in that category. We exclude bonds that are re-rated
on the day the index is constructed. Since few bonds trade on a daily basis, the
composition of the index changes daily. As suggested by [17], the bond index return
is computed using the value-weighted average to reflect the daily change in index
composition.
The cumulative bond return is first calculated at the issue level using transaction
prices observed immidately before and after the event day. Because bonds do not
often trade daily, the closest observations to the event day may be several days away.
We pick the closest pre-event and post-event bond trades around the event day (Day
0) in the (-7,+7) event window. If we do not observe bond trades within (-7,+7) days
relative to the event date, the rating change observation is excluded. On average,
the closest transaction prices are observed on event-days -2.7 and +2.4 relative to
the event date.2 The cumulative abnormal return for the bond price is calculated
by subtracting the cumulative bond return with the cumulative bond index return
over the same window period. Finally, the bond market reaction to a rating change
event for a firm is calculated as the value-weighted average returns of all of the issues
traded around the event date.
Appendix Table B.10 displays the number of upgrades and downgrades and the
sizes of rating changes per year in the bond sample. There are about twice the
downgrades for every upgrade in the bond event-study sample, which is similar to
the stock sample (Table B.10). Relative to the stock sample, we find significantly
fewer rating events. This is because TRACE and NAICS databases had limited bond
2Sampling over smaller event windows such as (-3,+3) and (-5,+5) lead to a very small sample of
unique firms. On the other hand, extending the sampling window – e.g., (-15,+15) would increase
the bias due to confounding information arrivals (see [138], and [53]).
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coverage during the early years. We rely on NAICS bond database before 2002, which
reports only bond trades executed by national insurance companies. For TRACE, it
was not until March 2003 that it began to cover all the bonds with an issue size of at
least $100 million that were rated “A” or higher. Nevertheless, in subsequent years,
the coverage has steadily increased. The Traded-CDS sample for bonds is constructed
in the same manner as for the stocks. Panel B of Table B.10 shows a large reduction
in the number of observations from the Full sample to the Traded-CDS sample. The
number of unique firms in the Traded-CDS sample is only 123 (as opposed to 672
unique firms for the full sample) Therefore, we rely mainly on the Full sample when
interpreting the results.
Table B.11 reports the mean bond cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the pre-
and post-CDS trading periods. The results in Panel A are based on the full sample.
Consistent with prior literature ([77]), we find that bond prices react significantly to
downgrades (-2.39%) but little to upgrades (0.0%). We find that average bond price
reactions to rating upgrades in the post-CDS period is negative, but not significant.
Panel A shows the mean of bond CARs to downgrades are negative and significant
at the 1% level for both pre-CDS and post-CDS periods. However, the magnitude
of bond price reaction is significantly weaker in the post-CDS period. The mean
CARs for the pre- and post-CDS cases are -3.37% and -1.44%, respectively, and their
difference is significant at the 1% level. To rule out concerns that our results are
due to outliers, we verify that the difference in the means of bond CARs to rating
downgrades is statistically significant using the bootstrapped standard error. As for
upgrades, the difference between bond price reactions in the pre- and post-CDS cases
is not significant. This set of results is consistent with our findings on stock price
reactions to rating change announcements.
Panel B of Table B.11 displays results for the Traded-CDS sample, which repre-
sents firms that have CDS traded at some point during 1996–2010. Again, we find
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that the overall bond price reaction to downgrades is negative (-1.94%) and signif-
icant at the 1% level. Consistent with our hypothesis, the magnitude of the bond
price reaction is weaker in the post-CDS period (-1.61%) than in the pre-CDS period
(-2.61%), although not significant. The fall in statistical power is likely due to the
small sample size. Also, most of the post-CDS downgrades for the bond sample occur
during the crisis, i.e. 2007-2009, which could systematically amplify the magnitude
of bond price reaction to rating downgrade announcements.
B.1.9 Primary market bond yields
This section tests whether CDS spreads are useful relative to credit ratings in explain-
ing the primary market bond yields. Table B.9 reports the cross-sectional regression
results where the dependent variables are corporate bond yields, in basis points,
observed at their primary bond issuance. We report results for four regression speci-
fications. We include rating-level, firm-level, and bond-issuance-level controls in the
regressions. Where appropriate, the control variables are lagged by one period. In-
dustry, year, and rating agency fixed-effects are also included. Appendix B describes
the control variables. We use lagged CDS quotes that are traded immediately prior
to the bond issuance in order to avoid the endogeneity concern that bond yields and
CDS spreads are jointly determined.
In regression models (I) and (II), we compare the relative explanatory power of
Credit Rating and CDS Spread to explain the cross section of primary market bond
yields. Credit Rating is expressed on the cardinal scale (see Table B.1 for mapping),
and CDS Spread is expressed in basis points. The coefficient on Credit Rating in
regression model (I) is 17.18 and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that
credit ratings are useful for explaining the cross-section of newly issued bond yields.
However, we find that once CDS Spread is introduced as a variable in the regression
(see regression model (II)), the size of coefficient on Credit Rating decreases by a
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third to 6.18. We also find a substantial increase in adjusted R2 when CDS Spread
is added to the list of explantory variables —from 58.3 to 71.5 percent. We conclude
that CDS spreads significantly help explain the cross-sectional variations in primary
market bond yields in addition to credit ratings.
Because the Credit Rating variable is discrete while the CDS Spread is a con-
tinuous variable, we facilitate their comparison by expressing them as credit rating
classes, which range from 1 to 6. The mapping between credit rating scales to credit
rating classes is shown in Table B.1. For CDS spreads, we use the CDS-implied rating
classes calculated non-parametrically in Section 2.5.1. Regression models (III) and
(IV) in Table B.9 report results where both CDS spreads and credit ratings are con-
verted to the same unit of measurement, i.e., credit rating classes. We find that the
results remain qualitatively similar when using rating classes to define credit ratings
and CDS spreads. There is a substantial increase in adjusted R2 when CDS-implied
rating class is added to the list of explantory variables – from 57.9 percent in re-
gression model (III) to 71.1 percent in regression model (IV). Overall, we find that
CDS spreads provide incremental information for the pricing of primary market bond
issuance.
B.1.10 CDS-implied equity risk premia
This Appendix section describes how we empirically estimate the equity risk pre-
mia implied from CDS spreads as shown in equation (22) of the main paper. For
convenience, we replicate the equation below
ERP Tt+τ ≡ −






The equation above shows that calculating implied equity premium requires evaluat-
ing the Q- and P-measure expectations of future T -year CDS spreads. The expected
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Relying on the established approach in [38] who estimated bond risk premia using
the term structure of forward rates, [62] suggest that CDS Sharpe ratio in equation
(26) can be estimated from the term structure of forward CDS spreads for contracts











where SDt+τ refers to the sample standard deviation of daily CDS spread returns
between t and t + τ. The above method yields time-series of CDS Sharpe ratio esti-
mated from daily cross-maturity CDS spreads and CDS forward spreads. In order to
extract the common component similar to that in [38], we regress daily time-series
of SRt+τ on Ft =
(








, a vector of one-year CDS spread and
one-year CDS forward spreads that start in 1, 3, 5, and 7 years. That is, we estimate
SRt+τ = γ
′ · Ft + εt+τ . (27)
The fitted value of the estimated Sharpe ratio is then used for the implied equity
premium calculation, which according to equation (22), is given by
ÊRP t+τ = −γ̂ · Ftσ̂E,t,τ , (28)
where σ̂E,t,τ denotes the time-t conditional equity volatility estimated as the sample
standard deviation of daily equity returns from t− τ to t.
For our empirical analysis, we estimate one-year CDS-implied equity risk premium
in equation (28) on a daily basis for each firm in the sample. We use a one-year
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estimation window in the regression model (27) to obtain ÊRP t+τ with τ equal to
one year. In order for firms to be eligible for the ÊRP t+τ calculation, it must have
sufficient data on CDS quotes at maturities 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years.
Table B.12 reports results from constructing monthly portfolio sorts based on
CDS-implied equity risk premia (ERP). In Panel A, we report the mean characteristics
of quintile sorted portfolios that are formed monthly based on ERP. The means of
portfolio characteristics are calculated using equal weights. Because the start dates
of CDS trading differ across firms, the number of firms available in monthly cross-
sections also varies, but mostly increase from 2001 through 2010. On average, there
are 72 firms available for quintile portfolio sorting each month. Panel A of Table B.12
shows no monotonic pattern in portfolio characteristics sorted based on CDS-implied
equity premia. The equity risk premia estimated from CDS spreads are not related to
firms’ size or market-to-book values. We also do not find that ERP is monotonically
explained by firms’ cross-sections of credit ratings, as well as CDS spread levels.
Panel B of Table B.12 reports average one-year return of five portfolios sorted
monthly based on ERP, credit ratings, and CDS spreads. We assign equal weight
to firms in each porfoltio. We find a clear and distinct monotonic pattern in equity
returns across the five portfolios. Firms with higher equity risk premia implied by
their CDS spreads earn higher returns, consistent with the prediction of structural
models, e.g. [104]. The difference in one-year average returns between the highest
(5) and lowest (1) ERP portfolios is economically large, with the magnitude of about
24% per year. The t-statistic associated with this magnitude is 13.0, suggesting an
overwhelmingly strong statistical significance. [62] find the difference between the
highest and lowest portfolios sorted by one-month ERP is about 1.51% per month
after the risk-free rate (i.e., 18.12% per year). Thus, our results are roughly in line
with theirs.
Panel B also shows that average one-year returns of portfolios sorted monthly
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based on credit ratings and CDS spreads do not monotonically explain the cross-
section of equity returns. The finding is similarly weaker when we sort portfolios
based on the level of CDS spreads alone. We do not find any significant difference in
one-year portfolio returns between the highest (5) and lowest (1) CDS spread firms.
Overall, Panel B shows that ERP estimated from CDS term structures are informative
of equity returns, while the level of CDS spreads alone are not. Further, the findings
suggest that ratings issued by credit rating agencies are not a good measure of default
risk premium, and hence cannot explain cross-section of equity returns equally well
relative to the ERP estimated from CDS spreads.
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Table B.4: Distribution of bond rating changes
The sample consists of 4,665 downgrades and 2,171 upgrades of taxable corporate bonds issued by
U.S. firms from January 1996 to December 2010. The sample is split between rating changes that
occur in the presence of CDS trading (post-CDS period) and in the absence of CDS trading (pre-
CDS period) on the underlying firm’s debts. Panel A reports year-by-year distribution of rating
changes. Count represents the number of rating changes. Size represents the mean of the cardinal
value of the new rating minus the cardinal value of the old rating. Bond ratings are converted to
a cardinal scale measured on a 23-point scale (see Appendix A for the mapping). Panel B reports
the number of rating changes and the average sizes of rating changes for the “Full Sample” and the
“Traded-CDS”. The full sample represents the entire sample period consisting of firms that have
and do not have CDS traded on their debts. Traded-CDS sample consists only of firms that have
CDS trading at any point in our sample period, i.e from 1996 to 2010.
Panel A: Distribution of number and size of bond rating changes by year
Downgrades Upgrades
Year Pre-CDS Post-CDS Pre-CDS Post-CDS
Count Size Count Size Count Size Count Size
1996 16 1.31 31 1.23
1997 149 1.39 206 1.35
1998 251 1.65 195 1.52
1999 310 1.63 147 1.23
2000 428 1.73 128 1.34
2001 556 1.92 12 1.25 99 1.42
2002 510 1.74 72 1.25 66 1.45 4 1.00
2003 226 1.76 109 1.25 85 1.47 20 1.05
2004 131 1.63 108 1.31 97 1.33 73 1.25
2005 110 1.49 128 1.59 71 1.76 95 1.25
2006 98 1.23 170 1.60 95 1.22 132 1.17
2007 101 1.60 181 1.56 81 1.26 134 1.22
2008 112 1.56 290 1.62 58 1.24 77 1.31
2009 178 1.70 258 1.83 35 1.57 43 1.81
2010 73 1.42 88 1.27 88 1.38 111 1.28
Total 3249 1.69 1416 1.55 1482 1.38 689 1.27
Panel B: Distribution of number and size of bond rating changes by sub-sample
Downgrades Upgrades
Sample Pre-CDS Post-CDS Pre-CDS Post-CDS
Count Size Count Size Count Size Count Size
Full sample 3249 1.69 1416 1.55 1482 1.38 689 1.27
Traded-CDS sample 803 1.45 1029 1.49 300 1.22 574 1.29
257
Table B.5: Sample distribution by magnitude of rating changes
The sample consists of 4,665 downgrades and 2,171 upgrades of taxable corporate bonds issued by
U.S. firms from January 1996 to December 2010. The sample is split between rating changes that
occur in the presence of CDS trading (post-CDS period) and in the absence of CDS trading (pre-CDS
period) on the underlying firm’s debts. In Panel A, Freq represents the number of rating changes.
Bond ratings are converted to a cardinal scale measured on a 23-point scale. Scale change represents
the absolute change, in cardinal value, of the new rating minus the old rating. Pct represents the
percentage of rating changes observed in each scale change group. Panel B reports the distribution
of rating changes for three rating-change classifications. A rating change is classified as “Within
letter grade” if it is within the same letter group (e.g., A+, A, A-). All other rating change events
are classified as “Across letter grade” as their change is from one letter group to a different letter
group. We classify a rating change as“Across Inv Grade” if the change is from an investment grade
to a speculative grade or vice-versa. Investment grade rating for S&P and Fitch corresponds to
rating levels of BBB and above. Investment-grade rating for Moody’s corresponds to rating levels
of Baa and above.
Panel A: Sample distribution by absolute magnitude of rating changes
Downgrades Upgrades
Scale change Pre-CDS Post-CDS Pre-CDS Post-CDS
Freq Pct(%) Freq Pct(%) Freq Pct(%) Freq Pct(%)
1 1945 59.86 979 69.14 1168 78.81 557 80.84
2 802 24.68 272 19.21 206 13.90 102 14.80
3 299 9.20 82 5.79 56 3.78 19 2.76
4 106 3.26 39 2.75 26 1.75 4 0.58
5 42 1.29 22 1.55 7 0.47 5 0.73
6 20 0.62 10 0.71 5 0.34
7 15 0.46 7 0.49 5 0.34
8 10 0.31 2 0.14 1 0.07 2 0.29
9 5 0.15 2 0.13
10 3 0.09 1 0.07
11 2 0.06 2 0.14 3 0.20
12 1 0.07
14 1 0.07 1 0.07
Total 3249 100.00 1416 100.00 1482 100.00 689 100.00
Panel B: Sample distribution within and across rating
Downgrades Upgrades
Pre-CDS Post-CDS Pre-CDS Post-CDS
Freq Pct(%) Freq Pct(%) Freq Pct(%) Freq Pct(%)
Within letter grade 1714 52.75 655 46.26 592 39.95 258 37.45
Across letter grade 1535 47.25 761 53.74 890 60.05 431 62.55
Across Inv grade 367 11.30 206 14.55 167 11.27 79 11.47
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Table B.6: Stock price reactions to bond rating changes: Robustness I
This table reports regression results of stock price reactions to bond rating changes. The sample
consists of credit rating change events on taxable corporate bonds issued by U.S. firms from January
1996 to December 2010. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) calculated
over the 3-day event window (-1,+1) using the market model. Panel A consists of the full sample and
includes Industry×Year fixed effects to control for time-varying industry-level fixed effects. Panel
B consists of only non-financial firms. All the variables are defined in B.1. dCDS is an indicator
variable equal to one when the firm has CDS contracts traded on its debt, and zero otherwise.
Coefficients on other controls have been omitted to conserve space. Robust t-statistics are clustered
at the firm-level and reported in brackets below each estimate. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
Panel A: Time-varying industry-level FE
Downgrades Upgrades




Rating controls X X
Firm controls X X
CDS-trading controls X X
Fixed effects Ind×Year Ind×Year
Observations 4176 1972






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B: Pooled Downgrades & Upgrades
Full sample Traded-CDS
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
dCDS×dDowngrade 1.61*** 1.65*** 1.48** 1.38*
(2.70) (2.81) (2.56) (1.83)
dDowngrade -3.23*** -3.30*** -3.09*** -3.13***
(-8.51) (-8.14) (-7.16) (-4.29)
dCDS 0.28 0.05 -0.18 0.88
(0.76) (0.13) (-0.44) (1.62)
Rating controls X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
CDS-trading controls X X X X
Fixed effects Ind Ind & Year Ind ×Year Ind
Observations 6148 6148 6148 2609
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.134 0.138 0.091
262
Table B.8: Diff-in-diff downgrade CAR regression: 1–to–1 matching
without replacement
This table reports diff-in-diff regression analysis of stock price response CAR(-1,1) to bond down-
grades for the propensity-score matched sample. One non-traded-CDS (control) firm is matched to
one traded-CDS (treated) firm without replacement, with a caliper of 10% and common support.
Panel A reports the main diff-in-diff regression results for the matched sample. Panel B reports
matching diagnostics via a probit regression before and after matching. All the variables are defined
in B.1. Coefficients on other controls have been omitted to conserve space. For Panel A, robust
t-statistics are clustered at the firm-level and are reported in brackets below each estimate. *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
Panel A: 1:1 Matched Sample
Diff-in-diff Subsamples (diagnostics)
Treatment Control Post-CDS Pre-CDS
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
dTreatment×dCDS 3.19*** 3.02**
(2.60) (2.53)
dCDS -0.22 -1.65 2.41** -0.14
(-0.20) (-1.05) (2.18) (-0.11)
dTreatment -1.12 -1.46 2.18** -0.78
(-1.25) (-1.53) (2.34) (-0.93)
Rating controls X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X
CDS-trading controls X X X X X X
Fixed effects Ind Ind & Year Ind Ind Ind Ind
Observations 1368 1368 793 575 855 513









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.9: Primary market bond yields regression
This table reports regression results for the determinants of primary market bond yields. The
sample consists of coporate bonds issued by firms that have CDS contracts trading on their debt.
The dependent variables are corporate bond yield spreads (in bps) observed at issuance. Regression
models (I) and (II) examine the explanatory power of credit rating levels and lagged CDS spreads.
Credit Rating is the rating level, in cardinal scale, issued by the credit rating agency. CDS Spread
is the firm’s 5-year CDS spread (in bps) last observed prior to the bond issuance date. In regression
models (III) and (IV), credit rating and CDS-implied rating are expressed as rating class, i.e. between
1 to 6; see Table B.1 for mapping. CDS-implied rating class is calculated using the nonparametric
method described in Section 2.5.2. We include various issuance-level and firm-level controls in the
regressions. Subordinate is an indicator variable equal to one if the issued bond is a subordinate
debt, and zero otherwise. Callable is an indicator variable equal to one if the issued bond has a
callable option. Issue Size is the log of the notational amount (in $) of the bonds issued. Maturity
is the maturity of the issued bond. Firm-level characteristics are calculated using information in the
quarter prior to bond issuance; see C.2 for details. Treasury Slope is the difference between 10-year
and 1-year Treasury yields. All regressions include industry, year, and rating agency fixed-effects.
Robust t-statistics are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
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Table B.9 (continued)
Dependent variable: Primary market bond yields (bps)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Credit Rating (cardinal scale) 17.18*** 6.18***
(9.84) (4.57)
CDS Spread (bps) 0.58***
(9.91)
Credit Rating class 49.23*** 12.76***
(9.13) (2.97)
CDS-implied Rating class 56.34***
(15.51)
Issuance-level controls
Subordinated 23.66** 23.87*** 21.44** 25.61***
(2.30) (3.10) (2.21) (3.19)
Callable -3.83 -0.42 -1.57 -1.23
(-0.52) (-0.07) (-0.21) (-0.20)
Issue Size (log) 51.16*** 48.86*** 49.99*** 46.89***
(5.40) (4.89) (5.37) (5.27)
Maturity (yrs) 0.87*** 1.09*** 0.90*** 1.17***
(3.70) (5.77) (3.92) (5.62)
Other controls
Sales (log) -19.57*** -21.89*** -19.13*** -21.04***
(-4.24) (-5.30) (-4.06) (-5.41)
Profitability -17.88 -11.96 -21.07 -18.18*
(-1.49) (-1.05) (-1.62) (-1.75)
Long-Term Debt-to-Assets 8.89 -43.01 7.69 -43.84
(0.27) (-1.55) (0.24) (-1.61)
Leverage 0.83 -1.89 0.48 -2.59**
(0.65) (-1.57) (0.36) (-2.16)
Treasury Slope (10yr-1yr) 5.02 1.43 7.17 3.05
(0.68) (0.21) (0.98) (0.46)
Rating-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2208 2208 2208 2208
Adj. R2 0.583 0.715 0.579 0.711
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Table B.10: Distribution of bond rating changes: Bond market reaction sample
We report the distribution of bond rating change events used in the bond market reaction analysis.
The full sample consists of 2,336 downgrades and 1,019 upgrades of taxable corporate bonds issued
by U.S. firms from January 1996 to December 2010. The sample is split between rating changes
that occur in the presence of CDS trading (post-CDS period), and in the absence of CDS trading
(pre-CDS period) on the underlying firm’s debts. Panel A reports year-by-year distribution of rating
changes. Count represents the number of rating changes. Size represents the mean of the cardinal
value of the new rating minus the cardinal value of the old rating. Bond ratings are converted to
a cardinal scale measured on a 23-point scale (see Table B.1 for the mapping). Panel B reports
the number of rating changes and the average sizes of rating changes for the “Full Sample” and the
“Traded-CDS”. The full sample represents the entire sample period consisting of firms that have
and do not have CDS traded on their debts. Traded-CDS sample consists only of firms that have
CDS trading at any point in our sample period, i.e from 1996 to 2010.
Panel A: Distribution of number and size of bond rating changes by year
Downgrades Upgrades
Year Pre-CDS Post-CDS Pre-CDS Post-CDS
Count Size Count Size Count Size Count Size
1996 3 1.00 2 1.00
1997 8 1.25 16 1.31
1998 22 1.50 23 1.35
1999 35 1.43 21 1.14
2000 71 2.15 17 1.82
2001 140 2.31 11 1.18 29 1.97
2002 208 1.96 47 1.26 16 1.19 3 1.00
2003 94 1.93 83 1.22 32 1.41 15 1.07
2004 48 1.56 92 1.33 40 1.40 38 1.16
2005 81 1.65 122 1.64 43 1.67 74 1.26
2006 71 1.38 164 1.80 82 1.48 133 1.11
2007 79 1.59 151 1.74 64 1.69 130 1.22
2008 95 1.48 240 1.66 32 2.69 70 1.69
2009 160 1.87 244 1.70 33 2.18 53 2.51
2010 36 1.44 31 1.23 16 1.25 37 1.59
Total 1151 1.81 1185 1.61 466 1.64 553 1.40
Panel B: Distribution of number and size of bond rating changes by sub-sample
Downgrades Upgrades
Sample Pre-CDS Post-CDS Pre-CDS Post-CDS
Count Size Count Size Count Size Count Size
Full sample 1151 1.81 1185 1.61 466 1.64 553 1.40
Traded-CDS sample 237 1.48 465 1.58 55 1.09 296 1.35
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Table B.11: Bond price response to credit rating downgrades and upgrades
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of bond price to credit rating downgrades
and upgrades.The full sample consists of 2,336 downgrades and 1,019 upgrades of taxable corporate
bonds issued by U.S. firms from January 1996 to December 2010. Table B.10 in the appendix reports
the distribution of bond rating changes used in this analysis. Panel A reports results for the full
sample, while Panel B reports results for the traded-CDS sample. The traded-CDS sample (Panel
B) consists only of firms that have CDS trading at any point in our sample period. In each panel, the
sample is split between rating changes that occur in the presence of CDS trading (Post-CDS period)
and in the absence of CDS trading (Pre-CDS period) on the underlying firm’s debts. Cumulative
abnormal bond return is defined as the firm’s value-weighted bond portfolio’s excess return against
the bond return of a matching portfolio based on Moody’s six major rating categories (Aaa, Aa, A,
Baa, Ba, and B). The event window is the shortest trading window within (-7,+7) calendar days
relative to the rating change event day. T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. *, **, and ***
indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Full sample
Downgrades Upgrades
Mean CAR(%) Count Mean CAR(%) Count
Pre-CDS -3.37*** 1151 0.12 466
(-10.25) (1.11)
Post-CDS -1.44*** 1185 -0.11 553
(-4.44) (-1.10)
Difference (Pre−Post) 1.93*** -0.23
(4.18) (-1.57)
Total -2.39*** 2336 -0.00 1019
(-10.32) (-0.06)
Panel B: Traded-CDS sample
Downgrades Upgrades
Mean CAR(%) Count Mean CAR(%) Count
Pre-CDS -2.61*** 237 0.09 55
(-4.01) (0.26)
Post-CDS -1.61*** 465 -0.25** 296
(-3.46) (-1.74)
Difference (Pre−Post) 1.00 -0.34
(1.35) (-0.93)
Total -1.94*** 702 -0.20 351
(-5.14) (-1.49)
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Table B.12: CDS-implied equity risk premium and portfolio characteristics
This table reports means of portfolio characteristics and one-year average portfolio returns sorted by
CDS-implied equity risk premia (ERP). The sample consists of U.S. firms that have CDS contracts
with maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 years trading on their debts. We calculate daily CDS-implied ERP
with one-year horizon for each reference entity using its CDS term structure. We follow the method
in [62] for calculating ERP, which is motivated by [38] who estimated bond risk premia using the
term structure of forward rates. Section 2.7 describes the procedure for calculating ERP. In Panel A,
we report the mean characteristics of quintile sort portfolios that are formed monthly based on based
on CDS-implied ERP. The means of portfolio characteristics are calculated using equal weights and
the sorting is done at the beginning of each month. Because the start dates of CDS trading differ
across firms, the number of firms available in monthly cross-sections also varies, but mostly increase
from 2001 through 2010. We require a minimum of 20 firms in the cross section to execute the
portfolio sorts. Size is the log of firm’s market capitalization. Mkt-to-Book is the ratio of a firm’s
market value of total assets to its book value of total assets. Credit rating is the average firm’s
credit ratings, in cardinal scale, given by the three agencies: Moody’s, Fitch, and S&P. CDS spread
is the 5-year CDS spread level of the firm. In Panel B, we report average one-year equity returns
of portfolios sorted monthly based on ERP, credit ratings, and CDS spreads. The fifth (highest)
quintile portfolio corresponds to firms with the highest ERP, lowest-rated firms, and largest CDS
spreads. Newey-West t-statistics adjusted for 11 lags are reported in brackets below the average
portfolio returns in Panels B–C. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Panel A: Portfolio characteristics sorted by CDS-implied ERP
Average values
ERP Size Mkt-to-Book Credit rating CDS spread
1 (lowest ERP) -0.005 15.753 2.486 9.105 0.015
2 0.005 21.289 2.931 7.913 0.006
3 0.009 22.842 2.806 8.151 0.007
4 0.016 18.925 2.635 8.739 0.011
5 (highest ERP) 0.034 12.095 2.392 10.016 0.025
Panel B: Average one-year returns of single-sorted portfolios
Average one-year return
Sorted by ERP Sorted by Credit ratings Sorted by CDS spreads
1 (lowest) -0.141*** -0.044*** -0.011*
(-10.81) (-3.80) (-1.44)
2 -0.042*** -0.018* -0.015**
(-4.76) (-1.53) (-1.89)
3 -0.012* -0.023** -0.018**
(-1.55) (-1.97) (-1.90)
4 0.020** -0.018* -0.032***
(2.31) (-1.44) (-2.75)
5 (highest) 0.086*** 0.012 -0.020
(7.10) (0.69) (-1.12)




MISCELLANEOUS SECTION FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1 Variable Definitions
• Total assets = atq
• Average assets = ((Total assets) + (lagged Total assets))/2
• Market value = prccq*cshoq - ( Total assets-ltq + txditcq) + total assets
• Market-to-book ratio = (Market value)/(Total assets)
• Total debt = dltcq + dlttq
• Leverage ratio = (Total debt)/(Total assets)
• Macro q = (prccq*cshoq+dlttq+dlcq-invtq)/lagged ppentq
• Net worth = atq - ltq
• Tangible net worth = actq + ppentq + aoq - ltq
• Current ratio = actq/lctq
• Cash scaled by assets = cheq/(Total assets)
• Operating income scaled by average assets = oibdpq/(Average assets)
• Interest expense scaled by average assets = xintq/(Average assets)
• Capital expenditures quarterly = capxy adjusted for fiscal quarter accumulation
• Cash acquisitions quarterly = aqcy adjusted for fiscal quarter accumulation
• Capital expenditures scaled by average assets = Capital expenditures quarterly/(Average
assets)
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• Investment = Capital expenditures quarterly/(Lagged ppentq)
• Net debt issuance = (Total debt-Total lagged debt)/(Lagged total assets)
• Sales = saleq
• Operating costs = Sales-(Operating income)
• Sales scaled by average assets = Sales/(Average assets)
• Operating costs scaled by average assets = Sales/(Average assets)
• Beta = Borrower’s market model beta calculated using daily stock returns for a given
firm over the estimation period of one year ranging from one month prior to the loan
announcement day and extending back one year.
• Runup = Cumulative return of the borrower’s stock during the estimation period of
one year ranging from one month prior to the loan announcement day and extending
back to one year.
• Idiosyncratic risk = Standard deviation of the prediction errors (i.e., borrower’s stock
return residual) during the estimation period of one year ranging from one month prior
to the loan announcement day and extending back to one year.
• Loan Size = The total deal amount in a given package.
• Relative Loan Size = The total deal amount divided by total assets of the firm at the
point when the loan is made.
• Maturity = The maturity of a package or deal, measured in months.
• Loan Spread = The all-in-drawn spread over LIBOR in basis points for a given loan.
• Number of lenders = The number of lenders at loan syndication.
• Lending Relationship = The number of loans to borrower i by bank m scaled by the
total number of loans to the borrower made until then.
271
• Loan Types = Loans are classified as (a) Revolvers: if the LoanType field in Dealscan
consists of Revolver, 364-Day, Demand Loan, or Limited Line; (b) Term loan A: if
the LoanType field in Dealscan consists of Term Loan A; (c) Term Loan B: if the
LoanType field in Dealscan consists of Term Loan, Term Loan B to Term Loan E.
• CR Distance = 1CurrentRatioit×(CurrentRatioit−CurrentRatio0it) where 1CurrentRatioit
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-quarter observations are bound by a
current ratio covenant. CurrentRatio0it is the current ratio covenant threshold and
CurrentRatioit is the current ratio in quarter t for firm i.
• NW Distance = 1NetWorthit × (NetWorthit − NetWorth0it) where 1NetWorthit is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm-quarter observations are bound by a net
worth covenant. NetWorth0it is the net worth covenant threshold and NetWorthit is
the net worth in quarter t for firm i.
• Analyst Coverage = The number of analyst EPS forecasts made in the 90 days prior to
the earnings announcement date. It is calculated using I/B/E/S unadjusted estimates
and actual files. We adjust for any stock splits using adjustment factors obtained from
the CRSP dataset (cfacshr) to ensure that EPS values in the Estimates and Actuals
are on the same basis.
• Analyst Dispersion = The standard deviation of analyst EPS estimates made in the
90 days prior to the earnings announcement date scaled by the actual reported EPS.
It is calculated using I/B/E/S Unadjusted Estimates and Actual files.
• Institutional Ownership = The ratio of total shares held by institutional investors to
the total shares outstanding for a given stock. Institutional holding data are obtained
from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database.
• Stock Illiquidity = The monthly average stock illiquidity defined as the squared root
of the Amihud measure. It is the monthly average of the following daily values:
√
1000000 ∗ |Rett|/ (Volume× Pricet),
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where Rett and Pricet are daily return and price of the stock.
• Forex Derivative Hedging = The average amount of foreign exchange derivatives used
for hedging purposes (i.e., non-trading purposes) relative to total assets of the lead
syndicate banks and bond underwriters that the firm has done business with in the
past five years. Banks’ derivatives usage data is obtained from Bank Holding Com-
pany (BHC) Y9-C filings. Data on the firm’s lead bank syndicate are obtained from
LPC Dealscan, and the firm’s underwriter information is obtained from Mergent
FISD.
• Non-Interest Income = Item number BHCK4079 from the FR Y-9C reports expressed
as a percentage of total income (BHCK4074 + BHCK4107)
• Loans Securitized = Sum of residential loans sold and securitized (BHCKB705), other
consumer loans sold and securitized (BHCKB709), commercial loans and industrial
loans (C&I loans) sold and securitized expressed as a percentage of total loans and
leases (BHCK2122). Data for these items is available from 2001 Q2 onwards.
• CD Bought = the total credit derivatives on which the reporting bank is the benefi-
ciary, which is reported as item number BHCKA535 from 1997 Q1 to 2005 Q4, and
the sum of item numbers BHCKC969, BHCKC971, BHCKC973, BHCKC975 from
2006 Q1 onwards expressed as a percentage of total assets (BHCK2170).
• CD Sold = the total credit derivatives on which the reporting bank is the guarantor,
which is reported as item number BHCKA534 from 1997 Q1 to 2005 Q4, and the
sum of item numbers BHCKC968, BHCKC970, BHCKC972, BHCKC974 from 2006
Q1 onwards expressed as a percentage of total assets (BHCK2170).
C.2 Additional Tables & Figures
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Figure C.1: Investment vs distance to violation: Polynomial Fit
This figure plots investment vs distance to covenant violation. Distance to covenant violation
is defined as the negative of the relative covenant distance for every firm-quarter observation
(−Ratio−CovenantThresholdRatioCovenantThresholdRatio ). In case both, net worth and current ratio covenants are present,
the tighter of the two is chosen to compute the distance to covenant violation. The plot displays the
mean investment for bins defined along the distance to covenant violation. The solid lines represent
the fitted values of a third-degree polynomial in distance to covenant violation.
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Table C.1: 2SLS IV regressions: Distress and outperformance
This table conducts a 2SLS IV regression using a linear probability model for firms after a covenant
violation in the presence and absence of traded CDS on its underlying debt. Firm exits in our sample
are classified based on the CRSP delisting codes and Moody’s URD database. Financial failure from
the CRSP codes is defined as liquidation (400 – 490), bankruptcy (574). Failure in URD is defined
as missed/delayed interest/principal payments, bankruptcy, or distressed exchange. Other forms of
firm exit include mergers (200 – 290) or going private (573). Distress and outperformance is defined
based on [66] and [67] as the firms in the bottom and top 5% of the entire universe of firms in the
CRSP based on the past three-year of cumulative return. The instrument for CDS trading is the
average amount of forex derivatives used for hedging purposes relative to total assets of the lead
syndicate banks and bond underwriters with which the firms have conducted business in the past
five years.
The data is constructed at firm-quarter level. The main independent variable of interest is CDS IV,
which is obtained from the first stage where d CDS is instrumented. d CDS is an indicator variable
equal to one if a CDS is traded on the underlying firm’s debt for that firm-quarter observation,
and zero otherwise. t-statistics displayed in parentheses are robust to within-firm correlation and
heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
All Distress Non-distress Equity Equity
Exits Related Related Distress Outperformance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CDS IV -0.05* -0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.10**
(-1.81) (-0.86) (-1.58) (1.45) (-2.16)
d Rated -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.04 0.01
(-0.00) (0.27) (-0.17) (-1.41) (0.18)
Assets(log) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01
(0.71) (0.34) (0.63) (-1.45) (1.16)
Profitability -0.15** -0.14*** -0.00 -0.30*** 0.06
(-2.36) (-2.65) (-0.12) (-4.52) (0.76)
Book Leverage -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.17* -0.02
(-0.72) (0.43) (-1.60) (1.65) (-0.26)
Interest Expense/Assets 0.95** 0.55 0.40 -0.10 -0.37
(2.08) (1.42) (1.24) (-0.11) (-0.50)
Market-to-Book -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.10***
(-0.21) (0.63) (-0.82) (-3.74) (5.23)
Initial Covenant Tightness -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(-0.22) (1.55) (-1.26) (0.57) (-1.10)
N 14506 14506 14506 14358 14358
Adj. R2 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.16
Industry FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
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Table C.2: Propensity of CDS trading: First-stage IV regression
This table conducts the first stage of the IV regression (reported in Table C.1) using a probit
model. The instrument for CDS trading is the average amount of forex derivatives used for hedging
purposes relative to total assets of the lead syndicate banks and bond underwriters with which the
firms have conducted business in the past five years. The independent variable is d CDS, which
is an indicator variable equal to one if a CDS is traded on the underlying firm’s debt for that
firm-quarter observation, and zero otherwise. t-statistics displayed in parentheses are robust to
within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%,




Forex Derivative Hedging (%, log) 0.16***
(2.64)
Firm-level controls










Monthly Volatility (log) -0.26*** -0.26***
(-5.37) (-5.44)
Monthly Trading Volume (log) 0.20*** 0.21***
(4.47) (4.49)
Monthly Return -0.02 -0.02
(-0.29) (-0.24)
CDS-trading controls
Analyst Coverage (log) 0.03 0.03
(0.79) (0.81)
Institutional Ownership 0.07 0.07*
(1.61) (1.65)
Stock Illiquidity 0.17 0.17
(1.22) (1.24)
Analyst Dispersion 0.00 0.00
(0.26) (0.26)
N 74330 74330
Pseudo R2 0.5810 0.5820
Industry FE X X
Year FE X X
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Table C.3: Firm quality at loan issuance
This table regresses various measures of firm quality on d CDS at loan issuance dates. d CDS is
an indicator variable equal to one if the loan announcement occurs when CDS is traded on the
underlying firm’s debt, and zero otherwise. Controls include firm-level characteristics, such as
whether the firm has a rating, which may indicate different access to credit markets, firm size,
leverage, market-to-book, profitability, and current ratio, and CDS-trading controls that may affect
the probability of CDS trading such as analyst coverage, institutional ownership, stock illiquidity,
and analyst dispersion. The control variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. t-statistics
displayed in parantheses are robust to within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and ***
indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Risk measures regressed on 1-quarter lagged variables
Altman Intangible Interest Cash-Flow
Z-score Assets Coverage Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d CDS 0.178*** 0.001 0.020 0.001
(3.35) (0.14) (1.41) (0.46)
d HasRating 0.007 -0.011 0.009 -0.002
(0.14) (-1.18) (0.67) (-0.84)
Assets (log) 0.122*** 0.076*** 0.010 -0.011***
(3.17) (9.10) (1.17) (-5.42)
Book Leverage -5.536*** 0.026 0.416*** 0.019**
(-29.66) (1.03) (10.71) (2.56)
Market-To-Book 1.563*** -0.030*** -0.022*** 0.010***
(34.39) (-5.20) (-3.64) (6.88)
Profitability 1.516*** 0.026 -0.141** -0.045***
(7.40) (1.24) (-2.23) (-4.47)
Current Ratio 0.657*** -0.027*** -0.006 0.001
(17.50) (-7.77) (-1.11) (0.90)
Analyst Coverage (log) 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.60) (-0.42) (-0.47) (0.45)
Institutional Ownership 0.001 -0.001 -0.013* -0.005***
(0.04) (-0.49) (-1.72) (-3.28)
Stock Illiquidity -0.054 0.001 0.006 0.001
(-0.63) (0.03) (0.17) (0.24)
Analyst Dispersion -0.008 -0.001 0.007* -0.000
(-0.97) (-1.58) (1.94) (-0.01)
N 17060 8302 17544 17648
Adj. R2 0.905 0.889 0.287 0.685
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
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Table C.4: Loan Announcement CAR Regressions: Within-Lender Analysis
The table report regression results of stock price reactions to firm loan announcements. The de-
pendent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) calculated over the 3-day event window
(-2,+2), where day 0 represents the loan announcement event day. CAR is calculated using the
market model. Our main variable of interest is d CDS, which is an indicator variable equal to
one if the loan announcement occurs when CDS is traded on the underlying firm’s debt, and zero
otherwise. d TradedCDS is an idicator variable equal to one if the firm in our sample has CDS
traded on the debt at any point during our sample period, and zero otherwise. We control for
Loan-level characteristics, Pre-announcement characteristics, Firm-level characteristics, and CDS-
Trading characteristics which are defined in detail in the appendix section. The observations in this
sample are at lender-package level. t-statistics displayed in parentheses are robust to within-firm
correlation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance greater than 10%, 5%, and
1% , respectively.
Lender FE Lender FE & Firm FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d CDS -0.35*** -0.41*** -0.34* -0.39**
(-2.78) (-2.99) (-1.92) (-2.14)
d TradedCDS 0.23** 0.19
(1.97) (1.55)
N 26755 21108 26755 21108
Adj. R2 0.048 0.046 0.199 0.208
Deal Purpose FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Firm FE 7 7 X X
Lender FE X X X X
Loan Controls X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X
Pre-announcement Controls X X X X
CDS-trading Controls 7 X 7 X
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APPENDIX D
MISCELLANEOUS SECTION FOR CHAPTER 4
D.1 Variable Definitions
D.1.1 Risk Measures
• ES = the negative of the average of the firms daily returns on 5% worst return
days during the calendar year for the firm expressed in percentage terms
• MES = the negative of the average firms daily return on 5% worst return days of
the market (S&P 500 instead of for the firm) during the calendar year expressed
in percentage terms
• ESidio = the residual plus constant upon regressing ES on MES separately for
each firm-type expressed in percentage terms
• Volatility = the standard deviation of daily firm equity return over the calendar
year expressed in percentage terms
• Beta = the estimate of the coefficient upon regressing the firms daily return on
markets daily return (S&P 500) expressed in percentage terms
D.1.2 Firm-level Variables
• Total debt = long-term debt + short-term debt
• Market value of assets = (stock price × shares outstanding) at bond issuance
+ Book value of debt
• Term spread = yield spread between the 10- and 1-year treasury bonds
• Profitability = operating income after depreciation ÷ sales
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• Long-term debt to total assets (book leverage) = long-term debt ÷ book value
of total assets
• Leverage (market leverage) = market value of assets ÷ market value of equity
• Market-to-Book = market value of equity ÷ by the book value of equity
• Asset growth = log( assetsi,t
assetsi,t−1





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D.2 : A Simple Model.
Following is a simple model that derives bond yields as a function of expected shortfall
(ES ). This serves as a motivation for our baseline regression specification in Equa-
tion 4.4.1.
Let equity - e be given for a firm (Adrian and Shin, 2011)
Let d be the amount of debt to be raised
Let v be the face-value of debt to be repaid by the firm
Let c be the cost of raising too much debt/bankruptcy/financial distress costs
Let r̃ be the random return per dollar invested by the firm with mean µ and
variance σ2
Let rf be the risk-free rate (opportunity cost of the investor)
Using the above notation, the wealth of the firm can be written as the following.
Wfirm = (e+ d)r̃ − v − cd2
The firm’s problem is to maximize it’s wealth over all cases when wealth is greater
than zero as the firm is protected by limited liability.





E[min{v, [r̃(e+ d)− cd2]} ≥ rfd


















[1− F (v + cd2e+ d
)]












Differentiating w.r.t v we get:





] = 0 =⇒ λ = 1













































− rf = 0




≈ 0 =⇒ d ≈ [1− F (0)]µ− rf
2c[1− F (0)]




















Briefly, the comparative statics are:
• If the cost of raising debt c is high then, less debt is raised
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• If the expected return from the investment is high, then more debt is raised
• If the volatility of the investment is high, then less debt is raised
• If the sharpe ratio of the investment is high, then more debt is raised



















































E(W |W < 0) = rfd




















wfirm,0E(r̃firm|W < 0) = rfd




















































− log (d) + log(wfirm,0)
or using the log expansion one can write the following:
y − rf = α + β.es+ controls
Further Defining:
Tail-risk of the market is defined as : esmkt,t = −E [rmkt,t|rmkt,t < −V ARmkt,α]
Tail-risk of the firm is: esi,t = −E [ri,t|ri,t < −V ARi,α]
Market’s return can be written as: rmkt,t = ωirit
Therefore tail-risk of the market can be written as:
esmkt,t = −E [ωiri,t|rmkt,t < −V ARmkt,α]
Taking partial derivatives we can define mes as the following:
∂esmkt,t
∂ωi
= mesi,t = −E [ri,t|rmkt,t < −V ARmkt,α]
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